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# THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG.

VOL. I

LONDON  
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NAWAB SALAR JUNG BAHADUR.







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## EPICTETUS.

**V**ERY little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a native of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and a branch of the Maeander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in the epistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv. 13); from which it has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis in the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is unknown. The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a slave in Rome, and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the emperor Nero. There is a story that the master broke his slave's leg by torturing him; but it is better to trust to the evidence of Simplicius, the commentator on the *Encheiridion* or *Manual*, who says that Epictetus was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not said how he became a slave; but it has been asserted in modern times that the parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any authority for this statement.

It may be supposed that the young slave showed intelligence, for his master sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius Rufus, an eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange that such a master should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher ; but Garnier, the author of a *Mémoire sur les ouvrages d'Epictète*, explains this matter very well in a communication to Schweighaeuser. Garnier says : " Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor parents, was indebted apparently for the advantages of a good education to the whim, which was common at the end of the Republic and under the first emperors, among the great of Rome, to reckon among their numerous slaves Grammarians, Poets, Rhetoricians, and Philosophers, in the same way as rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a great cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only one which can explain to us, how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus, had received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of Epaphroditus, one of the officers of the Imperial guard. For we cannot suspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine and for his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the debaucheries of Nero would have desired to possess such a slave."

Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master ; but I can find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus ac-

accompanied Nero when he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable tyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton. Domit. 14) afterwards put Epaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude that Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to teach at Rome ; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by Domitian, A.D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by Augustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a school or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old man. The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as we learn from Lucian (Damonax, c. 55, tom. ii., ed. Hemsterh., p. 393).<sup>1</sup> When Epictetus was finding fault with Damonax and advising him to take a wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, was a philosopher's duty, to leave in place of himself another in the Universe, Damonax refuted the doctrine by answering, Give me then, Epictetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Comment. c. 46, p. 432, ed. Schweighaeuser) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last he took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of Epictetus' friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, but Epictetus took the child and brought it up.

Epictetus wrote nothing ; and all that we

<sup>1</sup> Lucian's *Life of the Philosopher Damonax*.



have under his name was written by an affectionate pupil, Arrian, afterwards the historian of Alexander the Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing the philosopher's discourses (the Epistle of Arrian to Lucius Gellius, p. 1). These discourses formed eight books, but only four are extant under the title of ἘΠΙΚΤΗΤΟΥ διατριβαί. Simplicius, in his commentary on the Ἐγχειρίδιον or Manual, states that this work also was put together by Arrian, who selected from the discourses of Epictetus what he considered to be most useful, and most necessary, and most adapted to move men's minds. Simplicius also says that the contents of the Encheiridion are found nearly altogether and in the same words in various parts of the Discourses. Arrian also wrote a work on the life and death of Epictetus. The events of the philosopher's studious life were probably not many nor remarkable; but we should have been glad if this work had been preserved, which told, as Simplicius says, what kind of man Epictetus was.

Photius (Biblioth. 58) mentions among Arrian's works, Conversations with Epictetus, Ὀμιλίαι Ἐπικτήτου, in twelve books. Upton thinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that Photius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a different work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight books of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations. Schweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works

of Arrian on Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these works by Photius. The fact is, that Photius does not say that he had read these books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books which he enumerates in his *Bibliotheca*. The conclusion is that we are not certain that there was a work of Arrian entitled the *Conversations of Epictetus*.

The *Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion and Fragments* were translated into English by the learned lady, Mrs. Elizabeth Carter, who is said to have lived to the age of eighty-nine. The fourth edition (1807) contains the translator's last additions and alterations. There is an Introduction to this translation which contains a summary view of the Stoic philosophy for the purpose of explaining Epictetus ; and also there are notes to the translation. The editor of this fourth edition says that "the Introduction and notes of the Christian translator of Epictetus are, in the estimation of most readers, not the least valuable parts of the work" ; and he adds, "this was also the opinion of the late Archbishop Secker, who, though he thought very highly of the philosophy of Epictetus, considered the Introduction and notes as admirably calculated to prevent any mistake concerning it, as well as to amend and instruct the world." The Introduction is certainly useful, though it is not free from errors. I do not think that the notes are valuable. I have used some of them without any remarks ; and I

have used others and made some remarks on them where I thought that Mrs. Carter was mistaken in her opinion of the original text, or on other matters.

The translation of Mrs. Carter is good ; and perhaps no Englishman at that time would have made a better translation. I intended at first to revise Mrs. Carter's translation, and to correct any errors that I might discover. I had revised about half of it, when I found that I was not satisfied with my work ; and I was advised by a learned friend to translate the whole myself. This was rather a great undertaking for an old man, past seventy-six. I have however done the work with great care, and as well as I could. I have always compared my translation with the Latin version and with Mrs. Carter's ; and I think that this is the best way of avoiding errors such as any translator may make. A man who has not attempted to translate a Greek or Latin author does not know the difficulty of the undertaking. That which may appear plain when he reads, often becomes very difficult when he tries to express it in another language. It is true that Epictetus is generally intelligible ; but the style or manner of the author, or we may say of Arrian, who attempted to produce what he heard, is sometimes made obscure by the continual use of questions and answers to them, and for other reasons.

Upton remarks in a note on ii. 23, that "there are many passages in these dissertations which

are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes." The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker (Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii. 336 of his edition) that the connexion of the discourse is sometimes obscure through the omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connexion of the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot always understand Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passages more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he will miss the meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble. Every man must judge for himself. But I should not have translated the book if I had not thought it worth study; and I think that all books of this kind require careful reading, if they are worth reading at all.

The text of Epictetus is sometimes corrupted, and this corruption causes a few difficulties. However, these difficulties are not numerous enough to cause or to admit much variety or diversity in the translation of the text. This remark will explain why many parts of my translation are the same or nearly the same as Mrs. Carter's. When this happened, I did not think it necessary to alter my translation in order that it might not be the same as hers. I made my

translation first, and then compared it with Mrs. Carter's and the Latin version. I hope that I have not made many blunders. I do not suppose that I have made none.

The last and best edition of the Discourses, the Encheiridion, and the Fragments is by J. Schweighaeuser in 6 vols. 8vo. This edition contains the commentary of Simplicius on the Encheiridion, and two volumes of useful notes on the Discourses. These notes are selected from those of Wolf, Upton, and a few from other commentators ; but a large part are by Schweighaeuser himself, who was an excellent scholar and a very sensible man. I have read all these notes, and I have used them. Many of the notes to the translation are my own.

1877.





ARRIAN'S  
DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.

ARRIAN *to* LUCIUS GELLIUS, *with wishes for*  
*his happiness.*

**I** NEITHER wrote these Discourses <sup>1</sup> of Epictetus in the way in which a man might write such things ; nor did I make them public myself, inasmuch as I declare that I did not even write them. But whatever I heard him say, the same I attempted to write down in his own words as nearly as possible, for the purpose of preserving them as memorials to myself afterwards of the thoughts and the freedom of speech of Epictetus. Accordingly, the Discourses are naturally such as a man would address without preparation to another, not such as a man would write with the view of others reading them. Now, being such, I do not know how they fell into the hands of the public, without either my consent or my knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> See note 1 at end.

But it concerns me little if I shall be considered incompetent to write ; and it concerns Epictetus not at all if any man shall despise his words ; for at the time when he uttered them, it was plain that he had no other purpose than to move the minds of his hearers to the best things. If, indeed, these Discourses should produce this effect, they will have, I think, the result which the words of philosophers ought to have. But if they shall not, let those who read them know that, when Epictetus delivered them, the hearer could not avoid being affected in the way that Epictetus wished him to be. But if the Discourses themselves, as they are written, do not effect this result, it may be that the fault is mine, or, it may be, that the thing is unavoidable.

Farewell !





## BOOK I.

### CHAPTER I.

OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER,  
AND NOT IN OUR POWER.

OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving.<sup>1</sup> How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as

<sup>1</sup> "This moral approving and disapproving faculty" is Bp. Butler's translation of the *δοκιμαστική* and *ἀποδοκιμαστική* of Epictetus in his dissertation, *Of the Nature of Virtue*. See his note.



to musical sounds ; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty ;<sup>2</sup> for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties : for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances.<sup>3</sup> What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else.

As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances ; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed think

<sup>2</sup> The rational faculty is the λογική ψυχὴ of Epictetus and Antoninus, of which Antoninus says (xi. 1): "These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyzes itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears, itself enjoys."

<sup>3</sup> This is what he has just named the rational faculty. The Stoics gave the name of appearances (φαντασίαι) to all impressions received by the senses, and to all emotions caused by external things. Chrysippus said: φαντασία ἐστὶ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδείκνυμενον ἑαυτὸ τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός (Plutarch, iv. c. 12, De Placit. Philosoph.).

that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not.<sup>4</sup> For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals?

But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this : this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us,<sup>5</sup> this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things ; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments ; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person.

Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to

<sup>4</sup> See note 2 at end.

<sup>5</sup> See note 3 at end.

many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus.<sup>6</sup> What then? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please.

Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus<sup>7</sup> did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> He alludes to the *Odyssey*, x. 21:

*κείνον γὰρ ταμίην ἀνέμων ποίησε Κρονίων.*

<sup>7</sup> Plautius Lateranus, consul-elect, was charged with being engaged in Piso's conspiracy against Nero. He was hurried to execution without being allowed to see his children; and though the tribune who executed him was privy to the plot, Lateranus said nothing. (*Tacit. Ann. xv. 49, 60.*)

<sup>8</sup> Epaphroditus was a freedman of Nero, and once the master of Epictetus. He was Nero's secretary. One good act is recorded of him: he helped Nero to kill himself, and for this act he was killed by Domitian (*Suetonius, Domitian, c. 14*).

Nero's freedman, who asked him about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, "If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master."

What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains.<sup>9</sup> Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will<sup>10</sup> not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves.

Thrasea<sup>11</sup> used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow. What then

<sup>9</sup> This is an imitation of a passage in the *Bacchæ* of Euripides (v. 492, etc.), which is also imitated by Horace (*Epp.* i. 16).

<sup>10</sup> ἡ προαίρεσις. It is sometimes rendered by the Latin *propositum* or by *voluntas*, the will.

<sup>11</sup> Thrasea Paetus, a Stoic philosopher, who was ordered in Nero's time to put himself to death (*Tacit. Ann.* xvi. 21-35). He was the husband of Arria, whose mother Arria, the wife of Caecina Paetus, in the time of the Emperor Claudius, heroically

did Rufus<sup>12</sup> say to him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you?

What then did Agrippinus<sup>13</sup> say? He said, "I am not a hindrance to myself." When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, "I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day"—this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath—"let us go and take our exercise." After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then,<sup>14</sup> he said, and dine.

showed her husband the way to die (Plinius, Letters, iii. 16). Martial has immortalized the elder Arria in a famous epigram (i. 14):—

"When Arria to her Pactus gave the sword,  
Which her own hand from her chaste bosom drew,  
'This wound,' she said, 'believe me, gives no pain,  
But that will pain me which thy hand will do.'"

<sup>12</sup> C. Musonius Rufus, a Tuscan by birth, of equestrian rank, a philosopher and Stoic (Tacit. Hist. iii. 81).

<sup>13</sup> Paconius Agrippinus was condemned in Nero's time. The charge against him was that he inherited his father's hatred of the head of the Roman state (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 28). The father of Agrippinus had been put to death under Tiberius (Suetonius, Tib. c. 61).

<sup>14</sup> Aricia, about twenty Roman miles from Rome, on the Via Appia (Horace, Sat. i. 5, 1):—

"Egressum magna me exceptit Aricia Roma."

This it is to have studied what a man ought to study ; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour ; after this I will then die. How ? Like a man who gives up<sup>16</sup> what belongs to another.

## CHAPTER II.

HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER CHARACTER.

TO the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable ; but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that ? See how the Lacedaemonians<sup>1</sup> endure whipping when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational ; and, on the

<sup>16</sup> Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, c. 11 : "Never say about anything, 'I have lost it,' but say, 'I have restored it.'"

<sup>1</sup> The Spartan boys used to be whipped at the altar of Artemis Orthia till blood flowed abundantly, and sometimes till death ; but they never uttered even a groan (*Cicero*, *Tuscul.* ii. 14 v. 27).

contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational.

But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception<sup>2</sup> of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the estimates of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food : but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged ; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. "But this," you say, "would not be worthy of me." Well then, it is you who

<sup>2</sup> See note 4 at end.

must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I ; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself : for men sell themselves at various prices

For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go down to Nero's<sup>3</sup> spectacles, and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus said to him, Go down : and when Florus asked Agrippinus, Why do not you go down ? Agrippinus replied, Because I do not even deliberate about the matter. For he who has once brought himself to deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is preferable or life ? I say life. Pain or pleasure ? I say pleasure. But if I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off. Go then and take a part, but I will not. Why ? Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no design to be anything superior to the other threads. But I wish to be purple,<sup>4</sup> that small part which is

<sup>3</sup> Nero was passionately fond of scenic representations, and used to induce the descendants of noble families, whose poverty made them consent, to appear on the stage (Tacitus, *Annals*, xiv. 14 ; Suetonius, Nero, c. 21).

<sup>4</sup> The "purple" is the broad purple border on the toga named the *toga praetexta*, worn by certain Roman magistrates and



bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make myself like the many? and if I do, how shall I still be purple?

Priscus Helvidius<sup>5</sup> also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, "It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in." Well, go in then, says the emperor, but say nothing. Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I must ask your opinion. And I must say what I think right. But if you do, I shall put you to death. When then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow.

What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single person? And what good does the purple do for the toga? Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as purple, and is

some others, and by senators, it is said, on certain days (Cic. Phil. ii. 43).

<sup>5</sup> Helvidius Priscus, a Roman senator and a philosopher, is commended by Tacitus (Hist. iv. 4, 5) as an honest man: "He followed the philosophers who considered those things only to be good which are virtuous, those only to be bad which are foul; and he reckoned power, rank, and all other things which are external to the mind as neither good nor bad." Vespasian, probably in a fit of passion, being provoked by Helvidius, ordered him to be put to death, and then revoked the order when it was too late (Suetonius, Vespasianus, c. 15).

displayed also as a fine example to all other things? But in such circumstances another would have replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, I thank you for sparing me. But such a man Vespasian would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he knew that he would either sit there like an earthen vessel, or, if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished, and add even more.

In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate this member and return to the gymnasium? But the athlete persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked Epictetus, How he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher? As a man, Epictetus replied, and a man who had been proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton's school.<sup>6</sup> Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is that regard to character which is so strong in those who have been accustomed to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things into their deliberations.

<sup>6</sup> Baton was elected for two years gymnasiarch or superintendent of a gymnasium in or about the time of M. Aurelius Antoninus.

Come then, Epictetus, shave<sup>7</sup> yourself. If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. But I will take off your head? If that will do you any good, take it off.

Some person asked, how then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character? How, he replied, does the bull alone when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defence of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is immediately conjoined: and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us.

Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates;

<sup>7</sup> This is supposed, as Casaubon says, to refer to Domitian's order to the philosophers to go into exile; and some of them, in order to conceal their profession of philosophy, shaved their beards. Epictetus would not take off his beard.

but if he is not inferior,<sup>8</sup> this is enough for me ; for I shall never be a Milo,<sup>9</sup> and yet I do not neglect my body ; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property ; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.

### CHAPTER III.

HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD BEING THE FATHER OF ALL MEN TO THE REST.

**I**F a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from God<sup>1</sup> in an especial manner, and that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance ; and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated ? Yet we do not so ; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods, many incline

<sup>8</sup> See note 5 at end.

<sup>9</sup> Milo of Croton, a great athlete. The conclusion is the same as in Horace, *Epp.* i. 1, 28, etc.: "*Est quodam prole tenus, si non datur ultra.*"

<sup>1</sup> See note 6 at end.

to this kinship, which is miserable and mortal and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then it is of necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinion which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no mean or ignoble thoughts about themselves ; but with the many it is quite the contrary. For they say, What am I ? A poor, miserable man, with my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed ; but you possess something better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that which is better, and why do you attach yourself to this ?

Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous : some become like lions, savage and bestial and untamed ; but the greater part of us become foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and a malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal ? See<sup>2</sup> then and take care that you do not become some one of these miserable things.

<sup>2</sup> See note 7 at end.

## CHAPTER IV.

## OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT.

**H**E who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things ; having learned too that happiness <sup>1</sup> and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid ; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it, <sup>2</sup> but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point.

How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it ? What is the product

<sup>1</sup> τὸ εὐποῦν or ἡ εὐτυχία is translated "happiness." The notion is that of "flowing easily," as Seneca (Epp. 120) explains it : "beata vita, secundo defluens cursu."

<sup>2</sup> See note 8 at end.

of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus?<sup>3</sup> But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things,<sup>4</sup> and the most necessary, are those which I have named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not

<sup>3</sup> Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books or treatises, or whatever the word *συγγράμματα* means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in B.C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes.

<sup>4</sup> Compare iii. c. 2. The word is *τότα*.

to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving.

Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres<sup>5</sup> look to that. I should reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take the treatise on the active powers (*ὁρμή*), and see how I have studied it. I reply, Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making progress: but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your books, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another.

Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will (*προαίρεσις*) to exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has learned that he

<sup>5</sup> See note q at end.



who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid ; finally, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man ; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles (*τὰ προηγούμενα*) as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice—this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there ; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito,<sup>6</sup> if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so ; and not to say, Wretched am I,

<sup>6</sup> This is said in the *Criton* of Plato, 1 ; but not in exactly the same way

an old man ; have I kept my grey hairs for this ? Who is it that speaks thus ? Do you think that I shall name some man of no repute and of low condition ? Does not Priam say this ? Does not Oedipus say this ? Nay, all kings say it !<sup>7</sup> For what else is tragedy than the perturbations (*πάθη*) of men who value externals exhibited in this kind of poetry ? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external things which are independent of the will concern us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish.

What then does Chrysippus teach us ? The reply is, to know that these things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune ! O the great benefactor who points out the way ! To Triptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because he gave us food by cultivation ; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this ? Because the gods have given the vine, or

<sup>7</sup> So kings and such personages speak in the Greek tragedies. Compare what M. Antoninus (xi. 6) says of Tragedy

wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?

## CHAPTER V.

### AGAINST THE ACADEMICS.<sup>1</sup>

**I**F a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man's strength or the teacher's weakness; for when the man, though he has been confuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argument?

Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul's mortification. And indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think

<sup>1</sup> See Lecture V., *The New Academy*, Levin's *Lectures Introductory to the Philosophical Writings of Cicero*, Cambridge, 1871.

that he is in a bad condition : but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this we call even power (or strength).

Do you comprehend that you are awake? I do not, the man replies, for I do not even comprehend when in my sleep I imagine that I am awake. Does this appearance then not differ from the other? Not at all, he replies. Shall I still argue with this man?<sup>2</sup> And what fire or what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is deadened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. He is even worse than a dead man. He does not see the contradiction : he is in a bad condition. Another does see it, but he is not moved, and makes no improvement : he is even in a worse condition. His modesty is extirpated, and his sense of shame ; and the rational faculty has not been cut off from him, but it is brutalized. Shall I name this strength of mind? Certainly not, unless we also name it such in catamites, through which they do and say in public whatever comes into their head.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Cicero, *Academ. Prior.* ii. 6.

## CHAPTER VI.

## OF PROVIDENCE.

FROM everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen ; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in that case, also, would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife? Is it no one?<sup>1</sup> And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed

<sup>1</sup> See note 10 at end.

without a purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman? If they do not, let us consider<sup>2</sup> the constitution of our understanding according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we do not simply receive impressions from them, but we also select<sup>3</sup> something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion?

What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal had peculiarly need; but you will find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is

<sup>2</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note. I have given the sense of the passage, I think.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *De Off.* i. c. 4, on the difference between man and beast.

another : God had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient ; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For where the constitution of living beings are different, there also the acts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough : but in an animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use ; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them ? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God<sup>4</sup> and of His works ; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do ; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us ; and nature ends in

<sup>4</sup> See note 11 at end.

contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been spectators of these things.

But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias,<sup>5</sup> and all of you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand them? Will you not perceive either<sup>6</sup> what you are, or what you were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty of sight? But you may say, there are some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other disagreeable things? But I suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manli-

<sup>5</sup> This work was the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus by Phidias, which was at Olympia. This wonderful work is described by Pausanias (*Eliaca*, A, 11).

<sup>6</sup> Compare Persius, *Sat.* iii. 66—

“Discite, io, miseri et causas cognoscite rerum,  
Quid sumus aut quidnam victuri gignimur.”



ness? Have you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens?

Yes, but my nose runs.<sup>7</sup> For what purpose then, slave, have you hands? Is it not that you may wipe your nose?—Is it then consistent with reason that there should be running of noses in the world?—Nay, how much better it is to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think that Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out? And what would he have been doing if there had been nothing of the kind? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped himself up and have slept? In the first place then he would not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all his life in such luxury and ease; and even if he had been one, what would have been the use of him? and what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circumstances and occasions had not roused and exercised him? Well then must a man provide for himself such means of exercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some

<sup>7</sup> Compare Antoninus, viii. 50, and Epictetus, ii. 16.

place into his country, and a boar, and a hydra? This would be folly and madness: but as they did exist, and were found, they were useful for showing what Hercules was and for exercising him. Come then do you also having observed these things look to the faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by thee and powers<sup>8</sup> for honouring myself through the things which happen. You do not so: but you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what does happen: and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety?<sup>9</sup> And yet God has not only given us these faculties; by which we shall be able to bear everything that happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as your own, use them not: you do not even see what you have received, and from whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even acknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit,

<sup>8</sup> See note 12 at end.

<sup>9</sup> Compare Antoninus, ix. 1.

betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of soul and manliness: but what powers you have for finding fault and making accusations, do you show me.

## CHAPTER VII.

### OF THE USE OF SOPHISTICAL ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHETICAL AND THE LIKE.<sup>1</sup>

THE handling of sophistical and hypothetical arguments, and of those which derive their conclusions from questioning, and in a word the handling of all such arguments, relates to the duties of life, though the many do not know this truth. For in every matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover the proper path and the proper method of dealing with the matter. Let then people either say that the grave man will not descend into the contest of question and answer, or, that if he does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not conducting himself rashly or carelessly in questioning and answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry ought to be made into those topics (*τίμων*) on which

<sup>1</sup> See note 13 at end.

particularly questioning and answering are employed. For what is the end proposed in reasoning? To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only this? It is enough, a man may reply. Is it then also enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the use of coined money, to have heard this precept, that he should receive the genuine drachmae and reject the spurious? It is not enough. What then ought to be added to this precept? What else than the faculty which proves and distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachmae? Consequently also in reasoning what has been said is not enough; but it is necessary that a man should acquire the faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the false, and that which is not plain? It is necessary. Besides this, what is proposed in reasoning? That you should accept what follows from that which you have properly granted. Well, is it then enough in this case also to know this? It is not enough; but a man must learn how one thing is a consequence of other things, and when one thing follows from one thing, and when it follows from several collectively. Consider then if it be not necessary that this power should also be acquired by him, who purposes to conduct himself skillfully in reasoning, the power of demonstrating himself the several things which he has proposed, and the power of understanding the

demonstrations of others, and of not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstrating. Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and exercise of conclusive arguments<sup>2</sup> and figures, and it has been shown to be necessary.

But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the premises<sup>3</sup> or assumptions, and there results from them something ; and though it is not true, yet none the less it does result. What then ought I to do? Ought I to admit the falsehood? And how is that possible? Well, should I say that I did not properly grant that which we agreed upon? But you are not allowed to do even this. Shall I then say that the consequence does not arise through what has been conceded? But neither is this allowed. What then must be done in this case? Consider if it is not this : as to have borrowed is not enough to make a man still a debtor, but to this must be added the fact that he continues to owe the money and that the debt is not paid, so it is not enough to compel you to admit the inference<sup>4</sup> that you have granted the premises (*τὰ λήμματα*), but you must abide by what you have granted. Indeed, if the premises continue to the end such as they were when they were granted, it is

<sup>2</sup> These are syllogisms and figures, modes (*τρόποι*) by which the syllogism has its proper conclusion.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Aristotle, *Topic*. viii. 1, 22. Afterwards Epictetus uses *τὰ ὑποληγμένα* as equivalent to *λήμματα* (premises or assumptions).

<sup>4</sup> "The inference," *τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον*. "*Ἐπιφορά* est 'illatio' quae assumptionem sequitur" (Upton).

absolutely necessary for us to abide by what we have granted, and we must accept their consequences : but if the premises do not remain<sup>5</sup> such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us also to withdraw from what we granted, and from accepting what does not follow from the words in which our concessions were made. For the inference is now not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have withdrawn from the premises which we granted. We ought then both to examine such kinds of premises, and such change and variation of them (from one meaning to another), by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way, the premises undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded, if they do not see what conclusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to examine? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an improper manner nor in a confused way.

And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments ; for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one? And if not every one, which should we allow? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he sometimes

<sup>5</sup> See note 14 at end.

withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility. With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? But what other man than the man of sense can use argumentation and is skilful in questioning and answering, and incapable of being cheated and deceived by false reasoning? And shall he enter into the contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how can he be such a man as we conceive him to be? But without some such exercise and preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument? Let them show this; and all these speculations (*θεωρήματα*) become superfluous, and are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man.

Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do we seek pretences for not labouring and not being watchful in cultivating our reason? If then I shall make a mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father? Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could kill him? What then have you done? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus<sup>6</sup> when

<sup>6</sup> Rufus is Musonius Rufus (i. 1). To kill a father and to

he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a certain syllogism ; I suppose, I said, that I have burnt the Capitol. Slave, he replied, was the thing omitted here the Capitol ? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to kill your father ? But for a man to use the appearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration, nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent ; is there no error in this ?

## CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE FACULTIES<sup>1</sup> ARE NOT SAFE TO  
THE UNINSTRUCTED.

**I**N as many ways as we can change things<sup>2</sup>  
which are equivalent to one another, in just

burn the Roman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Comp. Horace, Epode, iii. ; Cicero, De Amicit. c. 11 ; Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus, c. 20.

<sup>1</sup> The faculties, as Wolf says, are the faculties of speaking and arguing, which, as he also says, make men arrogant and careless who have no solid knowledge, according to Bion's maxim, ἡ γὰρ οἴσις ἐγκοπή τῆς προκοπῆς ἐστίν, "arrogance (self-conceit) is a hindrance to improvement." See viii. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Things mean "propositions" and "terms." See Aristot. Analyt. Prior. i. 39, διὰ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν, etc. Ἐπιχειρήματα are arguments of any kind with which we attack (ἐπιχειρεῖν) an adversary.



so many ways we can change the forms of arguments (*ὑποχειρήματα*) and enthymemes<sup>a</sup> (*ἐνθυμήματα*) in argumentation. This is an instance : if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe me the money : you have not borrowed and you have not repaid ; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skilfully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher ; for if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also.

Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another in this manner ? Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this occupation ? and particularly as this would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit and arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive additional ornament from language : and so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak brings

<sup>a</sup> The Enthymeme is defined by Aristotle : ἐνθύμημα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων (Anal. Prior. ii. c. 27). He has explained, in the first part of this chapter, what he means by εἰκός and σημείον.

with it the danger of these persons being elated and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuade a young man who excels in these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage<sup>4</sup> to them, but to make them an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned aside?

What then, was not Plato a philosopher?<sup>5</sup> I reply, and was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippocrates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speak thus in respect of being a physician? Why do you mingle things which have been accidentally united in the same men? And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher? Will you not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men become philosophers, and what things belong to them in other respects? And if I were a philosopher, ought you also to

<sup>4</sup> A man, as Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of speaking, his chief excellence. He should use it to set off something which is superior.

<sup>5</sup> Plato was eloquent, and the adversary asks, if that is a reason for not allowing him to be a philosopher. To which the rejoinder is that Hippocrates was a physician, and eloquent too, but not as a physician.

be made lame?<sup>6</sup> What then? Do I take away these faculties which you possess? By no means; for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I cannot mention to you anything else than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect to appearances.<sup>7</sup>

## CHAPTER IX.

HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN MAY PROCEED TO THE CONSEQUENCES.

**I**F the things are true which are said by the philosophers about the kinship between God and man, what else remains for men to do than what Socrates did? Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world (*κόσμιος*).<sup>1</sup> For why do you say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call yourself an Athenian or Corinthian from the place which has a greater authority and comprises not only

<sup>6</sup> Epictetus was lame.

<sup>7</sup> See note 15 at end.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Tuscul.* v. 37, has the same: "Socrates cum rogetur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. Totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur." (Upton.)

that small nook itself and all your family, but even the whole country from which the stock of your progenitors is derived down to you? He then who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings—for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with him<sup>2</sup>—why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God,<sup>3</sup> and why should he be afraid of anything which happens among men? Is kinship with Caesar (the emperor) or with any other of the powerful in Rome sufficient to enable us to live in safety, and above contempt and without any fear at all? and to have God for your maker (*παιστήν*), and father and guardian, shall not this release us from sorrows and fears?

But a man may say, Whence shall I get bread to eat when I have nothing?

And how do slaves, and runaways, on what do

<sup>2</sup> See note 16 at end.

<sup>3</sup> It is not true that the "conception of a parental deity," as it has been asserted, was unknown before the teaching of Jesus, and, after the time of Jesus, unknown to those Greeks who were unacquainted with His teaching.

they rely when they leave their masters? Do they rely on their lands or slaves, or their vessels of silver? They rely on nothing but themselves; and food does not fail them.<sup>4</sup> And shall it be necessary for one among us who is a philosopher to travel into foreign parts, and trust to and rely on others, and not to take care of himself, and shall he be inferior to irrational animals and more cowardly, each of which being self-sufficient, neither fails to get its proper food, nor to find a suitable way of living, and one conformable to nature?

I indeed think that the old man <sup>5</sup> ought to be sitting here, not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignoble talk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us any young men of such a mind, that when they have recognised their kinship to God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, and its possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to us for the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw off these things as if they were burdens painful and intolerable, and to depart to their kinsmen. But this is the labour that your teacher and instructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he should be. You should come to him and say, "Epic-  
tetus, we can no longer endure being bound to this poor body, and feeding it and giving it

<sup>4</sup> See note 17 at end.

<sup>5</sup> The old man is Epictetus.

drink, and rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with the wishes of these and of those.<sup>6</sup> Are not these things indifferent and nothing to us ; and is not death no evil? And are we not in a manner kinsmen of God, and did we not come from him? Allow us to depart to the place from which we came ; allow us to be released at last from these bonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers and thieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, and think that they have some power over us by means of the body and its possessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over any man." And I on my part would say, "Friends, wait for God : when He shall give the signal<sup>7</sup> and release you from this service, then go to Him ; but for the present endure to dwell in this place where He has put you : short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for those who are so disposed : for what tyrant or what thief, or what courts of justice, are formidable to those who have thus considered as things of no value the body and

<sup>6</sup> He means, as Wolf says, "on account of the necessities of the body seeking the favour of the more powerful by disagreeable compliances."

<sup>7</sup> Upton refers to Cicero, *Tuscul.* i. 30 ; Cato Major, c. 20 ; *Somnium Scipionis*, c. 3 (*De Republica*, iv. 15) ; the purport of which passages is that we must not depart from life without the command of God. See Marcus Antoninus, ii. 17 : iii. 5 ; v. 33. But how shall a man know the signal for departure, of which Epictetus speaks ?

the possessions of the body? Wait then, do not depart without a reason."

Something like this ought to be said by the teacher to ingenuous youths. But now what happens? The teacher is a lifeless body, and you are lifeless bodies. When you have been well filled to-day, you sit down and lament about the morrow, how you shall get something to eat. Wretch, if you have it, you will have it ; if you have it not, you will depart from life. The door is open.<sup>8</sup> Why do you grieve? where does there remain any room for tears? and where is there occasion for flattery? why shall one man envy another? why should a man admire the rich or the powerful, even if they be both very strong and of violent temper? for what will they do to us? We shall not care for that which they can do ; and what we do care for, that they cannot do. How did Socrates behave with respect to these matters? Why, in what other way than a man ought to do who was convinced that he was a kinsman of the gods? "If you say to me now," said Socrates to his judges,<sup>9</sup> "we will acquit you on the condition that you no longer discourse in the way in which you have hitherto discoursed, nor trouble either our young or our old men, I shall answer, you make yourselves ridiculous by thinking that. if one of our

<sup>8</sup> See note 18 at end.

<sup>9</sup> This passage is founded on and is in substance the same as that in Plato's *Apology*, c. 17.

commanders has appointed me to a certain post, it is my duty to keep and maintain it, and to resolve to die a thousand times rather than desert it ; but if God has put us in any place and way of life, we ought to desert it." Socrates speaks like a man who is really a kinsman of the gods. But we think about ourselves, as if we were only stomachs, and intestines, and shameful parts; we fear, we desire ; we flatter those who are able to help us in these matters, and we fear them also.

A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a man who, as most people thought, had been unfortunate, for formerly he was a man of rank and rich, but had been stripped of all, and was living here. I wrote on his behalf in a submissive manner ; but when he had read the letter, he gave it back to me and said, " I wished for your help, not your pity : no evil has happened to me."

Thus also Musonius Rufus, in order to try me, used to say : This and this will befall you from your master ; and when I replied that these were things which happen in the ordinary course of human affairs, Why then, said he, should I ask him for anything when I can obtain it from you ? For, in fact, what a man has from himself, it is superfluous and foolish to receive from another ?<sup>10</sup> Shall I then, who am able to receive

<sup>10</sup> Schweighaeuser has a long note on this passage, to "receive from another." I think that there is no difficulty about the meaning ; and the careful reader will find none. Epictetus was once a slave.



from myself greatness of soul and a generous spirit, receive from you land and money or a magisterial office? I hope not: I will not be so ignorant about my own possessions. But when a man is cowardly and mean, what else must be done for him than to write letters as you would about a corpse.<sup>11</sup> Please to grant us the body of a certain person and a sextarius of poor blood. For such a person is, in fact, a carcass and a sextarius (a certain quantity) of blood and nothing more. But if he were anything more, he would know that one man is not miserable through the means of another.

## CHAPTER X.

### AGAINST THOSE WHO EAGERLY SEEK PREFER- MENT AT ROME.

**I**F we applied ourselves as busily to our own work as the old men at Rome do to those matters about which they are employed, perhaps we also might accomplish something. I am acquainted with a man older than myself, who is now superintendent of corn<sup>1</sup> at Rome, and I

<sup>11</sup> The meaning is obscure. Schweighaeuser thinks that the allusion is to a defeated enemy asking permission from the conqueror to bury the dead. Epictetus considers a man as a mere carcass who places his happiness in externals and in the favour of others.

<sup>1</sup> See note 19 at end.

remember the time when he came here on his way back from exile, and what he said as he related the events of his former life, and how he declared that with respect to the future after his return he would look after nothing else than passing the rest of his life in quiet and tranquillity. For how little of life, he said, remains for me. I replied, you will not do it, but as soon as you smell Rome, you will forget all that you have said ; and if admission is allowed even into the imperial palace, he<sup>2</sup> will gladly thrust himself in and thank God. If you find me, Epictetus, he answered, setting even one foot within the palace, think what you please. Well, what then did he do? Before he entered the city, he was met by letters from Caesar, and as soon as he received them, he forgot all, and ever after has added one piece of business to another. I wish that I were now by his side to remind him of what he said when he was passing this way, and to tell him how much better a seer I am than he is.

Well then do I say that man is an animal made for doing nothing?<sup>3</sup> Certainly not. But why are we not active?<sup>4</sup> (We are active.) For

<sup>2</sup> I cannot explain why the third person is used here instead of the second.

<sup>3</sup> The Stoics taught that man is adapted by his nature for action. He ought not therefore to withdraw from human affairs, and indulge in a lazy life, not even a life of contemplation and religious observances only. Upton refers to Antoninus, v. 1, viii. 19, and Cicero, *De Fin.* v. 20.

<sup>4</sup> See note 20 at end.

example, as to myself, as soon as day comes, in a few words I remind myself of what I must read over to my pupils; then forthwith I say to myself, But what is it to me how a certain person shall read? the first thing for me is to sleep. And indeed what resemblance is there between what other persons do and what we do? If you observe what they do, you will understand. And what else do they do all day long than make up accounts, inquire among themselves, give and take advice about some small quantity of grain, a bit of land, and such kind of profits? Is it then the same thing to receive a petition and to read in it: I intreat you to permit me to export<sup>5</sup> a small quantity of corn; and one to this effect: "I intreat you to learn from Chrysippus what is the administration of the world, and what place in it the rational animal holds; consider also who you are, and what is the nature of your good and bad." Are these things like the other, do they require equal care, and is it equally base to neglect these and those? Well then are we the only persons who are lazy and love sleep? No; but much rather you young men are. For we old men when we see young men amusing themselves are eager to play with them; and if I saw you active and zealous, much more should I be eager myself to join you in your serious pursuits.

<sup>5</sup> A plain allusion to restraints put on the exportation of grain.

## CHAPTER XI.

## OF NATURAL AFFECTION.

**W**HEN he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had ; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances. Miserable, the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect, for men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. But I, the man replied, am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered. Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right ? I acted naturally, the man replied. But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. This is the case, said the man, with all or at least most fathers. I do not deny that : but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behaviour is right ; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumours also come for the good of the body, because they do come ; and generally we must say that to do

wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then how your behaviour is natural. I cannot, he said: but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature, and is not rightly done.

Well, said Epictetus, if we were inquiring about white and black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing between them? The sight, he said. And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what criterion? The touch. Well then, since we are inquiring about things which are according to nature, and those which are done rightly or not rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should employ? I do not know, he said. And yet not to know the criterion of colours and smells, and also of tastes, is perhaps no great harm; but if a man do not know the criterion of good and bad, and of things according to nature and contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm? The greatest harm (I think). Come tell me, do all things which seem to some persons to be good and becoming, rightly appear such; and at present as to Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions of all of them in respect to food are right? How is it possible? he said. Well, I suppose, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions of the rest must be wrong: if the opinions of the Jews are right, those of the rest cannot be right. Certainly. But where there is ignorance, there also

there is want of learning and training in things which are necessary. He assented to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else, and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the criterion of things which are according to nature, and by using it also to determine each several thing. But in the present matter I have so much as this to aid you towards what you wish. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good? Certainly. Well, is such affection natural and good, and is a thing consistent with reason not good? By no means. Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction with affection? I think not. You are right, for if it is otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature. Is it not so? It is, he said. Whatever then we shall discover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good. Agreed. Well then to leave your sick child and to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with affection. Yes, let us consider. Did you then, since you had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when you ran off and left her; and has the mother no affection for the child? Certainly, she has. Ought then the mother also to have

left her, or ought she not? She ought not. And the nurse, does she love her? She does. Ought then she also to have left her? By no means. And the pedagogue,<sup>1</sup> does he not love her? He does love her. Ought then he also to have deserted her? and so should the child have been left alone and without help on account of the great affection of you the parents and of those about her, or should she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor cared for her? Certainly not. Now this is unfair and unreasonable, not to allow those who have equal affection with yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do because you have affection. It is absurd. Come then, if you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affectionate, and all the rest, children and wife, as to leave you alone and deserted? By no means. And would you wish to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affection you would always be left alone in sickness? or for this reason would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved by your enemies and deserted by them? But if this is so, it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate act.

Well then, was it nothing which moved you and induced you to desert your child? and how is that possible? But it might be something of the kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap

<sup>1</sup> "When we are children our parents put us in the hands of a pedagogue to see on all occasions that we take no harm."—*Epictetus, Frag. 97.*

up his head while a horse was running which he favoured ; and when contrary to expectation the horse won, he required sponges to recover him from his fainting fit. What then is the thing which moved? The exact discussion of this does not belong to the present occasion perhaps ; but it is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philosophers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere without, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding anything or pursuing : the very thing which is now the cause to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. And what is this? Is it any other than our will to do so? No other. But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have been doing than that which we willed to do? This then was the cause of Achilles' lamentation, not the death of Patroclus ; for another man does not behave thus on the death of his companion ; but it was because he chose to do so. And to you this was the very cause of your then running away, that you chose to do so ; and on the other side, if you should (hereafter) stay with her, the reason will be the same. And now you are going to Rome because you choose ; and if you should change your mind,<sup>2</sup> you will not go

<sup>2</sup> See note 21 at end.



thither. And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing ; but our own opinions and our wills (δύματα).

Do I convince you of this or not? You do convince me. Such then as the causes are in each case, such also are the effects. When then we are doing anything not rightly, from this day we shall impute it to nothing else than to the will (δύμα or opinion) from which we have done it : and it is that which we shall endeavour to take away and to extirpate more than the tumours and abscesses out of the body. And in like manner we shall give the same account of the cause of the things which we do right ; and we shall no longer allege as causes of any evil to us, either slave or neighbour, or wife or children, being persuaded, that if we do not think things to be what we do think them to be, we do not the acts which follow from such opinions ; and as to thinking or not thinking, that is in our power and not in externals. It is so, he said. From this day then we shall inquire into and examine nothing else, what its quality is, or its state, neither land nor slaves nor horses nor dogs, nothing else than opinions. I hope so. You see then that you must become a Scholasticus,<sup>3</sup> an animal whom all ridicule, if you really intend to make an examination of your own opinions :

<sup>3</sup> A Scholasticus is one who frequents the schools ; a studious and literary person, who does not engage in the business of active life.

and that this is not the work of one hour or day, you know yourself.

## CHAPTER XII.

### OF CONTENTMENT.

WITH respect to gods, there are some who say that a divine being does not exist ; others say that it exists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no forethought about anything ; a third class say that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth ; a fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say : " I move not without thy knowledge " <sup>1</sup> (*Iliad*, x. 278).

Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? <sup>2</sup> And if they exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be right to follow them? But if indeed they do exist and

<sup>1</sup> See note 22 at end

<sup>2</sup> " To follow God," is a Stoical expression. *Antoninus*, x. 11.

look after things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them)? The wise and good man then after considering all these things, submits his own mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed with this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how shall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I become free? For he is free to whom every thing happens according to his will, and whom no man can hinder. What then, is freedom madness? Certainly not : for madness and freedom do not consist. But, you say, I would have every thing result just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And how with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in every art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man's whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest

and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will inconsiderately? By no means; but to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that every thing may happen as it does.<sup>3</sup> And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed them. And he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole; <sup>4</sup> and to each of us he has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions.

Remembering then this disposition of things, we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may change the constitution <sup>5</sup> of things,—for we have not the power to do it, nor is it better that we should have the power,—but in order that, as the things around us are what they are and by nature exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things which happen. For can we escape from men? and how is it possible? And if we associate with them, can we change them? Who gives us the power? What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce with them? Is there such a

<sup>3</sup> This means that we ought to learn to be satisfied with everything that happens, in fact with the will of God. This is a part of education, according to Epictetus. But it does not appear in our systems of education so plainly as it does here. Antoninus (iv. 23): "Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee."

<sup>4</sup> See note 23 at end.

<sup>5</sup> The word is *υποθέσεις*. It is explained by what follows.

method by which they shall do what seems fit to them, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to nature? But you are unwilling to endure and are discontented: and if you are alone, you call it solitude; and if you are with men, you call them knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own parents and children, and brothers and neighbours. But you ought when you are alone to call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to think yourself like to the gods; and when you are with many, you ought not to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and assembly, and so accept all contentedly.

What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone? let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? let him be a bad son, and lament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? let him be a bad father. Cast him into prison. What prison? Where he is already, for he is there against his will; and where a man is against his will, there he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly—Must my leg then be lamed? Wretch, do you then on account of one poor leg find fault with the world? Will you not willingly surrender it for the whole? Will you not withdraw from it? Will you not gladly part with it to him who gave it? And will you be vexed and discontented with the things established by Zeus, which he with the Moirae (fates)

who were present and spinning the thread of your generation, defined and put in order? Know you not how small a part you are compared with the whole?" I mean with respect to the body, for as to intelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less ; for the magnitude of intelligence is not measured by length nor yet by height, but by thoughts.<sup>7</sup>

Will you not then choose to place your good in that in which you are equal to the gods?—Wretch that I am to have such a father and mother.—What then, was it permitted to you to come forth and to select and to say : Let such a man at this moment unite with such a woman that I may be produced? It was not permitted, but it was a necessity for your parents to exist first, and then for you to be begotten. Of what kind of parents? Of such as they were. Well then, since they are such as they are, is there no remedy given to you? Now if you did not know for what purpose you possess the faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and wretched if you closed your eyes when colours were brought before them ; but in that you possess greatness of soul and nobility of spirit for every event that may happen, and you know not that you possess them, are you not more unfortunate and wretched? Things are brought close to you which are proportionate to the power which

<sup>6</sup> "Et quota pars homo sit terrai totius unus." Lucret. vi. 652, and Antoninus, ii. 4.

<sup>7</sup> See note 24 at end.

you possess, but you turn away this power most particularly at the very time when you ought to maintain it open and discerning. Do you not rather thank the gods that they have allowed you to be above these things which they have not placed in your power, and have made you accountable only for those which are in your power? As to your parents, the gods have left you free from responsibility ; and so with respect to your brothers, and your body, and possessions, and death and life. For what then have they made you responsible? For that which alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why then do you draw on yourself the things for which you are not responsible? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to yourself.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS.

WHEN some one asked, how may a man eat acceptably to the gods, he answered : If he can eat justly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately and orderly, will it not be also acceptably to the gods? But when you have asked for warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has brought only tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house, then not to be vexed or to burst with

passion, is not this acceptable to the gods?—How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave? Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from above? But if you have been put in any such higher place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? Will you not remember who you are, and whom you rule? that they are kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?<sup>1</sup>—But I have purchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in what direction you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the pit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men?<sup>2</sup> but towards the laws of the gods you are not looking.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### THAT THE DEITY OVERSEES ALL THINGS.

**W**HEN a person asked him how a man could be convinced that all his actions

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Carter compares Job xxxi. 15 : “Did not he that made me in the womb make him (my man-servant)? And did not one fashion us in the womb?”

<sup>2</sup> I suppose he means human laws, which have made one man a slave to another; and when he says “dead men,” he may mean mortal men, as contrasted with the gods or God, who has made all men brothers.



are under the inspection of God, he answered, Do you not think that all things are united in one?<sup>1</sup> I do, the person replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things have a natural agreement and union<sup>2</sup> with heavenly things? I do. And how else so regularly as if by God's command, when He bids the plants to flower, do they flower? When He bids them to send forth shoots, do they shoot? when He bids them to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit? when He bids the fruit to ripen, does it ripen? when again He bids them to cast down the fruits, how else do they cast them down? and when to shed the leaves, do they shed the leaves? and when He bids them to fold themselves up and to remain quiet and rest, how else do they remain quiet and rest? And how else at the growth and the wane of the moon, and at the approach and recession of the sun, are so great an alteration and change to the contrary seen in earthly things?<sup>3</sup> But are plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole, and are not our souls much more? and our souls so bound up and in contact with God as parts of Him and portions of Him; and does not God perceive every motion of these parts as being His own motion connate with Himself? Now are you able to think of the divine administration,

<sup>1</sup> See note 25 at end.

<sup>2</sup> The word is *συμπάθειν*. Cicero (De Divin. ii. 69) translates *συμπάθειαν* by "continuatio conjunctioque naturae."

<sup>3</sup> Compare Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349-356.

and about all things divine, and at the same time also about human affairs, and to be moved by ten thousand things at the same time in your senses and in your understanding, and to assent to some, and to dissent from others, and again as to some things to suspend your judgment; and do you retain in your soul so many impressions from so many and various things, and being moved by them, do you fall upon notions similar to those first impressed, and do you retain numerous arts and the memories of ten thousand things; and is not God able to oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive from all a certain communication? And is the sun able to illuminate so large a part of the All, and to leave so little not illuminated, that part only which is occupied by the earth's shadow; and He who made the sun itself and makes it go round, being a small part of Himself compared with the whole, cannot He perceive all things?

But I cannot, the man may reply, comprehend all these things at once. But who tells you that you have equal power with Zeus? Nevertheless he has placed by every man a guardian, every man's Daemon,<sup>4</sup> to whom he has committed the care of the man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived. For to what better and more careful guardian could He have intrusted each of us? When then you have shut the doors and

<sup>4</sup> See note 26 at end.

made darkness within, remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not ; but God is within, and your Daemon is within, and what need have they of light to see what you are doing? To this God you ought to swear an oath just as the soldiers do to Caesar. But they who are hired for pay swear to regard the safety of Caesar before all things ; and you who have received so many and such great favours, will you not swear, or when you have sworn, will you not abide by your oath? And what shall you swear? Never to be disobedient, never to make any charges, never to find fault with any thing that he has given, and never unwillingly to do or to suffer any thing that is necessary. Is this oath like the soldier's oath? The soldiers swear not to prefer any man to Caesar : in this oath men swear to honour themselves before all.

## CHAPTER XV.

### WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES.

WHEN a man was consulting him how he should persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied, Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. If it did (or, if it were not as I say), philosophy would be allowing something which is not within its province. For as the

carpenter's material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter of the art of living is each man's life.--What then is my brother's?—That again belongs to his own art ; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part<sup>1</sup> conformable to nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she says.

How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me? Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.

When the man, who was consulting him, said, I seek to know this, How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time : let it flower<sup>2</sup> first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.

<sup>1</sup> This is τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, a word often used by Antoninus, ii 2 ; vi. 8.

<sup>2</sup> See note 27 at end

## CHAPTER XVI.

## OF PROVIDENCE.

**D**O not wonder if for other animals than man all things are provided for the body, not only food and drink, but beds also, and they have no need of shoes, nor bed materials, nor clothing ; but we require all these additional things. For animals not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit for them to be made so as to need other things. For consider what it would be for us to take care not only of ourselves, but also about cattle and asses, how they should be clothed, and how shod, and how they should eat and drink. Now as soldiers are ready for their commander, shod, clothed, and armed : but it would be a hard thing for the chiliarch (tribune) to go round and shoe or clothe his thousand men : so also nature has formed the animals which are made for service, all ready, prepared, and requiring no further care. So one little boy with only a stick drives the cattle.

But now we, instead of being thankful that we need not take the same care of animals as of ourselves, complain of God on our own account ; and yet, in the name of Zeus and the gods, any one thing of those which exist would be enough to make a man perceive the providence of God,

at least a man who is modest and grateful. And speak not to me now of the great things, but only of this, that milk is produced from grass, and cheese from milk, and wool from skins. Who made these things or devised them? No one, you say. O amazing shamelessness and stupidity!

Well, let us omit the works of nature, and contemplate her smaller (subordinate, *πάρεργα*) acts. Is there anything less useful than the hair on the chin? What then, has not nature used this hair also in the most suitable manner possible? Has she not by it distinguished the male and the female? does not the nature of every man forthwith proclaim from a distance, I am a man: as such approach me, as such speak to me; look for nothing else; see the signs? Again, in the case of women, as she has mingled something softer in the voice, so she has also deprived them of hair (on the chin). You say, not so: the human animal ought to have been left without marks of distinction, and each of us should have been obliged to proclaim, I am a man. But how is not the sign beautiful and becoming and venerable? how much more beautiful than the cock's comb, how much more becoming than the lion's mane? For this reason we ought to preserve the signs which God has given, we ought not to throw them away, nor to confound, as much as we can, the distinctions of the sexes.

Are these the only works of providence in us?

And what words are sufficient to praise them and set them forth according to their worth? For if we had understanding, ought we to do anything else both jointly and severally than to sing hymns and bless the deity, and to tell of his benefits?<sup>1</sup> Ought we not when we are digging and ploughing and eating to sing this hymn to God? "Great is God, who has given us such implements with which we shall cultivate the earth : great is God who has given us hands, the power of swallowing, a stomach, imperceptible growth, and the power of breathing while we sleep." This is what we ought to sing on every occasion, and to sing the greatest and most divine hymn for giving us the faculty of comprehending these things and using a proper way.<sup>2</sup> Well then, since most of you have become blind, ought there not to be some man to fill this office, and on behalf of all to sing<sup>3</sup> the hymn to God? For what else can I do, a lame old man, than sing hymns to God? If then I was a nightingale, I would do the part of a nightingale : if I were a swan, I would do like a swan. But now I am a rational creature, and I ought to praise God : this is my work ; I do it, nor will I desert this post, so long as I am allowed to keep it ; and I exhort you to join in this same song.

<sup>1</sup> Antoninus, v. 33.

<sup>2</sup> See Upton's note on ὁδοῦ.

<sup>3</sup> ᾄδοντες is Schweighaeuser's probable emendation.

## CHAPTER XVII.

THAT THE LOGICAL ART IS NECESSARY.

SINCE reason is the faculty which analyzes<sup>1</sup> and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalyzed, by what should it be analyzed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyze that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end.<sup>2</sup> Reason therefore is analyzed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions<sup>3</sup>) and the like. Will you then hear about these things? Hear. But if you should say, "I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely," and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, "Distinguish," I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, "It is more urgent."<sup>4</sup> This is the reason, I

<sup>1</sup> Λόγος ἵστιν ὁ διακρίνειν. Διακρίνειν means "to divide a thing into its parts or members." The word "analyze" seems to be the nearest equivalent. See Schweighauser's note on ὑπὸ τίνος

<sup>2</sup> See note 28 at end.

<sup>3</sup> See note 29 at end.

<sup>4</sup> He repeats the words of the supposed opponent; and he means that his adversary's difficulty shows the necessity of Dialectic.



suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?

In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully anything else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so?<sup>5</sup> And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified?<sup>6</sup> Is this then the great and

<sup>5</sup> Antisthenes, who professed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and Physic (Schweighaeuser, note p. 201).

<sup>6</sup> Xenophon, *Mem.* iv. 5, 12, and iv. 6, 7. Epictetus knew what education ought to be. We learn language, and we ought to learn what it means. When children learn words, they

wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.<sup>7</sup>—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter?<sup>8</sup> There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with

should learn what the thing is which is signified by the word. In the case of children this can only be done imperfectly as to some words, but it may be done even then in some degree; and it must be done, or the word signifies nothing, or, what is equally bad, the word is misunderstood. All of us pass our lives in ignorance of many words which we use: some of us in greater ignorance than others, but all of us in ignorance to some degree.

<sup>7</sup> The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says “the Roman tongue,” perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman and does not know Greek well.

<sup>8</sup> *Encheiridion*, c. 49. “When a man gives himself great airs because he can understand and expound Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of.” See the rest.

his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods ; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given ; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs.<sup>9</sup>

I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets : Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion ; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth ? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false ? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise ? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit ? And what can overcome desire and aversion (*ἐκκλισις*) except another desire and aversion ? But, you object : “ If you place before me the

<sup>9</sup> Compare Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 3.

fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will.<sup>10</sup> For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE  
ERRORS (FAULTS) OF OTHERS.

**I**F what philosophers say is true, that all men have one principle, as in the case of assent the persuasion<sup>1</sup> that a thing is so, and in the

<sup>10</sup> See note 30 at end.

<sup>1</sup> See note 31 at end.

case of dissent the persuasion that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so also in the case of a movement towards anything the persuasion that a thing is for a man's advantage, and it is impossible to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another, and to judge one thing to be proper and to move towards another, why then are we angry with the many?<sup>2</sup> They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity them? But show them their error, and you will see how they desist from their errors. If they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion.

Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every

<sup>2</sup> See note 32 at end.

man is the will or choice such as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by the bad things of another.<sup>8</sup> Pity him rather: drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: "these accursed and odious fellows." How have you been made so wise at once? and how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because we value so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things which are yours, but in those which belong to others and which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still angry? But so long as you value these things, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer. Consider the matter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbour has not: you have a window; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein man's good consists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and

<sup>8</sup> Here the text is defective.

swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not provoke them : do not have a window : do not air your clothes. I also lately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods : hearing a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done nothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen lamp : for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment. The reason is that you had a garment. I have pain in my head. Have you any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? for we only lose those things, we have only pains about those things which we possess.<sup>4</sup>

But the tyrant will chain—what? the leg. He will take away—what? the neck. What then will he not chain and not take away? the will. This is why the ancients taught the maxim, Know thyself.<sup>5</sup> Therefore we ought to exercise ourselves in small<sup>6</sup> things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater. I have pain in

<sup>4</sup> The conclusion explains what precedes. A man can have no pain in his horns, because he has none. A man cannot be vexed about the loss of a thing if he does not possess it. Upton says that Epictetus alludes to the foolish quibble : "If you have not lost a thing, you have it : but you have not lost horns ; therefore you have horns" (Seneca, Ep. 45). Epictetus says, "You do not lose a thing when you have it not."

<sup>5</sup> Compare what is said in Xenophon, Mem. iv. 2, 24, on the expression, Know thyself.

<sup>6</sup> This ought to be the method of teaching children.

the head. Do not say, alas ! I have pain in the ear. Do not say, alas ! And I do not say, that you are not allowed to groan, but do not groan inwardly ; and if your slave is slow in bringing a bandage, do not cry out and torment yourself, and say, "Everybody hates me" : for who would not hate such a man ? For the future, relying on these opinions, walk about upright, free : not trusting to the size of your body, as an athlete, for a man ought not to be invincible in the way that an ass is.<sup>7</sup>

Who then is the invincible ? It is he whom none of the things disturb which are independent of the will. Then examining one circumstance after another I observe, as in the case of an athlete ; he has come off victorious in the first contest : well then, as to the second ? and what if there should be a great heat ? and what, if it should be at Olympia ? And the same I say in this case : if you should throw money in his way, he will despise it. Well, suppose you put a young girl in his way, what then ? and what, if it is in the dark ?<sup>8</sup> what if

<sup>7</sup> That is obstinate, as this animal is generally ; and sometimes very obstinate. The meaning then is, as Schweighaeuser says : "A man should be invincible, not with a kind of stupid obstinacy or laziness and slowness in moving himself like an ass, but he should be invincible through reason, reflection, meditation, study, and diligence."

<sup>8</sup> "From the rustics came the old proverb, for when they commend a man's fidelity and goodness they say he is a man with whom you may play the game with the fingers in the dark." Cicero, *De Officiis*, iii. 19.



it should be a little reputation, or abuse ; and what, if it should be praise ; and what if it should be death ? He is able to overcome all. What then if it be in heat, and what if it is in the rain,<sup>9</sup> and what if he be in a melancholy (mad) mood, and what if he be asleep ? He will still conquer. This is my invincible athlete.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### HOW WE SHOULD BEHAVE TO TYRANTS.

**I**F a man possesses any superiority, or thinks that he does, when he does not, such a man, if he is uninstructed, will of necessity be puffed up through it. For instance, the tyrant says, "I am master of all !" And what can you do for me ? Can you give me desire which shall have no hindrance ? How can you ? Have you the infallible power of avoiding what you would avoid ? Have you the power of moving towards an object without error ? And how do you possess this power ? Come, when you are in a ship, do you trust to yourself or to the helmsman ? And when you are in a chariot, to whom do you trust but to the driver ? And how is it in all other arts ? Just the same. In what then lies your power ? All men pay respect<sup>1</sup> to

<sup>9</sup> See note 33 at end.

<sup>1</sup> ἀπαρνέσθαι. Epictetus continues to use the same word.

me. Well, I also pay respect to my platter, and I wash it and wipe it ; and for the sake of my oil flask, I drive a peg into the wall. Well then, are these things superior to me? No, but they supply some of my wants, and for this reason I take care of them. Well, do I not attend to my ass? Do I not wash his feet? Do I not clean him? Do you not know that every man has regard to himself, and to you just the same as he has regard to his ass? For who has regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become like you? Who imitates you, as he imitates Socrates?—But I can cut off your head.—You say right. I had forgotten that I must have regard to you, as I would to a fever<sup>2</sup> and the bile, and raise an altar to you, as there is at Rome an altar to fever.

What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? is it the tyrant and his guards? [By no means.] I hope that it is not so. It is not possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anything else, or hindered by any other thing than by itself. But it is a man's own opinions which disturb him : for when the tyrant says to a man, " I will chain your leg," he who values his leg says, " Do not ; have pity : " but he who values his own will says, " If it appears more advantageous to you, chain it." Do you not care? I do not care. I will show

<sup>2</sup> *Febris*, fever, was a goddess at Rome. Upton refers to an inscription in Gruter 97, which begins "*Febri Divae*." Compare Lactantius, *De falsa religione*, c. 20

you that I am master. You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free: do you think that he intended to allow his own son<sup>3</sup> to be enslaved? But you are master of my carcass: take it.—So when you approach me, you have no regard to me? No, but I have regard to myself; and if you wish me to say that I have regard to you also, I tell you that I have the same regard to you that I have to my pipkin.

This is not a perverse self-regard,<sup>4</sup> for the animal is constituted so as to do all things for itself. For even the sun does all things for itself; nay, even Zeus himself. But when he chooses to be the Giver of rain and the Giver of fruits, and the Father of Gods and men, you see that he cannot obtain these functions and these names, if he is not useful to man; and, universally, he has made the nature of the rational animal such that it cannot obtain any one of its own proper interests, if it does not contribute something to the common interest.<sup>5</sup> In this manner and sense it is not unsociable for a man to do everything for the sake of himself. For what do you expect? that a man should neglect himself and his own interest? And how in that case can there be one and the same principle in all animals, the principle of attachment (regard) to themselves?

What then? when absurd notions about things independent of our will, as if they were good and

<sup>3</sup> Comp. i. c. 3.

<sup>4</sup> See note 34 at end.

<sup>5</sup> See note 35 at end.

(or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we must of necessity pay regard to tyrants ; for I wish that men would pay regard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men.<sup>6</sup> How is it that the man becomes all at once wise, when Caesar has made him superintendent of the close stool? How is it that we say immediately, "Felicion spoke sensibly to me." I wish he were ejected from the bedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool.

Epaphroditus<sup>7</sup> had a shoemaker whom he sold because he was good for nothing. This fellow by some good luck was bought by one of Caesar's men, and became Caesar's shoemaker. You should have seen what respect Epaphroditus paid to him: "How does the good Felicion do, I pray?" Then if any of us asked, "What is master (Epaphroditus) doing?" the answer was, "He is consulting about something with Felicion." Had he not sold the man as good for nothing? Who then made him wise all at once? This is an instance of valuing something else than the things which depend on the will.

Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who meet him offer their congratulations: one kisses his eyes, another the neck, and the

<sup>6</sup> Such a man was named in Greek *κοιτωνίτης*: in Latin "cubicularius," a lord of the bedchamber, as we might say. Seneca, *De Constantia Sapientis*, c. 14, speaks "of the arrogance of the bedchamber man."

<sup>7</sup> Once the master of Epictetus (i. 1, 20).

slaves kiss his hands.<sup>8</sup> He goes to his house, he finds torches lighted. He ascends the Capitol : he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Now who ever sacrificed for having had good desires ? for having acted conformably to nature ? For in fact we thank the gods for those things in which we place our good.<sup>9</sup>

A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of Augustus.<sup>10</sup> I say to him : " Man, let the thing alone : you will spend much for no purpose." But he replies, " Those who draw up agreements will write my name." Do you then stand by those who read them, and say to such persons, " It is I whose name is written there " ? And if you can now be present on all such occasions, what will you do when you are dead ? My name will remain.—Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But come, what remembrance of you will there be beyond Nicopolis ?—But I shall wear a crown of gold.—If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses and put it on, for it will be more elegant in appearance.

<sup>8</sup> Hand-kissing was in those times of tyranny the duty of a slave, not of a free man. This servile practice still exists among men called free.

<sup>9</sup> See note 3<sup>d</sup> at end.

<sup>10</sup> See note 37 at end.

## CHAPTER XX.

ABOUT REASON, HOW IT CONTEMPLATES  
ITSELF.<sup>1</sup>

EVERY art and faculty contemplates certain things especially.<sup>2</sup> When then it is itself of the same kind with the objects which it contemplates, it must of necessity contemplate itself also: but when it is of an unlike kind, it cannot contemplate itself. For instance, the shoemaker's art is employed on skins, but itself is entirely distinct from the material of skins: for this reason it does not contemplate itself. Again, the grammarian's art is employed about articulate speech;<sup>3</sup> is then the art also articulate speech? By no means. For this reason it is not able to contemplate itself. Now reason, for what purpose has it been given by nature? For the right use of appearances. What is it then itself? A system (combination) of certain appearances. So by its nature it has the faculty of contemplating itself also. Again, sound sense, for the contemplation of what things does it belong to us? Good and evil, and things which are neither. What is it then itself? Good. And

<sup>1</sup> A comparison of lib. i. chap. 1, will help to explain this chapter. Compare also lib. i. chap. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Wolf suggests that we should read *πρὸς ἡγουμένῳ*; instead of *πρὸς ἡγουμένῳ*.

<sup>3</sup> See Schweighauser's note.

want of sense, what is it? Evil. Do you see then that good sense necessarily contemplates both itself and the opposite? For this reason it is the chief and the first work of a philosopher to examine appearances, and to distinguish them, and to admit none without examination. You see even in the matter of coin, in which our interest appears to be somewhat concerned, how we have invented an art, and how many means the assayer uses to try the value of coin, the sight, the touch, the smell, and lastly the hearing. He throws the coin (*denarius*) down, and observes the sound, and he is not content with its sounding once, but through his great attention he becomes a musician. In like manner, where we think that to be mistaken and not to be mistaken make a great difference, there we apply great attention to discovering the things which can deceive. But in the matter of our miserable ruling faculty, yawning and sleeping, we carelessly admit every appearance, for the harm is not noticed.

When then you would know how careless you are with respect to good and evil, and how active with respect to things which are indifferent<sup>4</sup> (neither good nor evil), observe how you feel with respect to being deprived of the sight of the eyes, and how with respect to being deceived,

<sup>4</sup> "We reckon death among the things which are indifferent (*indifferentia*), which the Greeks name *ἀδιάφορα*. But I name 'indifferent' the things which are neither good nor bad, as disease, pain, poverty, exile, death."—Seneca, *Ep.* 82.

and you will discover that you are far from feeling as you ought to do in relation to good and evil. But this is a matter which requires much preparation, and much labour and study. Well then do you expect to acquire the greatest of arts with small labour? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is very brief. If you would know, read Zeno's <sup>5</sup> writings and you will see. For how few words it requires to say that man's end (or object) is to follow <sup>6</sup> the gods, and that the nature of good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say, What is God, what is appearance, and what is particular and what is universal <sup>7</sup> nature? then indeed many words are necessary. If then Epicurus should come and say, that the good must be in the body; in this case also many words become necessary, and we must be taught what is the leading principle in us, and the fundamental and the substantial; and as it is not probable that the good of a snail is in the shell, is it probable that the

<sup>5</sup> Zeno, a native of Citium, in the island of Cyprus, is said to have come when he was young to Athens, where he spent the rest of a long life in the study and teaching of philosophy. He was the founder of the Stoic sect, and a man respected for his ability and high character. He wrote many philosophical works. Zeno was succeeded in his school by Cleanthes.

<sup>6</sup> Follow. See i. 12, note 2.

<sup>7</sup> "I now have what the universal nature wills me to have, and I do what my nature now wills me to do." M. Antoninus, v. 25, and xi. 5. Epictetus never attempts to say what God is. He was too wise to attempt to do what man cannot do. But man does attempt to do it, and only shows the folly of his attempts, and, I think, his presumption also.



good of a man is in the body? But you yourself, Epicurus, possess something better than this. What is that in you which deliberates, what is that which examines everything, what is that which forms a judgment about the body itself, that it is the principal part? and why do you light your lamp and labour for us, and write so many<sup>8</sup> books? is it that we may not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and what we are with respect to you? Thus the discussion requires many words.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRERD.

WHEN a man holds his proper station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do you wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid conformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish has always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who follow me should exclaim: O the great philosopher! Who are they by whom you wish to be

<sup>8</sup> See note 36 at end.

admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say, that they are mad? Well then do you wish to be admired by madmen?

## CHAPTER XXII.

### OF PRAECOGNITIONS.<sup>1</sup>

PRAECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and praecognition is not contradictory to praecognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction arise? It arises in the adaptation of the praecognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, He has done well: he is a brave man, and another says, "Not so; but he has acted foolishly;" then the disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness<sup>2</sup> should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles;<sup>3</sup> for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon?

<sup>1</sup> See note 39 at end.

<sup>2</sup> See note 40 at end.

<sup>3</sup> Horace, *Epp.* i. 2.

ought not that to be done which is proper and right? Certainly. Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? I do most certainly. Adapt your praecognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father. Achilles says, You ought. It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the praecognition of "ought" or "duty." Further, Agamemnon says, Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" Yes, her whom you love. Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize? Thus the dispute begins.<sup>4</sup>

What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not: in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and generally, all with whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To what kind of things (*οὐσιας*) shall we adapt it? To the things which are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and

<sup>4</sup> Iliad, i. The quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon about giving up Chryseis to her father.

soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny this?

Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain towards society a proper behaviour? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbour. If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath.<sup>5</sup> This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me; and what is he to me if he cannot help me; and further, what is he to me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such as to Fever;<sup>6</sup> and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the

<sup>5</sup> The bath was a place of common resort, where a thief had the opportunity of carrying off a bather's clothes. From men's desires to have what they have not, and do not choose to labour for, spring the disorders of society, as it is said in the epistle of James, iv. 1, to which Mrs. Carter refers.

<sup>6</sup> See i. 19, note 2.

nature of Good in any such things, all this follows.

What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher who is in labour.<sup>7</sup> Now I do not see what the Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the things which depend on the will: all will laugh at me. There will come some greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his head and say, Hear, my child. It is right that you should philosophize; but you ought to have some brains also: all this that you are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you know how to act better than philosophers do.—Man, why then do you blame me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way: Excuse me, as you would excuse lovers: I am not my own master: I am mad.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### AGAINST EPICURUS.

**E**VEN Epicurus perceives that we are by nature social, but having once placed our good in the husk<sup>1</sup> he is no longer able to say

<sup>7</sup> See note 41 at end.

<sup>1</sup> That is, in the body; see i. 20, 17. Compare ii. 20, at the beginning of the chapter.

anything else. For on the other hand he strongly maintains this, that we ought not to admire nor to accept anything which is detached from the nature of good ; and he is right in maintaining this. How then are we [suspicious],<sup>2</sup> if we have no natural affection to our children? Why do you advise the wise man not to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may thus fall into trouble? For does he fall into trouble on account of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What does he care if a little mouse in the house makes lamentation to him? But Epicurus knows that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care about it. For this reason, Epicurus says, that a man who has any sense also does not engage in political matters ; for he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such things ; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as you would among a swarm of flies, what hinders you? But Epicurus, who knows this, ventures to say that we should not bring up children. But a sheep does not desert its own offspring, nor yet a wolf ; and shall a man desert his child? What do you mean? that we should be as silly as sheep? but not even do they desert their offspring : or as savage as wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young. Well, who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping after falling on the ground? For my part I think that even if your

<sup>2</sup> See note 42 at end.

mother and your father had been told by an oracle, that you would say what you have said, they would not have cast you away.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES.

**I**T is circumstances (difficulties) which show what men are.<sup>1</sup> Therefore when a difficulty falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you may say. Why that you may become an Olympic conqueror; but it is not accomplished without sweat. In my opinion no man has had a more profitable difficulty than you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an athlete would deal with a young antagonist. We are now sending a scout to Rome; <sup>2</sup> but no man sends a cowardly scout,

<sup>1</sup> So Ovid says, *Trist.* iv. 3, 79:—

“*Quae latet inque bonis cessat non cognita rebus,  
Apparet virtus arguiturque malis.*”

<sup>2</sup> In the time of Domitian philosophers were banished from Rome and Italy by a *Senatusconsultum* (*Sueton. Domitian*, c. 10; *Dion.* 67, c. 13), and at that time Epictetus, as Gellius says (*xv.* 11), went from Rome to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he opened a school. We may suppose that Epictetus is here speaking of some person who had gone from Nicopolis to Rome to inquire about the state of affairs there under the cruel tyrant Domitian. (*Schweighaeuser.*)

who, if he only hears a noise and sees a shadow anywhere, comes running back in terror and reports that the enemy is close at hand. So now if you should come and tell us, Fearful is the state of affairs at Rome ; terrible is death ; terrible is exile ; terrible is calumny ; terrible is poverty ; fly, my friends ; the enemy is near—we shall answer, Be gone, prophesy for yourself ; we have committed only one fault, that we sent such a scout.

Diogenes,<sup>3</sup> who was sent as a scout before you, made a different report to us. He says that death is no evil, for neither is it base : he says that fame (reputation) is the noise of madmen. And what has this spy said about pain, about pleasure, and about poverty ? He says that to be naked is better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the bare ground is the softest bed ; and he gives as a proof of each thing that he affirms his own courage, his tranquillity, his freedom, and the healthy appearance and compactness of his body. There is no enemy near, he says ; all is peace. How so, Diogenes ? See, he replies, if I am struck, if I have been wounded, if I have fled from any man. This is what a scout ought to be. But you come to us and tell us one thing

<sup>3</sup> Diogenes was brought to king Philip after the battle of Chaeronea as a spy (iii. 22). Plutarch in the treatise, *Quomodo assentator ab amico dignoscatur*, c. 30, states that when Philip asked Diogenes if he was a spy, he replied, Certainly I am a spy, Philip, of your want of judgment and of your folly, which lead you without any necessity to put to the hazard your kingdom and your life in one single hour.



after another. Will you not go back, and you will see clearer when you have laid aside fear?

What then shall I do? What do you do when you leave a ship? Do you take away the helm or the oars? What then do you take away? You take what is your own, your bottle and your wallet; and now if you think of what is your own, you will never claim what belongs to others. The emperor (Domitian) says, Lay aside your laticlave.<sup>4</sup> See, I put on the angusticlave. Lay aside this also. See, I have only my toga. Lay aside your toga. See, I am now naked. But you still raise my envy. Take then all my poor body; when, at a man's command, I can throw away my poor body, do I still fear him?

But a certain person will not leave to me the succession to his estate. What then? had I forgotten that not one of these things was mine. How then do we call them mine? Just as we call the bed in the inn. If then the innkeeper at his death leaves you the beds; all well; but if he leaves them to another, he will have them, and you will seek another bed. If then you shall not find one, you will sleep on the ground: only sleep with a good will and snore, and remember that tragedies have their place among the rich and kings and tyrants, but no poor man fills a part in a tragedy, except as one of the Chorus. Kings indeed commence with prosperity: "ornament

<sup>4</sup> The garment with the broad border, the laticlave, was the dress of a senator; the garment with the narrow border, the angusticlave, was the dress of a man of the equestrian order.

the palace with garlands": then about the third or fourth act they call out, "Oh Cithaeron,<sup>5</sup> why didst thou receive me?" Slave, where are the crowns, where the diadem? The guards help thee not at all. When then you approach any of these persons, remember this that you are approaching a tragedian, not the actor, but Oedipus himself. But you say, such a man is happy; for he walks about with many, and I also place myself with the many and walk about with many. In sum remember this: the door is open; <sup>6</sup> be not more timid than little children, but as they say, when the thing does not please them, "I will play no longer," so do you, when things seem to you of such a kind, say I will no longer play, and be gone: but if you stay, do not complain.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### ON THE SAME.

**I**F these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the will, and

<sup>5</sup> The exclamation of Oedipus in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles, v. 1390.

<sup>6</sup> This means "you can die when you please." Comp. i. c. 9. The power of dying when you please is named by Pliny (N. H. ii. c. 7) the best thing that God has given to man amidst all the sufferings of life. Horace, *Epp.* ii. 2, 213,—

"Vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis;  
Lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti;  
Tempus abire tibi."

the evil too, and that everything else does not concern us, why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things about which we have been busied are in no man's power: and the things which are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have we still?

But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free from hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own subject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of orders did you bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what is your own; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things from you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them? But how do you act? when you seek what is not your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy of confidence? But if you observe these, do you want any others besides? Well, but he has not given these orders, you will say. Produce your *praecognitions* (*προλήψεις*), produce the proofs of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you have

meditated on ; and you will then see that all these things are from God.<sup>1</sup> How long then is it fit to observe these precepts from God, and not to break up the play?<sup>2</sup> As long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Saturnalia<sup>3</sup> a king is chosen by lot, for it has been the custom to play at this game. The king commands : Do you drink, Do you mix the wine, Do you sing, Do you go, Do you come. I obey that the game may not be broken up through me.—But if he says, think that you are in evil plight : I answer, I do not think so ; and who will compel me to think so ? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, Go to Achilles and tear from him Briseis. I go. He says, Come, and I come.

For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical argument, so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be night. I suppose that it is night. Well then ; is it day ? No, for I admitted the hypothesis that it was night. Suppose that you think that it is day ? Suppose that I do. But also think that it is night. That is not consistent

<sup>1</sup> See note 43 at end.

<sup>2</sup> See the end of the preceding chapter. Upton compares Horace's "*Incidere ludum*" (*Epp.* i. 14, 36). Compare also Epictetus, ii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> A festival at Rome in December, a season of jollity and licence (*Livy*, xxii. 1). Compare the passage in *Tacitus*, *Ann.* xiii. 15, in which Nero is chosen by lot to be king : and *Seneca*, *De Constant. Sapient.* c. 12, "*Illi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et praetextam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur.*"

with the hypothesis. So in this case also : Suppose that you are unfortunate. Well, suppose so. Are you then unhappy? Yes. Well then are you troubled with an unfavourable daemon (fortune)? Yes. But think also that you are in misery. This is not consistent with the hypothesis ; and another (Zeus) forbids me to think so.

How long then must we obey such orders? As long as it is profitable ; and this means as long as I maintain that which is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are sour and of bad temper, and they say, " I cannot sup with this man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he fought in Mysia " : " I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill : then I began to be besieged again." But another says, " I prefer to get my supper and to hear him talk as he likes." And do you compare these estimates (judgments) : only do nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to that.—Has it smoked in the chamber? If the smoke is moderate, I will stay ; if it is excessive, I go out : for you must always remember this and hold it fast, that the door is open.—Well, but you say to me, Do not live in Nicopolis. I will not live there.—Nor in Athens.—I will not live in Athens.—Nor in Rome.—I will not live in Rome.—Live in Gyarus.<sup>4</sup>—I will live in Gyarus, but it seems

<sup>4</sup> Gyarus or Gyara, a wretched island in the Aegean sea, to

like a great smoke to live in Gyarus ; and I depart to the place where no man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling place is open to all ; and as to the last garment, that is the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond this. This was the reason why Demetrius<sup>5</sup> said to Nero, "You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you." If I set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave : if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave : for I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught ; as if the snake draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which he guards ; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard, that part your master will attack. Remembering this whom will you still flatter or fear ?

But I should like to sit where the Senators sit.<sup>6</sup>—Do you see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself?—How then shall I see well in any other way in the amphi-

which criminals were sent under the empire at Rome. Juvenal, Sat. i. 73.

<sup>5</sup> Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca (*De Benef.* vii. 1) says : "He was in my opinion a great man, even if he is compared with the greatest." One of his sayings was ; "You gain more by possessing a few precepts of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning many, if you have them not at hand." Seneca often mentions Demetrius. The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (*Life* by Diogenes Laertius) and to Socrates by Xenophon (*Apologia*, 27).

<sup>6</sup> At Rome, and probably in other towns, there were seats reserved for the different classes of men at the public spectacles.

theatre? Man, do not be a spectator at all; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, who put ourselves in straits; that is, our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and revile it; and what will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone, what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishes something.—Strip him.—What do you mean by him?<sup>7</sup>—Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do you.

This was the practice of Socrates: this was the reason why he always had one face. But we choose to practise and study any thing rather than the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say, Philosophers talk paradoxes.<sup>8</sup> But are there no paradoxes in the other arts? and what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in order that he may see? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?

<sup>7</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note.

<sup>8</sup> See note 44 at end.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## WHAT IS THE LAW OF LIFE.

**W**HEN a person was reading hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said, This also is an hypothetical law that we must accept what follows from the hypothesis. But much before this law is the law of life, that we must act conformably to nature. For if in every matter and circumstance we wish to observe what is natural, it is plain that in everything we ought to make it our aim that neither that which is consequent shall escape us, and that we do not admit the contradictory. First then philosophers exercise us in theory<sup>1</sup> (contemplation of things), which is easier ; and then next they lead us to the more difficult things ; for in theory, there is nothing which draws us away from following what is taught ; but in the matters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is ridiculous then who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things ; and we ought to employ this fact as an argument to those parents who are vexed at their children learning philosophy : Am I doing wrong then, my father, and do I not know what is suitable to me and be-

<sup>1</sup> See note 45 at end.



coming? If indeed this can neither be learned nor taught, why do you blame me? but if it can be taught, teach me; and if you can not, allow me to learn from those who say that they know how to teach. For what do you think? do you suppose that I voluntarily fall into evil and miss the good? I hope that it may not be so. What is then the cause of my doing wrong? Ignorance. Do you not choose then that I should get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught by anger the art of a pilot or music? Do you think then that by means of your anger I shall learn the art of life? He only is allowed to speak in this way who has shown such an intention.<sup>2</sup> But if a man only intending to make a display at a banquet and to show that he is acquainted with hypothetical arguments reads them and attends the philosophers, what other object has he than that some man of senatorian rank who sits by him may admire? For there (at Rome) are the really great materials (opportunities), and the riches here (at Nicopolis) appear to be trifles there. This is the reason why it is difficult for a man to be master of the appearances, where the things that disturb the judgment are great.<sup>3</sup> I know a certain person who complained, as he

<sup>2</sup> "Such an intention" appears to mean "the intention of learning." "The son alone can say this to his father, when the son studies philosophy for the purpose of living a good life, and not for the purpose of display" (Wolf).

<sup>3</sup> I have followed Schweighaeuser's explanation of this difficult passage, and I have accepted his emendation ἐκείοντα, in place of the MSS. reading ἐκείντα.

embraced the knees of Epaphroditus, that he had only one hundred and fifty times ten thousand denarii <sup>4</sup> remaining. What then did Epaphroditus do? Did he laugh at him, as we slaves of Epaphroditus did? No, but he cried out with amazement, "Poor man, how then did you keep silence, how did you endure it?"

When Epictetus had reproved <sup>5</sup> (called) the person who was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the teacher who had suggested the reading was laughing at the reader, Epictetus said to the teacher, "You are laughing at yourself: you did not prepare the young man nor did you ascertain whether he was able to understand these matters; but perhaps, you are only employing him as a reader." Well then, said Epictetus, if a man has not ability enough to understand a complex (syllogism), do we trust him in giving praise, do we trust him in giving blame, do we allow that he is able to form a judgment about good or bad? and if such a man blames anyone, does the man care for the blame? and if he praises anyone, is the man elated, when in such small matters as an hypothetical syllogism he who praises cannot see what is consequent on the hypothesis?

This then is the beginning of philosophy, a

<sup>4</sup> This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmae, or of the Roman equivalents denarii. In Roman language the amount would be briefly expressed by "sexagies centena millia H.S.," or simply by "sexagies."

<sup>5</sup> See Schweighauser's note; and all his notes on this chapter, which is rather difficult.

man's perception of the state of his ruling faculty ;<sup>6</sup> for when a man knows that it is weak, then he will not employ it on things of the greatest difficulty. But at present, if men cannot swallow even a morsel, they buy whole volumes and attempt to devour them ; and this is the reason why they vomit them up or suffer indigestion : and then come gripings, defluxes, and fevers.<sup>7</sup> Such men ought to consider what their ability is. In theory it is easy to convince an ignorant person ; but in the affairs of real life no one offers himself to be convinced, and we hate the man who has convinced us. But Socrates advised us not to live a life which is not subjected to examination.<sup>8</sup>

## CHAPTER XXVII.

IN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST,  
AND WHAT AIDS WE SHOULD PROVIDE  
AGAINST THEM.

**A**PPPEARANCES are to us in four ways : for either things appear as they are ; or they are not, and do not even appear to be ; or they

<sup>6</sup> See ii. c. 11.

<sup>7</sup> Seneca, *De Tranquillitate animi*, c. 9, says : " What is the use of countless books and libraries, when the owner scarcely reads in his whole life the tables of contents ? The number only confuses a learner, does not instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than to wander through many."

<sup>8</sup> See Plato's *Apology*, c. 28 ; and Antoninus, iii. 5.

are, and do not appear to be ; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys (troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho<sup>1</sup> and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply the remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we find against habit ? The contrary habit. You hear the ignorant say : "That unfortunate person is dead : his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow ;<sup>2</sup> he was cut off by an untimely death and in a foreign land." Hear the contrary way of speaking : Tear yourself from these expressions : oppose to one habit the contrary habit ; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason ; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we ought to have manifest *præcognitions*

<sup>1</sup> Pyrrho was a native of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He is said to have accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61). The time of his birth is not stated, but it is said that he lived to the age of ninety.

See Levin's Six Lectures, 1871. Lecture II., On the Pyrrhonian Ethic ; Lecture III., On the Grounds of Scepticism.

<sup>2</sup> ἀπώλετο does not mean that the father is dead, and that the mother is dead. They survive and lament. Compare Euripides, *Alcestis*, v. 825 :

ἡνωμένοι καὶ παύσης, οὐ κείνη μόνη.

(*πρόληψις*), cleared of all impurities and ready to hand.

When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary thing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon,<sup>3</sup> the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way: I will go, and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give to another the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doing anything myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something noble.—Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our power to reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death: discover for me the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do you wish me to do? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my wish, I change them; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the

<sup>3</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, xii. v. 328: ἴομεν, ἢ ἐν τέρῳ εὖχος ἀρέτομεν ἢ τις ἡμῖν.

evil. Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for me, what are they to me?—Yes, but you will be an impious man.—In what respect then will it be worse for me than it is now?—To sum up, remember this, that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem necessary (true)?

Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defence of common consent (opinion).<sup>4</sup> If I had a suit even about a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests. With what evidence then am I satisfied? With that which belongs to the matter in hand.<sup>5</sup> How indeed perception is affected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain: for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. How do you know it? When I intend to swallow anything, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own. When

<sup>4</sup> "This means, the received opinion about the knowledge and certainty of things, which knowledge and certainty the Sceptic philosophers attack by taking away general assent or consent" (Wolf).

<sup>5</sup> See note 46 at end.

I intend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom, but I always go to the bread as to a mark.<sup>6</sup> And you yourselves (the Pyrrhonists), who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Who among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill?

What then? Ought we not with all our power to hold to this also, the maintaining of general opinion, and fortifying ourselves against the arguments which are directed against it? Who denies that we ought to do this? Well, he should do it who is able, who has leisure for it; but as to him who trembles and is perturbed and is inwardly broken in heart (spirit), he must employ his time better on something else.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN;  
AND WHAT ARE THE SMALL AND THE GREAT  
THINGS AMONG MEN.<sup>1</sup>

WHAT is the cause of assenting to any thing? The fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to that which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature of the understanding, to incline

<sup>6</sup> ὡς πρὸς σκόνιν, Schweighaeuser's emendation in place of ὡς πρὸς τὸν αἶρα.

<sup>1</sup> See c. 18 of this book.

to the true, to be dissatisfied with the false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof of this? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night. It is not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is not possible. Persuade yourself to take away your persuasion that the stars are even in number.<sup>2</sup> It is impossible. When then any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says ; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?<sup>3</sup>—

'Tis true I know what evil I shall do,  
But passion overpowers the better counsel.

She thought that to indulge her passion and

<sup>2</sup> We cannot conceive that the number of stars is either even or odd. The construction of the word ἀποπάσχειν is uncertain, for, says Schweighaeuser, the word is found only here.

<sup>3</sup> The Medea of Euripides, 1079, "where, instead of δρᾶν μέλλω of Epictetus, the reading is πολμήσω (Upton). "πολμήσω (Kirchoff), with the best MSS, for δρᾶν μέλλω, which, however, is the reading cited by several ancient authors."—Paley's Euripides, note.



take vengeance on her husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so ; but she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will not do it ; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow except that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why then are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about the most important things, and is become a viper rather than a human creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which are supreme?

Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every act is the appearance (the opinion),—whether the thing appears good or bad : if good, he is free from blame ; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and he who suffers another person— whoever remembers this will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel with any man.

So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the appearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The *Iliad* is nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared<sup>4</sup> to Alexander to

<sup>4</sup> See note 47 at end.

carry off the wife of Menelaus : it appeared to Helene to follow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a matter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by such great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing?—But what great matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are these things then like those? Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and sheep ; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there in this great or dreadful? Or show me what is the difference between a man's house and a stork's nest, as far as each is a dwelling ; except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork and a man then like things? What say you?—In body they are very much alike.

Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork? Don't suppose that I say so ; but there is no difference in these matters (which I have mentioned). In what then is the difference? Seek and you will find that there is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man the understanding of what he does, see if it

is not in social community, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. Where then is the great good and evil in men? It is where the difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains fenced round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man also is preserved ; but if any of these things is destroyed and stormed like a city, then the man too perishes ; and in this consist the great things. Alexander, you say, sustained great damage then when the Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers perished. By no means ; for no man is damaged by an action which is not his own ; but what happened at that time was only the destruction of storks' nests : now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened when he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he was not at Troy to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted.

When then women are carried off, when children are made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not evils? How is it then that you add to the facts these opinions? Explain this to me also.—I shall not do that ; but how is it that you say that these are not

evils?—Let us come to the rules: produce the praecognitions (*προληψεις*): for it is because this is neglected that we cannot sufficiently wonder at what men do. When we intend to judge of weights, we do not judge by guess: where we intend to judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess. In all cases where it is our interest to know what is true in any matter, never will any man among us do anything by guess. But in things which depend on the first and the only cause of doing right or wrong, of happiness or unhappiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only are we inconsiderate and rash. There is then nothing like scales (balance), nothing like a rule; but some appearance is presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I then suppose that I am superior to Achilles and Agamemnon, so that they by following appearances do and suffer so many evils: and shall not the appearance be sufficient for me?<sup>5</sup>—And what tragedy has any other beginning? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? An appearance.<sup>6</sup> The Oedipus of Sophocles, what is it? An appearance. The Phœnix? An appearance. The Hippolytus? An appearance. What kind of a man then do you suppose him to be who pays no regard to this matter? And what is the name of those

<sup>5</sup> Schweighaeuser proposes to erase *μή* from the text, but it is, I suppose, in all the MSS. : and it is easy to explain the passage without erasing the *μή*.

<sup>6</sup> See note 48 at end.

who follow every appearance? They are called madmen. Do we then act at all differently?

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### ON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS).

THE being<sup>1</sup> (nature) of the Good is a certain Will; the being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What then are externals? Materials for the Will, about which the will being conversant shall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the good if it does not admire<sup>2</sup> (overvalue) the materials? for the opinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good: but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has fixed this law, and says, "If you would have any thing good, receive it from yourself." You say, No, but I will have it from another.—Do not so: but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls me, I say, Whom do you threaten? If he says, I will put you in chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will cut off your head, I reply, You threaten my head. If he says, I will throw

<sup>1</sup> The word is *οὐσία*. The corresponding Latin word which Cicero introduced is "essentia" (Seneca, Epist. 58). The English word "essence" has obtained a somewhat different sense. The proper translation of *οὐσία* is "being" or "nature."

<sup>2</sup> See note 49 at end.

you into prison, I say, You threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me with banishment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern me, he does not threaten me at all; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear? the master of what? The master of things which are in my own power? There is no such master. Do I fear the master of things which are not in my power? And what are these things to me?

Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they possess? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take those who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, they may truly accuse me.—Yes, but I intend to command your opinions also.—And who has given you this power? How can you conquer the opinion of another man? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself,<sup>3</sup> and is not conquered by another? But nothing else can conquer Will except the Will itself. For this reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just, which is this: Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten are stronger than one. For what? For putting

<sup>3</sup> This is explained by what follows. Opinion does not really conquer itself; but one opinion can conquer another, and nothing else can.

in chains, for killing, for dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In what then are the ten weaker? If the one possesses right opinions and the others do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How is it possible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale in which it is.

How strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates? Speak of the thing as it is : how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to prison by stronger men, and that anyone should have given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these things? Where then for him was the nature of good? Whom shall we listen to, you or him? And what does Socrates say? Anytus and Melitus<sup>4</sup> can kill me, but they cannot hurt me : and further, he says, " If it so pleases God, so let it be."

But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come

<sup>4</sup> The two chief prosecutors of Socrates (Plato, *Apology*, c. 13 ; *Epictetus*, ii. 2).

near showing it; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is superior. One body is stronger than another: many are stronger than one: the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the reason why I also lost my lamp,<sup>5</sup> because in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, and is drawing me to the public place: then others bawl out, Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? see you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what system of philosophy (ἐισαγωγὴν) could I have made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged off; that if ten men should have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have learned to see that everything which happens, if it be independent of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if you have not gained by this. Why then do you seek advantage in anything else than in that in which you have learned that advantage is?

Then sitting in prison I say: The man who cries out in this way<sup>6</sup> neither hears what words

<sup>5</sup> See i. 18, p. 74.

<sup>6</sup> One of those who cry out "Philosopher," etc.



mean, nor understands what is said, nor does he care at all to know what philosophers say or what they do. Let him alone.

But now he says to the prisoner, Come out from your prison.—If you have no further need of me in prison, I come out : if you should have need of me again, I will enter the prison.—How long will you act thus?—So long as reason requires me to be with the body : but when reason does not require this, take away the body, and fare you well.<sup>7</sup> Only we must not do it inconsiderately, nor weakly, nor for any slight reason ; for, on the other hand, God does not wish it to be done, and he has need of such a world and such inhabitants in it.<sup>8</sup> But if he sounds the signal for retreat, as he did to Socrates, we must obey him who gives the signal, as if he were a general.<sup>9</sup>

Well then, ought we to say such things to the many ? Why should we ? Is it not enough for a man to be persuaded himself ? When children come clapping their hands and crying out, “ To-day is the good Saturnalia,”<sup>10</sup> do we say, “ The Saturnalia are not good ” ? By no means, but

<sup>7</sup> See i. 9, p. 42.

<sup>8</sup> See i. 6, p. 26.

<sup>9</sup> Socrates was condemned by the Athenians to die, and he was content to die, and thought that it was a good thing ; and this was the reason why he made such a defence as he did, which brought on him condemnation ; and he preferred condemnation to escaping it by entreating the dicasts (judges), and lamenting, and saying and doing things unworthy of himself, as others did.—Plato, *Apology*, cc. 29-33. Compare *Epict.* i. 9, p. 41.

<sup>10</sup> See i. 25, p. 95.

we clap our hands also. Do you also then, when you are not able to make a man change his mind, be assured that he is a child, and clap your hands with him ; and if you do not choose<sup>11</sup> to do this, keep silent.

A man must keep this in mind ; and when he is called to any such difficulty, he should know that the time is come for showing if he has been instructed. For he who is come into a difficulty is like a young man from a school who has practised the resolution of syllogisms ; and if any person proposes to him an easy syllogism, he says, rather propose to me a syllogism which is skilfully complicated that I may exercise myself on it. Even athletes are dissatisfied with slight young men, and say, "He cannot lift me."—"This is a youth of noble disposition."<sup>12</sup> [You do not so] ; but when the time of trial is come, one of you must weep and say, "I wish that I had learned more." A little more of what ? If you did not learn these things in order to show them in practice, why did you learn them ? I think that there is some one among you who are sitting here, who is suffering like a woman in labour, and saying, "Oh, that such a difficulty does not present itself to me as that which has come to this man ; oh, that I should be wasting my life in a corner, when I

<sup>11</sup> Read *θιλῆς* instead of *θιλῆ*. See Schweighaeuser's note.

<sup>12</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note. This appears to be the remark of Epictetus. If it is so, what follows is not clear. Schweighaeuser explains it, "But most of you act otherwise."

might be crowned at Olympia. When will any one announce to me such a contest?" Such ought to be the disposition of all of you. Even among the gladiators of Caesar (the Emperor) there are some who complain grievously that they are not brought forward and matched, and they offer up prayers to God and address themselves to their superintendents entreating that they may fight.<sup>13</sup> And will no one among you show himself such? I would willingly take a voyage [to Rome] for this purpose and see what my athlete is doing, how he is studying his subject.<sup>14</sup>—I do not choose such a subject, he says. Why, is it in your power to take what subject you choose? There has been given to you such a body as you have, such parents, such brethren, such a country, such a place in your country:—then you come to me and say, Change my subject. Have you not abilities which enable you to manage the subject which has been given to you? [You ought to say]: It is your business to propose; it is mine to exercise myself well. However, you do not say so, but you say, "Do not propose to me such a tropic,"<sup>15</sup> but such [as I would choose]: do not urge against me such an objection, but such [as I would choose]." There will be a time perhaps when tragic actors will suppose that they are [only] masks and buskins and the long cloak.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See note 50 at end.

<sup>14</sup> See note 51 at end.

<sup>15</sup> See note 52 at end.

<sup>16</sup> There will be a time when tragic actors shall not know what

I say, these things, man, are your material and subject. Utter something that we may know whether you are a tragic actor or a buffoon ; for both of you have all the rest in common. If any one then should take away the tragic actor's buskins and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a phantom, is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain ? If he has voice, he still remains.

An example of another kind. "Assume the governorship of a province." I assume it, and when I have assumed it, I show how an instructed man behaves. "Lay aside the laticlave (the mark of senatorial rank), and clothing yourself in rags, come forward in this character." What then, have I not the power of displaying a good voice (that is, of doing something that I ought to do) ? How then do you now appear (on the stage of life) ? As a witness summoned by God. "Come forward,<sup>17</sup> you, and bear testimony for me, for you are worthy to be brought forward as a witness by me : is any thing external to the will good or bad ? do I hurt any man ? have I made every man's interest dependent on any man except himself ? What testimony do you give for God ?"—I am in a

their business is, but will think that it is all show. So, says Wolf, philosophers will be only beard and cloak, and will not show by their life and morals what they really are ; or they will be like false monks, who only wear the cowl, and do not show a life of piety and sanctity.

<sup>17</sup> God is introduced as speaking.—Schweighaeuser.

wretched condition, Master<sup>18</sup> (Lord), and I am unfortunate ; no man cares for me, no man gives me anything ; all blame me, all speak ill of me.—Is this the evidence that you are going to give, and disgrace his summons, who has conferred so much honour on you, and thought you worthy of being called to bear such testimony ?

But suppose that he who has the power has declared, “I judge you to be impious and profane.” What has happened to you? I have been judged to be impious and profane? Nothing else? Nothing else. But if the same person had passed judgment on an hypothetical syllogism (*συμμεμίνον*), and had made a declaration, “the conclusion that, if it is day, it is light, I declare to be false,” what has happened to the hypothetical syllogism? who is judged in this case? who has been condemned? the hypothetical syllogism, or the man who has been deceived by it? Does he then who has the power of making any declaration about you know what is pious or impious? Has he studied it, and has he learned it? Where? From whom? Then is it the fact that a musician pays no regard to him who declares that the lowest<sup>19</sup> chord in the lyre is the highest; nor yet a geometrician, if he declares that the lines from the centre of a circle to the circumference are not equal; and shall he who is really instructed pay any regard

<sup>18</sup> See note 53 at end.

<sup>19</sup> See note 54 at end.

to the uninstructed man when he pronounces judgment on what is pious and what is impious, on what is just and unjust? Oh, the signal wrong done by the instructed.<sup>20</sup> Did they learn this here?

Will you not leave the small arguments (*λογάρια*)<sup>21</sup> about these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them anything; and will you not come forward and make use of what you have learned? For it is not these small arguments that are wanted now: the writings of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted? A man who shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to his words.<sup>22</sup> Assume, I entreat you, this character, that we may no longer use in the schools the examples of the ancients, but may have some example of our own.

To whom then does the contemplation of these

<sup>20</sup> I think that Schweighaeuser's interpretation is right, that "the instructed" are those who think that they are instructed but are not, as they show by their opinion that they accept in moral matters the judgment of an ignorant man, whose judgment in music or geometry they would not accept.

<sup>21</sup> He names these "small arguments" *λογάρια*, which Cicero (*Tusc. Disput.* ii. 12) names "*ratiunculae*."

<sup>22</sup> "What is the profit, my brethren, if any one should say that he hath faith and have not works? . . . . Thus also faith, if it hath not works, is dead in itself. But a man may say, 'Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works.'—*Epistle of James*, ii. 14-18.

matters (philosophical inquiries) belong? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal that loves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things as runaway slaves do : we should sit, as in a theatre, free from distraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another time to the lute-player ; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave has taken his station he praises the actor<sup>23</sup> and at the same time looks round : then if anyone calls out his master's name, the slave is immediately frightened and disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers thus to contemplate the works of nature. For what is a master? Man is not the master of man ; but death is, and life and pleasure and pain ; for if he comes without these things, bring Caesar to me and you will see how firm I am.<sup>34</sup> But when he shall come with these things, thundering and lightning,<sup>25</sup> and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except to recognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long as I have any respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theatre, so do I : I bathe, I drink, I sing ; but all this I do with terror and uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, that is from

<sup>23</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note on *ἐπίστη*.

<sup>24</sup> The word is *εὐστασίω*. The corresponding noun is *εὐστασία*, which is the title of this chapter.

<sup>25</sup> Upton supposes that Epictetus is alluding to the verse of Aristophanes (*Acharn.* 531), where it is said of Pericles :

He flashed, he thundered, and confounded Hellas,

those things by means of which masters are formidable, what further trouble have I, what master have I still?

What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we ought to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant<sup>26</sup> (τοῖς ἰδιώταις) and to say: "This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for himself: I excuse him." For Socrates also excused the jailer, who had the charge of him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to drink the poison, and said, How generously he laments over us.<sup>27</sup> Does he then say to the jailer that for this reason we have sent away the women? No, but he says it to his friends who were able to hear (understand) it; and he treats the jailer as a child.

<sup>26</sup> See note 55 at end.

<sup>27</sup> Compare the Phaedon of Plato (§ 151). The children of Socrates were brought in to see him before he took the poison by which he died; and also the wives of the friends of Socrates who attended him to his death. Socrates had ordered his wife Xanthippe to be led home before he had his last conversation with his friends, and she was taken away lamenting and bewailing.



## CHAPTER XXX.

WHAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE READY IN  
DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.<sup>1</sup>

**W**HEN you are going in to any great personage, remember that another also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please him rather than the other. He then who sees from above asks you : In the schools what used you to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace ? I used to say that they are things indifferent (neither good nor bad). What then do you say of them now ? Are they changed at all ? No. Are you changed then ? No. Tell me then what things are indifferent. The things which are independent of the will. Tell me, also, what follows from this. The things which are independent of the will are nothing to me. Tell me also about the Good, what was your opinion ? A will such as we ought to have and also such a use of appearances. And the end (purpose), what is it ? To follow thee. Do you say this now also ? I say the same now also.

Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember these things ; and you will see what a youth is who has studied these things when he

<sup>1</sup> The reader may understand why Epictetus gave such a lesson as this, if he will remember the tyranny under which men at that time lived.

is among men who have not studied them. I indeed imagine that you will have such thoughts as these : Why do we make so great and so many preparations for nothing ? Is this the thing which men name power ? Is this the antechamber ? this the men of the bedchamber ? this the armed guards ? Is it for this that I listened to so many discourses ? All this is nothing : but I have been preparing myself as for something great.





## BOOK II,

### CHAPTER I.

THAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION.

THE opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some to be a paradox ; but still let us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do everything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in my opinion is of this kind : if we asserted that we ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said ? for if these things are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things independent of our will do not admit

either the nature of evil nor of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should employ caution? For if the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident because of our caution. For by employing caution towards things which are really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not so.

We are then in the condition of deer;<sup>1</sup> when they flee from the huntsmen's feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly

<sup>1</sup> It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by displaying feathers of various colours on ropes or strings and thus frightening them towards the nets. Virgil, *Georg.* iii. 372—

*Puniceaeve agitant pavidos formidine pennae.*

or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness ; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will immediately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoiding what he chooses : but if he transfer it to the things which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet <sup>2</sup> who said

Not death is evil, but a shameful death.

Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to escape ; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness, rash-

<sup>2</sup> Euripides, fragments.

ness and indifference. These things Socrates<sup>3</sup> properly used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in like manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other reason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated<sup>4</sup> from the spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be separated now? for if it is not separated now, it will be separated afterwards. Why? That the period of the universe may be completed,<sup>5</sup> for it has need of the present, and of the future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If this does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open :<sup>6</sup> if it does, bear (with things). For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so we have no trouble.

What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the

<sup>3</sup> In the *Phaedon*, c. 24.

<sup>4</sup> It was the opinion of some philosophers that the soul was a portion of the divinity sent down into human bodies.

<sup>5</sup> See note 56 at end.

<sup>6</sup> See i. 9, note 8; and see note 57 at end.

most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers who say that the educated only are free. How is this? In this manner. Is freedom anything else than the power of living as we choose? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? We do not. No one then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do you wish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? By no means. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you say, We only allow free persons to be educated? For philosophers say we allow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not allow it. When then a man has turned<sup>7</sup> round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing? He has done something. What? He has turned round his own slave before the praetor. Has he done nothing more? Yes: he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free? No

<sup>7</sup> See note 58 at end.

more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant? why do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind? It is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which you may determine what those things are with reference to which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those things with reference to which you ought to be cautious: courageous in that which does not depend on your will; cautious in that which does depend on it.

Well have I not read to you,<sup>8</sup> and do you not know what I was doing? In what? In my little dissertations.—Show me how you are with respect to desire and aversion (*ἐκκλίσειν*); and show me if you do not fail in getting what you wish, and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid: but as to these long and laboured sentences<sup>9</sup> you will take them and blot them out.

What then did not Socrates write? And who wrote so much?<sup>10</sup>—But how? As he could not

<sup>8</sup> These are the words of some pupil who is boasting of what he has written.

<sup>9</sup> The word is *περίδια*. I am not sure about the exact meaning of *περίδια*: see the notes of Wolf and Schweighaeuser.

<sup>10</sup> No other author speaks of Socrates having written anything. It is therefore very difficult to explain this passage in which Arrian, who took down the words of Epictetus, represents him as saying that Socrates wrote so much. Socrates talked



always have at hand one to argue against his principles or to be argued against in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he was always treating at least some one subject in a practical way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But little dissertations and that method which I speak of, he leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who being free from perturbations <sup>11</sup> have leisure, or to such as are too foolish to reckon consequences.

And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and display those things which you possess, and recite them, and make an idle show,<sup>12</sup> and say, See how I make dialogues? Do not so, my man; but rather say, See how I am not disappointed of that which I desire: See how I do not fall into that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condemnation. This is the proper display of a young man who is come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and let no one ever hear you say a word about these things; and if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and syllo-

much, and Epictetus may have spoken of talking as if it were writing: for he must have known that Socrates was not a writer.

<sup>11</sup> See note 59 at end.

<sup>12</sup> See note 60 at end.

gisms : do you labour at thinking about death,<sup>13</sup> chains, the rack, exile ;<sup>14</sup> and do all this with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous : courageous towards the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in things which are within the power of the will.

## CHAPTER II.

### OF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION).

CONSIDER, you who are going into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For

<sup>13</sup> "The whole life of philosophers," says Cicero (*Tusc. i. 30*), following Plato, "is a reflection upon death."

<sup>14</sup> See note 61 at end.

who is the master of such things? Who can take them away? If you choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not to desire? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will determine against you something that appears formidable; but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what else do you care for? Let this be your preface,<sup>1</sup> this your narrative, this your confirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this your applause (or the approbation which you will receive).

Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his trial,<sup>2</sup> Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my life? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in my own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my private or in my public life.

But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this

<sup>1</sup> Epictetus refers to the rhetorical divisions of a speech.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. c. 8, 4) has reported this saying of Socrates on the authority of Hermogenes. Compare the *Apology* of Xenophon near the beginning.

moment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees ; if to weep, weep ; if to groan, groan. For when you have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well-bred cock or a mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once ; and let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature of evil and good ? It is where truth is : where truth is and where nature is, there is caution : where truth is, there is courage where nature is.<sup>3</sup>

For what do you think ? do you think that, if Socrates had wished to preserve externals, he would have come forward and said : Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, but to harm me they are not able ? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and fortune, but to another end ? What is the reason then that he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates them ?<sup>4</sup> Just

<sup>3</sup> Schweighaeuser says that he can extract no sense out of this passage. I leave it as it is.

<sup>4</sup> There is some difficulty here in the original. See Schweighaeuser's note

in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had a little suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved to the judges (δικασταῖς) that his case was just, said when he had come to the peroration of his speech, I will neither entreat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it is you rather than I who are on your trial. And thus he ended the business.<sup>5</sup> What need was there of this? Only do not entreat; but do not also say, "I do not entreat;" unless there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such a peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order to submit to trial? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come: but if you choose to submit and to plead your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consistent with this object, provided you maintain what is your own (your proper character).

For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me<sup>6</sup> (tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind so as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to

<sup>5</sup> The words may mean either what I have written in the text, or "and so he lost his suit."

<sup>6</sup> "The meaning is, You must not ask for advice when you are come into a difficulty, but every man ought to have such principles as to be ready on all occasions to act as he ought; just as he who knows how to write can write any name which is proposed to him" (Wolf).

write when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion but that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if you have practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) anything that is required. If<sup>7</sup> you are not, what can I now suggest? For if circumstances require something else, what will you say, or what will you do? Remember then this general precept and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is the master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain or try to avoid.<sup>8</sup>

### CHAPTER III.

#### TO THOSE WHO RECOMMEND PERSONS TO PHILOSOPHERS.

**D**IOGENES said well to one who asked from him letters of recommendation, "That you are a man, he said, he will know as soon as he sees you; and he will know whether you are good or bad, if he is by experience skilful to distinguish the good and the bad; but if he is without experience, he will never know, if I write

<sup>7</sup> See note 62 at end.

<sup>8</sup> See the *Encheiridion* or *Manual* (c. 14).

to him ten thousand times.”<sup>1</sup> For it is just the same as if a drachma (a piece of silver money) asked to be recommended to a person to be tested. If he is skilful in testing silver, he will know what you are, for you (the drachma) will recommend yourself. We ought then in life also to have some skill as in the case of silver coin that a man may be able to say like the judge of silver, Bring me any drachma and I will test it. But in the case of syllogisms, I would say, Bring any man that you please, and I will distinguish for you the man who knows how to resolve syllogisms and the man who does not. Why? Because I know how to resolve syllogisms. I have the power, which a man must have who is able to discover those who have the power of resolving syllogisms. But in life how do I act? At one time I call a thing good, and at another time bad. What is the reason? The contrary to that which is in the case of syllogisms, ignorance and inexperience.

## CHAPTER IV.

### AGAINST A PERSON WHO HAD ONCE BEEN DETECTED IN ADULTERY.

AS Epictetus was saying that man is formed for fidelity, and that he who subverts fidelity subverts the peculiar characteristic of

<sup>1</sup> See note 63 at end.

men, there entered one of those who are considered to be men of letters, who had once been detected in adultery in the city. Then Epictetus continued, But if we lay aside this fidelity for which we are formed and make designs against our neighbour's wife, what are we doing? What else but destroying and overthrowing? Whom, the man of fidelity, the man of modesty, the man of sanctity. Is this all? And are we not overthrowing neighbourhood, and friendship, and the community; and in what place are we putting ourselves? How shall I consider you, man? As a neighbour, as a friend? What kind of one? As a citizen? Wherein shall I trust you? So if you were an utensil so worthless that a man could not use you, you would be pitched out on the dung-heaps, and no man would pick you up. But if being a man you are unable to fill any place which befits a man, what shall we do with you? For suppose that you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold the place of a slave? And who will trust you? Are you not then content that you also should be pitched somewhere on a dung-heap, as a useless utensil, and a bit of dung? Then will you say, no man cares for me, a man of letters? They do not, because you are bad and useless. It is just as if the wasps complained because no man cares for them, but all fly from them, and if a man can, he strikes them and knocks them down. You have such a sting that you throw into trouble and pain any man that you wound



with it. What would you have us do with you? You have no place where you can be put.

What then, are not women common by nature?<sup>1</sup> So I say also; for a little pig is common to all the invited guests, but when the portions have been distributed, go, if you think it right, and snatch up the portion of him who reclines next to you, or slyly steal it, or place your hand down by it and lay hold of it, and if you cannot tear away a bit of the meat, grease your fingers and lick them. A fine companion over cups, and Socratic guest indeed! Well, is not the theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their seats, come, if you think proper, and eject one of them. In this way women also are common by nature. When then the legislator, like the master of a feast, has distributed them, will you not also look for your own portion and not filch and handle what belongs to another. But I am a man of letters and understand Archedemus.<sup>2</sup> — Understand Archedemus then, and be an adulterer, and faithless, and instead of a man, be a wolf or an ape: for what is the difference?<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See note 64 at end.

<sup>2</sup> Archedemus was a Stoic philosopher of Tarsus. We know little about him.

<sup>3</sup> A man may be a philosopher or pretend to be; and at the same time he may be a beast.

## CHAPTER V.

HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE.

THINGS themselves (materials) are indifferent;<sup>1</sup> but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall a man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time be careful and neither rash nor negligent? If he imitates those who play at dice. The counters are indifferent; the dice are indifferent. How do I know what the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously the cast of the dice, this is my business.<sup>2</sup> Thus then in life also the chief business is this: distinguish and separate things, and say, *Externals* are not in my power: *will* is in my power. Where shall I seek the good and the bad? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what does not belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage or anything of the kind.

What then? Should we use such things care-

<sup>1</sup> The materials (*ὕλαι*) on which man works are neither good nor bad, and so they are, as Epictetus names them, indifferent. But the use of things, or of material, is not indifferent. They may be used well or ill, conformably to nature or not.

<sup>2</sup> Terence says (*Adelphi*, iv. 7)—

*Si illud, quod est maxime opus, jactu non cadit,  
Illud quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas.*

"Dexterously" is "arte," *τεχνικῶς* in Epictetus.—Upton.

lessly? In no way: for this on the other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequently against nature; but we should act carefully because the use is not indifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom from perturbations because the material is indifferent. For where the material is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me nor compel me. Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things is not in my power; nor is it good or bad; but the use is either bad or good, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and to bring together these two things, the carefulness of him who is affected by the matter (or things about him) and the firmness of him who has no regard for it; but it is not impossible: and if it is, happiness is impossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What can I do? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, the opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for? for my part is done. The business belongs to another, the master.—But the ship is sinking—what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish: for I am not an immortal being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day: I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What difference then does it make to me, how I pass away, whether by

being suffocated, or by a fever, for I must pass through some such means?

This is just what you will see those doing who play at ball skilfully. No one cares about the ball<sup>3</sup> as being good or bad, but about throwing and catching it. In this therefore is the skill, in this the art, the quickness, the judgment, so that even if I spread out my lap I may not be able to catch it, and another, if I throw, may catch the ball. But if with perturbation and fear we receive or throw the ball, what kind of play is it then, and wherein shall a man be steady, and how shall a man see the order in the game? But one will say, Throw; or Do not throw; and another will say, You have thrown once. This is quarrelling, not play.

Socrates then knew how to play at ball. How? By using pleasantry in the court where he was tried. Tell me, he says, Anytus, how do you say that I do not believe in God. The Daemons (*δαίμονες*), who are they, think you? Are they not sons of Gods, or compounded of gods and men? When Anytus admitted this, Socrates said, Who then, think you, can believe that there are mules (half asses), but not asses; and this he said as if he were playing at ball.<sup>4</sup> And what was the ball in that case? Life, chains, banishment, a draught of poison, separation from wife and leaving children orphans. These were the things with which he was playing; but still he

<sup>3</sup> See note 65 at end.

<sup>4</sup> See note 66 at end.

did play and threw the ball skilfully. So we should do : we must employ all the care of the players, but show the same indifference about the ball. For we ought by all means to apply our art to some external material, not as valuing the material, but, whatever it may be, showing our art in it. Thus too the weaver does not make wool, but exercises his art upon such as he receives. Another gives you food and property and is able to take them away and your poor body also. When then you have received the material, work on it. If then you come out (of the trial) without having suffered anything, all who meet you will congratulate you on your escape ; but he who knows how to look at such things, if he shall see that you have behaved properly in the matter, will commend you and be pleased with you ; and if he shall find that you owe your escape to any want of proper behaviour, he will do the contrary. For where rejoicing is reasonable, there also is congratulation reasonable.

How then is it said that some external things are according to nature and others contrary to nature? It is said as it might be said if we were separated from union (or society)<sup>5</sup> : for to the foot I shall say that it is according to nature for it to be clean ; but if you take it as a foot and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for the good

<sup>5</sup> ἀπόλυτοι. Compare Antoninus, x. 24, viii. 34.

of the whole body ; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should think in some such way about ourselves also. What are you? A man. If you consider yourself as detached from other men, it is according to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consider yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at another time be in want, and in some cases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled? Do you not know, that as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you are no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For what is a man?<sup>6</sup> A part of a state, of that first which consists of Gods and of men ; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of the universal state. What then, must I be brought to trial ; must another have a fever, another sail on the sea, another die, and another be condemned? Yes, for it is impossible in such a body, in such a universe of things, among so many living together, that such things should not happen, some to one and others to others. It is your duty then since you are come here, to say what you ought, to arrange these things as it is fit.<sup>7</sup> Then some

<sup>6</sup> Compare Antoninus, ii. 16, iii. 11, vi. 44, xii. 36 ; and Seneca, de Otio Sap. c. 31 ; and Cicero, De Fin. iii. 19.

<sup>7</sup> He tells some imaginary person, who hears him, that since he is come into the world, he must do his duty in it.

one says, "I shall charge you with doing me wrong." Much good may it do you: I have done my part; but whether you also have done yours, you must look to that; for there is some danger of this too, that it may escape your notice.

## CHAPTER VI.

### OF INDIFFERENCE.<sup>1</sup>

THE hypothetical proposition<sup>2</sup> is indifferent: the judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or opinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent. When any man tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of material things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation and power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over you.

<sup>1</sup> This discussion is with a young philosopher who, intending to return from Nicopolis to Rome, feared the tyranny of Domitian, who was particularly severe towards philosophers. See i. 24, note 2. Compare Plin. Epp. i. 12, and the expression of Corellius Rufus about the detestable villain, the Emperor Domitian.

The title "of Indifference" means "of the indifference of things;" of the things which are neither good nor bad.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ συνημμένον, p. 120.

For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them ; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them by saying, "I have learned them, and you have not." Thus also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need (of such practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind.

Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly.—But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window ; and when I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the window.—But still speak to him.—In what way? Not meanly. But suppose that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, and not his? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what belongs to another ; and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to those which are more adapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature ; for God himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move towards it ; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into the mud.<sup>3</sup> For why are ears of

<sup>3</sup> See p. 145.



corn produced? Is it not that they may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped?<sup>4</sup> for they are not separated from communion with other things. If then they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But this is a curse upon ears of corn, to be never reaped. So we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither know what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas<sup>5</sup> when he was going to strike the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat: so it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call them "circumstances." What kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which are around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has been produced? But that

<sup>4</sup> See note 67 at end.

<sup>5</sup> The story is in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (iv. near the beginning where Cyrus says that he called Chrysantas by name Epictetus, as Upton remarks, quotes from memory.

which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades? All ways are equal.<sup>6</sup> But if you will listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months: but a fever is often a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty names.

I am in danger of my life from Caesar.<sup>7</sup> And am not I in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes: and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what hazard do you run? Is it not the hazard of your life? But I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own? how? For who can compel you to have any opinion which you do not choose? But is it as to another man's opinion? and what kind of danger is yours, if others have false opinions? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Rome? Yes: what then if I should be sent to Gyara?<sup>8</sup> If that suits you, you will go there; but if it does not, you can go to another place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then do you go up to Rome as if it were something

<sup>6</sup> See note 68 at end.

<sup>7</sup> The text has *ἐν Κασσάνδρῃ*; but *ἐν* perhaps ought to be *ἐξ* or *ἀπὸ*.

<sup>8</sup> See i. 25, note 4.

great? It is not worth all this preparation, that an ingenuous youth should say, It was not worth while to have heard so much and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remember that division by which your own and not your own are distinguished: never claim anything which belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high and the other low; but the will can be maintained equal, if you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans in prison.\* But in our present disposition, consider if we could endure in prison another person saying to us, Would you like me to read paeans to you?—Why do you trouble me? do you not know the evils which hold me? Can I in such circumstances (listen to paeans)?—What circumstances? — I am going to die.—And will other men be immortal?

\* Diogenes Laertius reports in his life of Socrates that he wrote in prison a paean, and he gives the first line, which contains an address to Apollo and Artemis.

## CHAPTER VII.

### HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION.

**T**HROUGH an unreasonable regard to divination many of us omit many duties.<sup>1</sup> For what more can the diviner see than death or danger or disease, or generally things of that kind? If then I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my duty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination? Have I not within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil, and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of both? What need have I then to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds, and why do I submit when he says, It is for your interest? For does he know what is for my interest, does he know what is good; and as he has learned the signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs of good and evil? For if he knows the signs of these, he knows the signs both of the beautiful and of the ugly, and of the just and of the unjust. Do you tell me, man, what is the thing which is signified for me: is it life or death, poverty or wealth? But whether these things are for my interest or whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. Why don't you give your opinion on matters of

<sup>1</sup> See note 69 at end.

grammar, and why do you give it here about things on which we are all in error and disputing with one another?<sup>2</sup> The woman therefore, who intended to send by a vessel a month's provisions to Gratilla<sup>3</sup> in her banishment, made a good answer to him who said that Domitian would seize what she sent, I would rather, she replied, that Domitian should seize all than that I should not send it.

What then leads us to frequent use of divination? Cowardice, the dread of what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father? Let us see: let us sacrifice on the occasion.—Yes, master, as fortune chooses.—When he has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if we received the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they play upon us.<sup>4</sup>

What then should we do? We ought to come (to divination) without desire or aversion, as the wayfarer asks of the man whom he meets which

<sup>2</sup> A man who gives his opinion on grammar gives an opinion on a thing of which many know something. A man who gives his opinion on divination or on future events, gives an opinion on things of which we all know nothing. When then a man affects to instruct on things unknown, we may ask him to give his opinion on things which are known, and so we may learn what kind of man he is.

<sup>3</sup> Gratilla was a lady of rank, who was banished from Rome and Italy by Domitian. Pliny, *Epp.* iii. 11.

<sup>4</sup> As knavish priests have often played on the fears and hopes of the superstitious.

of two roads leads (to his journey's end), without any desire for that which leads to the right rather than to the left, for he has no wish to go by any road except the road which leads (to his end). In the same way ought we to come to God also as a guide ; as we use our eyes, not asking them to show us rather such things as we wish, but receiving the appearances of things such as the eyes present them to us. But now we trembling take the augur (bird interpreter)' by the hand, and while we invoke God we entreat the augur, and say, Master, have mercy on me ;<sup>6</sup> suffer me to come safe out of this difficulty. Wretch, would you have then anything other than what is best ? Is there anything better than what pleases God ? Why do you, as far as is in your power, corrupt your judge and lead astray your adviser ?

<sup>5</sup> Schweighaeuser reads τὸν ἐρμῆνα. See his note.

<sup>6</sup> "Κεῖσε δαῖμον, Domine miserere. Notissima formula in Christiana ecclesia jam usque a primis temporibus usurpata" (Upton).

## CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT IS THE NATURE (*ἡ οὐσία*) OF THE GOOD.<sup>1</sup>

**G**OD is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial.<sup>2</sup> It is consistent then that where the nature of God is, there also the nature of the good should be. What then is the nature of God?<sup>3</sup> Flesh? Certainly not. An estate in land? By no means. Fame? No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason? Yes. Herein then simply seek the nature of the good; for I suppose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal, why do you still seek it anywhere except in the superiority of rational over irrational animals?<sup>4</sup> Now plants have not even the power of using appearances, and for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it require this use

<sup>1</sup> Schweighaeuser observes that the title of this chapter would more correctly be *ἡ θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν*, God in man. There is no better chapter in the book.

<sup>2</sup> Socrates (Xenophon, *Mem.* iv. 6, 8) concludes "that the useful is good to him to whom it is useful."

<sup>3</sup> I do not remember that Epictetus has attempted any other description of the nature of God. He has done more wisely than some who have attempted to answer a question which cannot be answered. But see ii. 14, p. 185.

<sup>4</sup> Compare Cicero, *de Offic.* i. 27.

only? For if you say that it requires this use only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhappiness are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and you do right; for if they possess even in the highest degree the use of appearances, yet they have not the faculty of understanding the use of appearances; and there is good reason for this, for they exist for the purpose of serving others, and they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, does not exist for any superiority over others. No; but because we had need of a back which is able to bear something; and in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for this reason he received also the faculty of making use of appearances, for otherwise he would not have been able to walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appearances, it is plain that consistently with reason he would not then have been subjected to us, nor would he have done us these services, but he would have been equal to us and like to us.

Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for if it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals also the works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor yet parts of the Gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion separated from the deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of



him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent? <sup>5</sup> Why do you not know whence you came? Will you not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat and whom you feed? When you are in conjunction with a woman, will you not remember who you are who do this thing? When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not. <sup>6</sup> Do you think that I mean some god of silver or of gold, and external? You carry him within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing: but when God himself is present within and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why do we fear when we are sending a young

<sup>5</sup> Noble descent. See i. c. 9.

The doctrine that God is in man is an old doctrine. Euripides said (Apud Theon. Soph. Progm.):—

*Ὁ θεὸς γὰρ ἑστὶν ἐν ἐμῷ ὡς ἐν ἑστίᾳ θεῷ.*

The doctrine became a commonplace of the poets (Ovid, Fast. vi.), "Est deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo;" and Horace, Sat. ii. 2, 79, "Atque affigit humo divinae particulam auræ." See i. 14, note 4.

<sup>6</sup> See note 70 at end.

man from the school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have improper intercourse with women ; and lest the rags in which he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments should make him proud ? This youth (if he acts thus) does not know his own God : he knows not with whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure when he says, "I wish I had you (God) with me." Have you not God with you ? and do you seek for any other, when you have him ? or will God tell you anything else than this ? If you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself and of the artist, and if you had any understanding (power of perception) you would try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) to those who look on you. But now because Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not how you shall appear ? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the artist in the other ? or the work in the one case like the other ? And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the faculties, which the artist shows in making it ? Is it not marble or bronze, or gold or ivory ? and the Athena of Phidias when she has once extended the hand and received in it the figure of Victory<sup>7</sup> stands in that attitude for ever. But

<sup>7</sup> The Athena of Phidias was in the Parthenon on the Athenian Acropolis, a colossal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame work of wood, covered with ivory and gold (Pausanias, i. 24.)

the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you dishonour him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also intrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will you not think of this too, but do you also dishonour your guardianship? But if God had intrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He has delivered yourself to your own care, and says, I had no one fitter to intrust him to than yourself: keep him for me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrified, free from passion and perturbation. And then you do not keep him such.

But some will say, Whence has this fellow got the arrogance which he displays and these supercilious looks?—I have not yet so much gravity as befits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I have learned and in what I have assented to: I still fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as I ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have: then I will show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished. What do you expect? a supercilious countenance? Does the Zeus at

The figure of Victory stood on the hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins. See. i. 6, p. 27, and the note in Schweighæuser's edition. Cicero, *de Natura Deorum*, iii. 34.

Olympia<sup>8</sup> lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say

Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail.—

*Iliad*, i. 526.

Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation—What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What nerves<sup>9</sup> are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion<sup>10</sup> which never falls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit (*εἰμωδ*), a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you shall see.

<sup>8</sup> The great statue at Olympia was the work of Phidias (*Pausanias*, v. 11). It was a seated colossal chryselephantine statue, and held a Victory in the right hand.

<sup>9</sup> An allusion to the combatants in the public exercises, who used to show their shoulders, muscles, and sinews as a proof of their strength. See i. 4, ii. 18, iii. 22 (*Mrs. Carter*).

<sup>10</sup> *ἰσχυρὸν*. See Book iii. c. 2.

## CHAPTER IX.

THAT WHEN WE CANNOT FULFIL THAT WHICH  
THE CHARACTER OF A MAN PROMISES,  
WE ASSUME THE CHARACTER OF A PHILO-  
SOPHER.

**I**T is no common (easy) thing to do this only,  
to fulfil the promise of a man's nature. For  
what is a man? The answer is, a rational and  
mortal being. Then by the rational faculty from  
whom are we separated?<sup>1</sup> From wild beasts.  
And from what others? From sheep and like  
animals. Take care then to do nothing like  
a wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the  
character of a man; you have not fulfilled  
your promise. See that you do nothing like a  
sheep; but if you do, in this case also the man  
is lost. What then do we do as sheep? When  
we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when  
we act rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what  
have we declined? To sheep. What have we  
lost? The rational faculty. When we act con-  
tentiously and harmfully and passionately and  
violently, to what have we declined? To wild  
beasts. Consequently some of us are great wild  
beasts, and others little beasts, of a bad dispo-  
sition and small, whence we may say, Let me be

<sup>1</sup> See note 71 at end.

caten by a lion.<sup>2</sup> But in all these ways the promise of a man acting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex) proposition maintained?<sup>3</sup> When it fulfils what its nature promises; so that the preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a conjunction of truths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what it promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved? (when they severally keep their promise). What is the wonder then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in like manner is lost? Each man is improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man accustoms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him: and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on the other hand contrary actions strengthen contrary characters: shamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the faithless man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an angry temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the avaricious man more avaricious.

For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with learning only, but also to add

<sup>2</sup> This seems to be a proverb. If I am eaten, let me be eaten by the nobler animal.

<sup>3</sup> See note 72 at end.

study, and then practice.<sup>4</sup> For we have long been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the expositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not able to discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things (in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the indifferent are wealth, health, reputation.—Then, if in the midst of our talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of those who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed. Philosopher, where are the things which you were talking about? Whence did you produce and utter them? From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat the weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice? For it is one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to eat. That which has been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy colour, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it; but you have no other advantage from it

<sup>4</sup> See note 73 at end.

except so far as to appear to possess it. For what is the difference between explaining these doctrines and those of men who have different opinions? Sit down now and explain according to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus himself.<sup>5</sup> Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you act the part of a Jew, when you are a Greck? Do you not see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian or an Egyptian? and when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say, This man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has assumed the affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew.<sup>6</sup> Thus we too being falsely imbued (baptized), are in name Jews, but in fact we are something else. Our affects (feelings) are inconsistent with our words; we are far from practising what we say, and that of which we are proud, as if we knew it. Thus being unable to fulfil even what the character of a man promises, we even add to it the profession of a philosopher, which is as heavy a burden, as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds should attempt to raise the stone which Ajax<sup>7</sup> lifted.

<sup>5</sup> See note 74 at end.

<sup>6</sup> See note 75 at end.

<sup>7</sup> See ii. 24; *Iliad*, vii. 264, etc.; *Juvenal*, xv. 65:

Nec hunc lapidem, quales et Turnus et Ajax  
Vel quo Tydides percussit pondere coxam  
Aeneac. (Upton.)



## CHAPTER X.

HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF  
LIFE FROM NAMES.

CONSIDER who you are. In the first place, you are a man ;<sup>1</sup> and this is one who has nothing superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to it ; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by reason. You have been separated from wild beasts : you have been separated from domestic animals (*προβάτων*). Further, you are a citizen of the world,<sup>2</sup> and a part of it, not one of the subservient (serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise (promise)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself ; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the

<sup>1</sup> Cicero (de Fin. iv. 10) ; Seneca, Ep. 95.

<sup>2</sup> See i. 9. M. Antoninus, vi. 44 : " But my nature is rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world."

I have here translated *προβάτων* by " domestic animals ; " I suppose that the bovine species, and sheep and goats are meant.

hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows<sup>3</sup> that these things are assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen.<sup>4</sup> But now because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we are made among other things for this.

After this remember that you are a son. What does this character promise? To consider that everything which is the son's belongs to the father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor to say or do anything which does him an injury, to yield to him in all things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After this know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due to make concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your brother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which are inde-

<sup>3</sup> See note 76 at end.

<sup>4</sup> Antoninus, vi. 42: "We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others without knowing what they do."

pendent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may have the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thing it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, to gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the advantage.<sup>5</sup>

Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are a senator : if a youth, that you are a youth : if an old man, that you are an old man ; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith ; and if you have forgotten the brother, and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to have changed one thing for another in that case ? And if instead of a man, who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing ? But (I suppose) you must lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage ? And does the loss of nothing else do a man damage ? If you had lost the art of grammar or music, would you think the loss of it a damage ? and if you shall lose modesty, moderation (*καταστολήν*) and gentleness, do you

<sup>5</sup> A lettuce is an example of the most trifling thing. A seat probably means a seat of superiority, a magistrate's seat, a Roman *sella curulis*

think the loss nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the will, and the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have them nor to lose them is shameful; but as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is shameful and matter of reproach and a misfortune. What does the pathic lose? He loses the (character of) man. What does he lose who makes the pathic what he is? Many other things; and he also loses the man no less than the other. What does he lose who commits adultery? He loses the (character of the) modest, the temperate, the decent, the citizen, the neighbour. What does he lose who is angry? Something else. What does the coward lose? Something else. No man is bad without suffering some loss and damage. If then you look for the damage in the loss of money only, all these men receive no harm or damage; it may be, they have even profit and gain, when they acquire a bit of money by any of these deeds. But consider that if you refer everything to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in your opinion damaged. Yes, you say, for he is mutilated in his body. Well; but does he who has lost his smell only lose nothing? Is there then no energy of the soul which is an advantage to him who possesses it, and a damage to him who has lost it?—Tell me what sort (of energy) you mean.—Have we not a natural modesty?—We have.—Does he who loses this sustain no damage? is he deprived of

nothing, does he part with nothing of the things which belong to him? Have we not naturally fidelity? natural affection, a natural disposition to help others, a natural disposition to forbearance? The man then who allows himself to be damaged in these matters, can he be free from harm and uninjured?<sup>6</sup> What then? shall I not hurt him, who has hurt me?<sup>7</sup> In the first place consider what hurt (*βλάβη*) is, and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will (purpose, intention, *προαίρεσις*), and the evil also in the will,<sup>8</sup> see if what you say is not this: What then, since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust act to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves (mentally think of) something of this kind? But where there is any detriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm there; and where the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is (you suppose) no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done an unjust act neither suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, nor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than (security to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest and faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the least, except only in the school so far as a few words are concerned.

<sup>6</sup> οὐτος ἢ ἀβλαβής. See Schweighaeuser's note.

<sup>7</sup> See note 77 at end.

<sup>8</sup> See the beginning of ii. 16.

Therefore our proficiency is limited to these few words ; but beyond them it does not exist even in the slightest degree.\*

## CHAPTER XI.

### WHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS.

THE beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door, is a consciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things. For we come into the world with no natural notion of a right-angled triangle, or of a diesis (a quarter tone), or of a half tone ; but we learn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art ; and for this reason those who do not know them, do not think that they know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them ? Wherefore we all use these names, and we endeavour to fit the

\* The same remark will apply to most dissertations spoken or written on moral subjects : they are exercises of skill for him who delivers or writes them, or matter for criticism and perhaps a way of spending an idle hour for him who listens ; and that is all. Epictetus blames our indolence and indifference as to acts, and the trifling of the schools of philosophy in disputation.

preconceptions<sup>1</sup> to the several cases (things) thus : he has done well, he has not done well ; he has done as he ought, not as he ought ; he has been unfortunate, he has been fortunate ; he is unjust, he is just : who does not use these names ? who among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he defers the use of words about lines (geometrical figures) or sounds ? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already taught as it were by nature some things on this matter (*τῶν*), and proceeding from these we have added to them self-conceit (*εἰς*).<sup>2</sup> For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful and the ugly ? Have I not the notion of it ? You have. Do I not adapt it to particulars ? You do. Do I not then adapt it properly ? In that lies the whole question ; and conceit is added here. For beginning from these things which are admitted men proceed to that which is matter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation ; for if they possessed this power of adaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them from being perfect ? But now since you think that you properly adapt the preconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this (assume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not seem so to another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation ; or does he not think so ? He does think so. Is

<sup>1</sup> See i. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See Cicero's use of "*opinio*" (*Tusc. iv. 11*).

it possible then that both of you can properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you have contrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything better towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that you do? Does the madman do any other things than the things which seem to him right? Is then this criterion sufficient for him also? It is not sufficient. Come then to something which is superior to seeming (τὸ δοκῶν). What is this?

Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only "seems," and a certain investigation of that which "seems" whether it "seems" rightly, and the discovery of some rule (κανὼν), as we have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a carpenter's rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked things.—This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all things are right which seem so to all?<sup>3</sup> And how is it possible that contradictions can be right?—Not all, then, but all which seem to us to be right.—How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seems right to me or to any other man? Not at all more. What

<sup>3</sup> See Schweighauser's note.



then "seems" to every man is not sufficient for determining what "is;" for neither in the case of weights or measures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In this matter then is there no rule superior to what "seems"? And how is it possible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without it?<sup>4</sup> For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their madness those who use mere "seeming" as a measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain things (principles) known and made clear, we may use in the case of particular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.

What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring? Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to be. Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No. Is then pleasure anything secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the scale, and

<sup>4</sup> Doing nothing without the rule. This is a Greek proverb, used also by Persius, Sat. v. 119; compare Cicero, de Fin. iii. 17; and Antoninus, ii. 16.

drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the balance.<sup>5</sup> Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules; and then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good man.<sup>6</sup>

## CHAPTER XII.

### OF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION.

**W**HAT things a man must learn in order to be able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown by our philosophers (the Stoics); but with respect to the proper use of the things, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whom you please, an

<sup>5</sup> That is, so far shall I consider you from being able to judge rightly of things without a balance that I shall understand that not even with the aid of a balance can you do it, that you cannot even use a balance, and consequently that you are not worth a single word from me (Schweighaeuser).

<sup>6</sup> This is a just conclusion. We must fix the canons or rules by which things are tried; and then the rules may be applied by the wise and good to all cases

illiterate man to discuss with, and he cannot discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a little, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not know how to treat him, but he then either abuses or ridicules him, and says, He is an illiterate man ; it is not possible to do anything with him. Now a guide, when he has found a man out of the road, leads him into the right way ; he does not ridicule or abuse him, and then leave him. Do you also show the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he follows. But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule him, but rather feel your own incapacity.

How then did Socrates act? He used to compel his adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he wanted no other witness.<sup>1</sup> Therefore he could say, " I care not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disputing with me." For he used to make the conclusions drawn from natural notions<sup>2</sup> so plain that every man saw the contradiction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus): Does the envious<sup>3</sup> man rejoice? By no means, but he is rather pained. Well, Do you think that envy is pain over evils? and what

<sup>1</sup> This is what is said in the *Gorgias* of Plato.

<sup>2</sup> The word is *ἰνναυ*, which Cicero explains to be the same as *εὐλογιστικὴ* (*Acad. Pr.* ii. 10).

<sup>3</sup> See note 78 at end.

envy is there of evils? Therefore he made his adversary say that envy is pain over good things. Well then, would any man envy those who are nothing to him? By no means. Thus having completed the notion and distinctly fixed it he would go away without saying to his adversary, Define to me envy; and if the adversary had defined envy, he did not say, You have defined it badly, for the terms of the definition do not correspond to the thing defined—These are technical terms, and for this reason disagreeable and hardly intelligible to illiterate men, which terms we (philosophers) cannot lay aside. But that the illiterate man himself, who follows the appearances presented to him, should be able to concede anything or reject it, we can never by the use of these terms move him to do.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, being conscious of our own inability, we do not attempt the thing; at least such of us as have any caution do not. But the greater part and the rash, when they enter into such disputations, confuse themselves and confuse others; and finally abusing their adversaries and abused by them, they walk away.

Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, never to be irritated in argument, never to utter anything abusive, anything insulting, but to bear with abusive persons and to put an end to the quarrel. If you would know what great power he had in this way, read the Sym-

<sup>4</sup> I am not sure that I have understood rightly *ἐν τῷ ἀρχῇ* at the beginning of this sentence.

posium of Xenophon,<sup>5</sup> and you will see how many quarrels he put an end to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power is most highly praised,

Quickly with skill he settles great disputes.

Hesiod, *Theogony*, v. 87.

Well then ; the matter is not now very safe, and particularly at Rome ; for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a corner, you may be sure, but must go to a man of consular rank, if it so happen, or to a rich man, and ask him, Can you tell me, Sir, to whose care you have entrusted your horses? I can tell you. Have you entrusted them to any person indifferently, and to one who has no experience of horses?—By no means.—Well then : can you tell me to whom you entrust your gold or silver things or your vestments? I don't entrust even these to any one indifferently. Well ; your own body, have you already considered about entrusting the care of it to any person?—Certainly.—To a man of experience, I suppose, and one acquainted with the aliptic,<sup>6</sup> or with the healing art?—Without doubt.—Are these the best things that you have,

<sup>5</sup> The Symposium or Banquet of Xenophon is extant. Compare Epictetus, iii. c. 16, and iv. c. 5, the beginning.

<sup>6</sup> The aliptic art is the art of anointing and rubbing one of the best means of maintaining a body in health. The iatric or healing art is the art of restoring to health a diseased body. The aliptic art is also equivalent to the gymnastic art, or the art of preparing for gymnastic exercises, which are also a means of preserving the body's health, when the exercises are good and moderate.

or do you also possess something else which is better than all these?—What kind of a thing do you mean?—That I mean which makes use of these things, and tests each of them, and deliberates.—Is it the soul that you mean?—You think right, for it is the soul that I mean.—In truth I do think that the soul is a much better thing than all the others which I possess.—Can you then show us in what way you have taken care of the soul? for it is not likely that you, who are so wise a man and have a reputation in the city, inconsiderately and carelessly allow the most valuable thing that you possess to be neglected and to perish.—Certainly not.—But have you taken care of the soul yourself; and have you learned from another to do this, or have you discovered the means yourself?—Here comes the danger that in the first place he may say, What is this to you, my good man, who are you? Next, if you persist in troubling him, there is danger that he may raise his hands and give you blows. I was once myself also an admirer of this mode of instruction until I fell into these dangers.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Epictetus is speaking of himself and of his experience at Rome.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## ON ANXIETY (SOLICITUDE).

WHEN I see a man anxious, I say, What does this man want? If he did not want something which is not in his power, how could he be anxious? For this reason a lute-player when he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute ; for he not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause : but this is not in his power. Accordingly, where he has skill, there he has confidence. Bring any single person who knows nothing of music, and the musician does not care for him. But in the matter where a man knows nothing and has not been practised, there he is anxious. What matter is this? He knows not what a crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. However he has learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest ;<sup>1</sup> but what the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life, he neither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must of necessity tremble and grow pale. I cannot then say that a man is not a lute-player when I see him afraid, but I can say something else, and not one thing, but many. And first of all I call him a stranger and

<sup>1</sup> See i. 29, note 19.

say, This man does not know in what part of the world he is, but though he has been here so long, he is ignorant of the laws of the State and the customs, and what is permitted and what is not ; and he has never employed any lawyer to tell him and to explain the laws. But a man does not write a will, if he does not know how it ought to be written, or he employs a person who does know ; nor does he rashly seal a bond or write a security. But he uses his desire without a lawyer's advice, and aversion, and pursuit (movement), and attempt and purpose. How do you mean without a lawyer ? He does not know that he wills what is not allowed, and does not will that which is of necessity ; and he does not know either what is his own or what is another man's ; but if he did know, he would never be impeded, he would never be hindered, he would not be anxious. How so ?—Is any man then afraid about things which are not evils ?—No.—Is he afraid about things which are evils, but still so far within his power that they may not happen ?—Certainly he is not.—If then the things which are independent of the will are neither good nor bad, and all things which do depend on the will are within our power, and no man can either take them from us or give them to us, if we do not choose, where is room left for anxiety ? But we are anxious about our poor body, our little property, about the will of Caesar ; but not anxious about things internal. Are we anxious about not forming a



false opinion?—No, for this is in my power.—About not exerting our movements contrary to nature?—No, not even about this.—When then you see a man pale, as the physician says, judging from the complexion, this man's spleen is disordered, that man's liver; so also say, this man's desire and aversion are disordered, he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. For nothing else changes the colour, or causes trembling or chattering of the teeth, or causes a man to

Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot.

*Iliad*, xiii. 281.

For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus,<sup>2</sup> he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno admired; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus had power. But Antigonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for he wished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of his power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; for no man who is skilled in any art wishes to please one who has no such skill.

Should I try to please you? Why? I suppose you know the pleasure by which one man is estimated by another. Have you taken pains

<sup>2</sup> In Diogenes Laertius (*Zeno*, vii.) there is a letter from Antigonus to Zeno and Zeno's answer. Simplicius (note on the *Encheiridion*, c. 51) supposes this Antigonus to be the king of Syria; but Upton remarks that it is Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia.

to learn what is a good man and what is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or the other? Why then are you not good yourself?—How, he replies, am I not good?—Because no good man laments or groans or weeps, no good man is pale and trembles, or says, How will he receive me, how will he listen to me?—Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do you care about what belongs to others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what proceeds from you?—Certainly.—And is it possible that a fault should be one man's, and the evil in another?—No.—Why then are you anxious about that which belongs to others?—Your question is reasonable; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him. Cannot you then speak to him as you choose?—But I fear that I may be disconcerted?—If you are going to write the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be disconcerted?—By no means.—Why? is it not because you have practised writing the name?—Certainly.—Well, if you were going to read the name, would you not feel the same? and why? Because every art has a certain strength and confidence in the things which belong to it.—Have you then not practised speaking? and what else did you learn in the school? Syllogisms and sophistical propositions?<sup>3</sup> For what purpose? was it not for the purpose of discoursing skilfully? and is not discoursing skilfully the same as discoursing

<sup>3</sup> See i. c. 7.

seasonably and cautiously and with intelligence, and also without making mistakes and without hindrance, and besides all this with confidence?—Yes.—When then you are mounted on a horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched against a man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in which you are practised, and he is not?—Yes, but that person (to whom I am going to speak) has power to kill me.<sup>4</sup> Speak the truth then, unhappy man, and do not brag, nor claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your masters, but so long as you present this handle in your body, follow every man who is stronger than yourself. Socrates used to practise speaking, he who talked as he did to the tyrants,<sup>5</sup> to the dicasts (judges), he who talked in his prison. Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as he did to Alexander, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. These men were confident in the things which they practised.<sup>6</sup> But do you walk off to your own affairs and never leave them:

<sup>4</sup> The original is "but that person (*ἀλλ' ὁτις*) has power to kill me." "That person" must be the person already mentioned, and Mrs. Carter has done right in adding this explanation.

<sup>5</sup> The Thirty tyrants of Athens, as they were named (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, ii.) The talk of Socrates with Critias and Charicles, two of the Thirty, is reported in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (i. 2, 33). The defence of Socrates before those who tried him and his conversation in prison are reported in Plato's *Apology*, and in the *Phaedon* and *Crito*. Diogenes was captured by some pirates and sold (iv. 2, 115).

<sup>6</sup> There is some corruption here.

go and sit in a corner, and weave syllogisms, and propose them to another. There is not in you the man who can rule a state.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### TO NASO.

WHEN a certain Roman entered with his son and listened to one reading, Epictetus said, This is the method of instruction ; and he stopped. When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus said, Every art when it is taught causes labour to him who is unacquainted with it and is unskilled in it, and indeed the things which proceed from the arts immediately show their use in the purpose for which they were made ; and most of them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed to be present and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a pleasant thing ; but the shoe is useful and also not disagreeable to look at. And the discipline of a smith when he is learning is very disagreeable to one who chances to be present and is a stranger to the art ; but the work shows the use of the art. But you will see this much more in music ; for if you are present while a person is learning, the discipline will appear most disagreeable ; and yet the results of music are pleasing and delightful to those who know nothing of music. And here we conceive the

work of a philosopher to be something of this kind : he must adapt his wish (*βούληται*) to what is going on,<sup>1</sup> so that neither any of the things which are taking place shall take place contrary to our wish, nor any of the things which do not take place shall not take place when we wish that they should. From this the result is to those who have so arranged the work of philosophy, not to fail in the desire, nor to fall in with that which they would avoid ; without uneasiness, without fear, without perturbation to pass through life themselves, together with their associates maintaining the relations both natural and acquired,<sup>2</sup> as the relation of son, of father, of brother, of citizen, of man, of wife, of neighbour, of fellow traveller, of ruler, of ruled. The work of a philosopher we conceive to be something like this. It remains next to inquire how this must be accomplished.

We see then that the carpenter (*τεκτων*) when he has learned certain things becomes a carpenter ; the pilot by learning certain things becomes a pilot. May it not then in philosophy also not be sufficient to wish to be wise and good, and that there is also a necessity to learn certain things ? We inquire then what these things are. The philosophers say that we ought first to learn

<sup>1</sup> *Encheiridion*, c. 8 : " Do not seek (wish) that things which take place shall take place as you desire, but desire that things which take place shall take place as they do, and you will live a tranquil life."

<sup>2</sup> See note 79 at end.

that there is a God and that he provides for all things ; also that it is not possible to conceal from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts.<sup>3</sup> The next thing is to learn what is the nature of the Gods ; for such as they are discovered to be, he, who would please and obey them, must try with all his power to be like them. If the divine is faithful, man also must be faithful ; if it is free, man also must be free ; if beneficent, man also must be beneficent ; if magnanimous, man also must be magnanimous ; as being then an imitator of God he must do and say every thing consistently with this fact.

With what then must we begin ? If you will enter on the discussion, I will tell you that you must first understand names<sup>4</sup> (words).—So then you say that I do not now understand names.—You do not understand them.—How then do I use them ?—Just as the illiterate use written language, as cattle use appearances : for use is one thing, understanding is another. But if you think that you understand them, produce whatever word you please, and let us try whether we understand it.—But it is a disagreeable thing for a man to be confuted who is now old, and, it may be, has now served his three campaigns.—I too know this : for now you are come to me as if you were in want of nothing : and what could you even imagine to be wanting to you ? You

<sup>3</sup> See note 80 at end.

<sup>4</sup> See ii. 10, i 17, ii. 11, etc. : *M. Antoninus*, x. 8.

are rich, you have children and a wife perhaps, and many slaves : Caesar knows you, in Rome you have many friends, you render their dues to all, you know how to requite him who does you a favour, and to repay in the same kind him who does you a wrong. What do you lack ? If then I shall show you that you lack the things most necessary and the chief things for happiness, and that hitherto you have looked after everything rather than what you ought, and, to crown all,<sup>6</sup> that you neither know what God is nor what man is, nor what is good nor what is bad ; and as to what I have said about your ignorance of other matters, that may perhaps be endured, but if I say that you know nothing about yourself, how is it possible that you should endure me and bear the proof and stay here ? It is not possible ; but you immediately go off in bad humour. And yet what harm have I done you ? unless the mirror also injures the ugly man because it shows him to himself such as he is ; unless the physician also is supposed to insult the sick man, when he says to him, Man, do you think that you ail nothing ? But you have a fever ; go without food to-day ; drink water. And no one says, What an insult ! But if you say to a man, Your desires are inflamed, your aversions are low, your intentions are inconsistent, your pursuits (movements) are not conformable to nature.

<sup>6</sup> The original is "to add the colophon," which is a proverbial expression and signifies to give the last touch to a thing.

your opinions are rash and false, the man immediately goes away and says, He has insulted me.

Our way of dealing is like that of a crowded assembly.<sup>6</sup> Beasts are brought to be sold and oxen ; and the greater part of the men come to buy and sell, and there are some few who come to look at the market and to inquire how it is carried on, and why, and who fixes the meeting and for what purpose. So it is here also in this assembly (of life): some like cattle trouble themselves about nothing except their fodder. For to all of you who are busy about possessions and lands and slaves and magisterial offices, these are nothing except fodder. But there are a few who attend the assembly, men who love to look on and consider what is the world, who governs it. Has it no governor?<sup>7</sup> And how is it possible that a city or a family cannot continue to exist, not even the shortest time, without an administrator and guardian, and that so great and beautiful a system should be administered with such order and yet without a purpose and by chance?<sup>8</sup> There is then an administrator. What kind of administrator and how does he govern? And who are we, who were produced by him,

<sup>6</sup> See the fragments of Menander quoted by Upton.

<sup>7</sup> Sunt in Fortunæ qui casibus omnia ponunt,  
Et mundum credunt nullo rectore moveri.

Juvenal, xiii. 86.

<sup>8</sup> From the fact that man has some intelligence Voltaire concludes that we must admit that there is a greater intelligence (Letter to M<sup>de</sup> Necker. Vol. 67, ed. Kehl. p. 278).



and for what purpose? Have we some connection with him and some relation towards him, or none? This is the way in which these few are affected, and then they apply themselves only to this one thing, to examine the meeting and then to go away. What then? They are ridiculed by the many, as the spectators at the fair are by the traders; and if the beasts had any understanding, they would ridicule those who admired anything else than fodder.

## CHAPTER XV.

TO OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY  
PERSIST IN WHAT THEY HAVE DETER-  
MINED.

**W**HEN some persons have heard these words, that a man ought to be constant (firm), and that the will is naturally free and not subject to compulsion, but that all other things are subject to hindrance, to slavery, and are in the power of others, they suppose that they ought without deviation to abide by everything which they have determined. But in the first place that which has been determined ought to be sound (true). I require tone (sinews) in the body, but such as exists in a healthy body, in an athletic body; but if it is plain to me that you have the tone of a phrensiéd man and you boast of it, I shall say to you, Man, seek a physician: this is not tone,

but atony (deficiency in right tone). In a different way something of the same kind is felt by those who listen to these discourses in a wrong manner ; which was the case with one of my companions who for no reason resolved to starve himself to death.<sup>1</sup> I heard of it when it was the third day of his abstinence from food, and I went to inquire what had happened. I have resolved, he said.—But still tell me what it was which induced you to resolve ; for if you have resolved rightly, we shall sit with you and assist you to depart ; but if you have made an unreasonable resolution, change your mind.—We ought to keep to our determinations. —What are you doing, man ? We ought to keep not to all our determinations, but to those which are right ; for if you are now persuaded that it is right, do not change your mind, if you think fit, but persist and say, we ought to abide by our determinations. Will you not make the beginning and lay the foundation in an inquiry whether the determination is sound or not sound, and so then build on it firmness and security ? But if you lay a rotten and ruinous foundation, will not your miserable little building fall down the sooner, the more and the stronger are the materials which you shall lay on it ? Without any reason would you withdraw from us out of life a man who is a friend, and a companion, a citizen of the same city, both the great and the small city ?<sup>2</sup> Then while you are committing murder

<sup>1</sup> See note 81 at end.

<sup>2</sup> The great city is the world.

and destroying a man who has done no wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by your determinations? And if it ever in any way came into your head to kill me, ought you to abide by your determinations?

Now this man was with difficulty persuaded to change his mind. But it is impossible to convince some persons at present; so that I seem now to know, what I did not know before, the meaning of the common saying, That you can neither persuade nor break a fool.<sup>3</sup> May it never be my lot to have a wise fool for my friend: nothing is more untractable. "I am determined," the man says. Madmen are also; but the more firmly they form a judgment on things which do not exist, the more ellebore<sup>4</sup> they require. Will you not act like a sick man and call in the physician?—I am sick, master, help me; consider what I must do: it is my duty to obey you. So it is here also: I know not what I ought to do, but I am come to learn.—Not so; but speak to me about other things: upon this I have determined.—What other things? for what is greater and more useful than for you to be persuaded

<sup>3</sup> The meaning is that you cannot lead a fool from his purpose either by words or force. "A wise fool" must mean a fool who thinks himself wise; and such we sometimes see. "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in the mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him" (Proverbs, xxvii. 22).

<sup>4</sup> Ellebore was a medicine used in madness. Horace says, Sat. ii. 3. 82—

*Danda est ellebor, multo pars maxima avaria.*

that it is not sufficient to have made your determination and not to change it. This is the tone (energy) of madness, not of health.—I will die, if you compel me to this.—Why, man? What has happened?—I have determined.—I have had a lucky escape that you have not determined to kill me.—I take no money.<sup>5</sup> Why?—I have determined.—Be assured that with the very tone (energy) which you now use in refusing to take, there is nothing to hinder you at some time from inclining without reason to take money and then saying, I have determined. As in a distempered body, subject to defluxions, the humour inclines sometimes to these parts, and then to those, so too a sickly soul knows not which way to incline: but if to this inclination and movement there is added a tone (obstinate resolution), then the evil becomes past help and cure.

<sup>5</sup> "Epictetus seems in this discussion to be referring to some professor, who had declared that he would not take money from his hearers, and then, indirectly at least, had blamed our philosopher for receiving some fee from his hearers" (Schweighaeuser).

## CHAPTER XVI.

THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR  
OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD AND EVIL.

WHERE is the good? In the will.<sup>1</sup> Where is the evil? In the will. Where is neither of them? In those things which are independent of the will. Well then? Does any one among us think of these lessons out of the schools? Does any one meditate (strive) by himself to give an answer to things<sup>2</sup> as in the case of questions? Is it day?—Yes.—Is it night?—No.—Well, is the number of stars even?<sup>3</sup>—I cannot say.—When money is shown (offered) to you, have you studied to make the proper answer, that money is not a good thing? Have you practised yourself in these answers, or only against sophisms? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which you have studied, in those you have improved; but in those which you have not studied, in those you remain the same? When the rhetorician knows that he has

<sup>1</sup> See ii. 10, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> "To answer to things" means to act in a way suitable to circumstances, to be a match for them. So Horace says (Sat. ii. 7. 85)—

Responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores  
Fortis.

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps this was a common puzzle. The man answers right he cannot say.

written well, that he has committed to memory what he has written, and brings an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious? Because he is not satisfied with having studied. What then does he want? To be praised by the audience? For the purpose then of being able to practise declamation he has been disciplined; but with respect to praise and blame he has not been disciplined. For when did he hear from any one what praise is, what blame is, what the nature of each is, what kind of praise should be sought, or what kind of blame should be shunned? And when did he practise this discipline which follows these words (things)?<sup>4</sup> Why then do you still wonder, if in the matters which a man has learned, there he surpasses others, and in those in which he has not been disciplined, there he is the same with the many. So the lute-player knows how to play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and yet he trembles when he enters on the stage; for these matters he understands, but he does not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts of a crowd, nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what anxiety is, whether it is our work or the work of another, whether it is possible to stop it or not. For this reason if he has been praised, he leaves the theatre puffed up, but if he has been ridiculed, the swollen bladder has been punctured and subsides.

<sup>4</sup> That is, which follows praise or blame. He seems to mean making the proper use of praise or of blame.

This is the case also with ourselves. What do we admire? Externals. About what things are we busy? Externals. And have we any doubt then why we fear or why we are anxious? What then happens when we think the things, which are coming on us, to be evils? It is not in our power not to be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious. Then we say, Lord God, how shall I not be anxious? Fool, have you not hands, did not God make them for you? Sit down now and pray that your nose may not run.<sup>6</sup> Wipe yourself rather and do not blame him. Well then, has he given to you nothing in the present case? Has he not given to you endurance? has he not given to you magnanimity? has he not given to you manliness? When you have such hands, do you still look for one who shall wipe your nose? But we neither study these things nor care for them. Give me a man who cares how he shall do any thing, not for the obtaining of a thing, but who cares about his own energy. What man, when he is walking about, cares for his own energy? who, when he is deliberating, cares about his own deliberation, and not about obtaining that about which he deliberates? And if he succeeds, he is elated and says, How well we have deliberated; did I not tell you, brother, that it is impossible, when we have thought about any

<sup>6</sup> By the words "Sit down" Epictetus indicates the man's baseness and indolence who wishes God to do for him that which he can do himself and ought to do (Schweighaeuser).

thing, that it should not turn out thus? But if the thing should turn out otherwise, the wretched man is humbled; he knows not even what to say about what has taken place. Who among us for the sake of this matter has consulted a seer? Who among us as to his actions has not slept in indifference?<sup>6</sup> Who? Give (name) to me one that I may see the man whom I have long been looking for, who is truly noble and ingenuous, whether young or old; name him.<sup>7</sup>

Why then are we still surprised, if we are well practised in thinking about matters (any given subject), but in our acts are low, without decency, worthless, cowardly, impatient of labour, altogether bad? For we do not care about these things nor do we study them. But if we had feared not death or banishment, but fear itself,<sup>8</sup> we should have studied not to fall into those things which appear to us evils. Now in the school we are irritable and wordy; and if any little question arises about any of these things, we are able to examine them fully. But drag us to practice, and you will find us miserably shipwrecked. Let some disturbing appearance come on us, and you will know what we have been studying and in what we have been exercising ourselves. Consequently through want of discipline we are always adding something to the appearance and representing things to be greater

<sup>6</sup> So Schweighaeuser explains this difficult passage. Perhaps he is right. This part of the chapter is obscure.

<sup>7</sup> See note 82 at end.

<sup>8</sup> See ii. 1



than what they are. For instance as to myself, when I am on a voyage and look down on the deep sea, or look round on it and see no land, I am out of my mind and imagine that I must drink up all this water if I am wrecked, and it does not occur to me that three pints are enough. What then disturbs me? The sea? No, but my opinion. Again, when an earthquake shall happen, I imagine that the city is going to fall on me; but is not one little stone enough to knock my brains out?

What then are the things which are heavy on us and disturb us? What else than opinions? What else than opinions lies heavy upon him who goes away and leaves his companions and friends and places and habits of life? Now little children, for instance, when they cry on the nurse leaving them for a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive a small cake. Do you choose then that we should compare you to little children?—No, by Zeus, for I do not wish to be pacified by a small cake, but by right opinions.—And what are these? Such as a man ought to study all day, and not to be affected by anything that is not his own, neither by companion nor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own body, but to remember the law and to have it before his eyes. And what is the divine law? To keep a man's own, not to claim that which belongs to others, but to use what is given, and when it is not given, not to desire it; and when a thing is taken away, to

give it up readily and immediately, and to be thankful for the time that a man has had the use of it, if you would not cry for your nurse and mamma. For what matter does it make by what thing a man is subdued, and on what he depends? In what respect are you better than he who cries for a girl, if you grieve for a little gymnasium, and little porticoes and young men and such places of amusement? Another comes and laments that he shall no longer drink the water of Dirce. Is the Marcian water worse than that of Dirce? But I was used to the water of Dirce.<sup>9</sup> And you in turn will be used to the other. Then if you become attached to this also, cry for this too, and try to make a verse like the verse of Euripides,

The hot baths of Nero and the Marcian water.

See how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men.

When then shall I see Athens again and the Acropolis? Wretch, are you not content with what you see daily? have you anything better or greater to see than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea? But if indeed

<sup>9</sup> Dirce, a pure stream in Boeotia, which flows into the Ismenus. The Marcian water is the Marcian aqueduct at Rome, which was constructed B.C. 144, and was the best water that Rome had. Some of the arches of this aqueduct exist. The "bright stream of Dirce" is spoken of in the *Hercules Furens* of Euripides (v. 573). The verse in the text, which we may suppose that Epictetus made, has a spondee in the fourth place, which is contrary to the rule.

you comprehend him who administers the Whole, and carry him about in yourself, do you still desire small stones, and a beautiful rock? <sup>10</sup> When then you are going to leave the sun itself and the moon, what will you do? will you sit and weep like children? Well, what have you been doing in the school? what did you hear, what did you learn? why did you write yourself a philosopher, when you might have written the truth; as, "I made certain introductions,"<sup>11</sup> and I read Chrysippus, but I did not even approach the door of a philosopher"? For how should I possess anything of the kind which Socrates possessed, who died as he did, who lived as he did, or anything such as Diogenes possessed? Do you think that any one of such men wept or grieved, because he was not going to see a certain man, or a certain woman, nor to be in Athens or in Corinth, but, if it should so happen, in Susa or in Ecbatana? For if a man can quit the banquet when he chooses, and no longer amuse himself, does he still stay and complain, and does he not stay, as at any amusement, only so long as he is pleased? Such a man, I suppose, would endure perpetual exile or to be condemned to death. Will you not be weaned now, like children, and take more solid food, and not cry

<sup>10</sup> The "small stones" are supposed to be the marbles which decorated Athens, and the rock to be the Acropolis.

<sup>11</sup> In the original it is *Eisayuyai*. It was a name used for short commentaries on the principles of any art; such as we now call Introductions, Compendiums, Elements. Gellius, xvi. 8.

after mammas and nurses, which are the lamentations of old women?—But if I go away, I shall cause them sorrow.—You cause them sorrow? By no means; but that will cause them sorrow which also causes you sorrow, opinion. What have you to do then? Take away your own opinion, and if these women are wise, they will take away their own: if they do not, they will lament through their own fault.

My man, as the proverb says, make a desperate effort on behalf of tranquillity of mind, freedom and magnanimity. Lift up your head at last as released from slavery. Dare to look up to God and say, Deal with me for the future as thou wilt; I am of the same mind as thou art; I am thine: <sup>12</sup> I refuse nothing that pleases thee: lead me where thou wilt: clothe me in any dress thou choosest: is it thy will that I should hold the office of a magistrate, that I should be in the condition of a private man, stay here or be an exile, be poor, be rich? I will make thy defence to men in behalf of all these conditions: <sup>13</sup> I will show the nature of each thing what it is.—You will not do so; but sit in an ox's belly <sup>14</sup> and wait for your mamma till she shall feed you. Who would Hercules have been, if he had sat at home? He would have been Eurystheus and not Hercules. Well, and in

<sup>12</sup> The MSS. have ἵσας εἶμι: but the emendation of Salmasius, εὖς εἶμι, is certain.

<sup>13</sup> See note 83 at end.

<sup>14</sup> The meaning is uncertain. See Schweighaeuser's note.

his travels through the world how many intimates and how many friends had he? But nothing more dear to him than God. For this reason it was believed that he was the son of God, and he was. In obedience to God then he went about purging away injustice and lawlessness. But you are not Hercules, and you are not able to purge away the wickedness of others; nor yet are you Theseus, able to purge away the evil things of Attica. Clear away your own. From yourself, from your thoughts cast away, instead of Procrustes and Sciron,<sup>15</sup> sadness, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance. But it is not possible to eject these things otherwise than by looking to God only, by fixing your affections on him only, by being consecrated to his commands. But if you choose anything else, you will with sighs and groans be compelled to follow<sup>16</sup> what is stronger than yourself, always seeking tranquillity and never able to find it; for you seek tranquillity there where it is not, and you neglect to seek it where it is.

<sup>15</sup> Procrustes and Sciron, two robbers who infested Attica and were destroyed by Theseus, as Plutarch tells in his life of Theseus.

<sup>16</sup> Antoninus, x. 28: "Only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all." Compare Seneca, *Quaest. Nat.* ii. 59.

## CHAPTER XVII.

HOW WE MUST ADAPT PRECONCEPTIONS TO  
PARTICULAR CASES.

WHAT is the first business of him who philosophizes? To throw away self-conceit (*οἰσίσις*).<sup>1</sup> For it is impossible for a man to begin to learn that which he thinks that he knows. As to things then which ought to be done and ought not to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, all of us talking of them at random go to the philosophers; and on these matters we praise, we censure, we accuse, we blame, we judge and determine about principles honourable and dishonourable. But why do we go to the philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not think that we know. And what is this? 'Theorems.'<sup>2</sup> For we wish to learn what philosophers say as being something elegant and acute; and some wish to learn that they may get profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous then to think that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learn another; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that which he does not learn. But the many are deceived by this which deceived

<sup>1</sup> See ii. 11 and iii. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Theorems are defined by Cicero, de Fato, c. 6, "Percepta appello quae dicuntur Graece θεωρήματα."

also the rhetorician Theopompus,<sup>3</sup> when he blames even Plato for wishing everything to be defined. For what does he say? Did none of us before you use the words Good or Just, or do we utter the sounds in an unmeaning and empty way without understanding what they severally signify? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural notions of each of these things and preconceptions (*προλήψεις*)? But it is not possible to adapt preconceptions to their correspondent objects if we have not distinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired what object must be subjected to each preconception. You may make the same charge against physicians also. For who among us did not use the words healthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates lived, or did we utter these words as empty sounds? For we have also a certain preconception of health,<sup>4</sup> but we are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says, abstain from food; another says, give food; another says bleed; and another says, use cupping. What is the reason? is it any other than that a man cannot properly adapt the preconception of health to particulars?

So it is in this matter also, in the things which concern life. Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful; for who among us has not a preconception of each of

<sup>3</sup> This rhetorician or orator, as Epictetus names him, appears to be the same person as Theopompus of Chios, the historian.

<sup>4</sup> See note 84 at end.

these things? Is it then a distinct and perfect preconception? Show this. How shall I show this? Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things. Plato, for instance, subjects definitions to the preconception of the useful, but you to the preconception of the useless. Is it possible then that both of you are right? How is it possible? Does not one man adapt the preconception of good to the matter of wealth, and another not to wealth, but to the matter of pleasure and to that of health? For, generally, if all of us who use those words know sufficiently each of them, and need no diligence in resolving (making distinct) the notions of the preconceptions, why do we differ, why do we quarrel, why do we blame one another?

And why do I now allege this contention with one another and speak of it? If you yourself properly adapt your preconceptions, why are you unhappy, why are you hindered? Let us omit at present the second topic about the pursuits (*ἔργα*) and the study of the duties which relate to them. Let us omit also the third topic, which relates to the assents (*συγκαταβάσεις*): I give up to you these two topics. Let us insist upon the first, which presents an almost obvious demonstration that we do not properly adapt the preconceptions.<sup>5</sup> Do you now desire that which is possible and that which is possible to you? Why then are you hindered? why are

<sup>5</sup> The topic of the desires and aversions. See iii. c. 2.



you unhappy? Do you not now try to avoid the unavoidable? Why then do you fall in with anything which you would avoid? Why are you unfortunate? Why, when you desire a thing, does it not happen, and, when you do not desire it, does it happen? For this is the greatest proof of unhappiness and misery: I wish for something, and it does not happen. And what is more wretched than I?<sup>6</sup>

It was because she could not endure this that Medea came to murder her children: an act of a noble spirit in this view at least, for she had a just opinion what it is for a thing not to succeed which a person wishes. Then she says, "Thus I shall be avenged on him (my husband) who has wronged and insulted me; and what shall I gain if he is punished thus? how then shall it be done? I shall kill my children, but I shall punish myself also: and what do I care?"<sup>7</sup> This is the aberration of soul which possesses great energy. For she did not know wherein lies the doing of that which we wish; that you cannot get this from without, nor yet by the alteration and new adaptation of things. Do not desire the man (Jason, Medea's husband), and nothing which you desire will fail to happen: do not obstinately desire that he shall live with you: do not desire to remain in Corinth; and in a word desire nothing than that which God

<sup>6</sup> Compare i. c. 27.

<sup>7</sup> This is the meaning of what Medea says in the *Medea* of Euripides. Epictetus does not give the words of the poet.

wills.—And who shall hinder you? who shall compel you? No man shall compel you any more than he shall compel Zeus.

When you have such a guide,<sup>8</sup> and your wishes and desires are the same, why do you still fear disappointment? Give up your desire to wealth and your aversion to poverty, and you will be disappointed in the one, you will fall into the other. Well, give them up to health, and you will be unfortunate: give them up to magistracies, honours, country, friends, children, in a word, to any of the things which are not in man's power (and you will be unfortunate). But give them up to Zeus and to the rest of the gods; surrender them to the gods, let the gods govern, let your desire and aversion be ranged on the side of the gods, and wherein will you be any longer unhappy?<sup>9</sup> But if, lazy wretch, you envy, and complain, and are jealous, and fear, and never cease for a single day complaining both of yourself and of the gods, why do you still speak of being educated? What kind of an education, man? Do you mean that you have been employed about sophistical syllogisms (*συλλογισμούς μεταπίπτοντας*)?<sup>10</sup> Will you not, if it is possible, unlearn all these things and begin from the beginning, and see at the same time that hitherto you have not even touched the

<sup>8</sup> Compare iv. c. 7.

<sup>9</sup> "If you would subject all things to yourself, subject yourself to reason" (Seneca, Ep. 37).

<sup>10</sup> See i. c. 7.

matter ; and then commencing from this foundation, will you not build up all that comes after, so that nothing may happen which you do not choose, and nothing shall fail to happen which you do choose ?

Give me one young man who has come to the school with this intention, who is become a champion for this matter, and says, "I give up everything else, and it is enough for me if it shall ever be in my power to pass my life free from hindrance and free from trouble, and to stretch out (present) my neck to all things like a free man, and to look up to heaven as a friend of God and fear nothing that can happen." Let any of you point out such a man that I may say, "Come, young man, into the possession of that which is your own, for it is your destiny to adorn philosophy : yours are these possessions, yours these books, yours these discourses." Then when he shall have laboured sufficiently and exercised himself in this part of the matter (*τόπῳ*), let him come to me again and say, "I desire to be free from passion and free from perturbation ; and I wish as a pious man and a philosopher and a diligent person to know what is my duty to the gods, what to my parents, what to my brothers, what to my country, what to strangers." (I say) "Come also to the second matter (*τόπῳ*) : this also is yours."—"But I have now sufficiently studied the second part (*τόπῳ*) also, and I would gladly be secure and unshaken, and not only when I am awake, but also when I

am asleep, and when I am filled with wine, and when I am melancholy." Man, you are a god, you have great designs.

No : but I wish to understand what Chrysippus says in his treatise of the *Pseudomenos*<sup>11</sup> (the Liar).—Will you not hang yourself, wretch, with such your intention? And what good will it do you? You will read the whole with sorrow, and you will speak to others trembling. Thus you also do. "Do you wish me,<sup>12</sup> brother, to read to you, and you to me?"—You write excellently, my man; and you also excellently in the style of Xenophon, and you in the style of Plato, and you in the style of Antisthenes. Then having told your dreams to one another you return to the same things : your desires are the same, your aversions the same, your pursuits are the same, and your designs and purposes, you wish for the same things and work for the same. In the next place you do not even seek

<sup>11</sup> The *Pseudomenos* was a treatise by Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. vii., Chrysippus). "The *Pseudomenos* was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks truth: if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself in studying to answer it."—Mrs. Carter.

<sup>12</sup> Epictetus is ridiculing the men who compliment one another on their writings. Upton compares Horace, *Epp.* ii. 87:

ut alter

*Alterius sermone meros audiret honores—*

*Discedo Alcaeus puncto illius? ille meo quis?*

*Quis nisi Callimachus?*

for one to give you advice, but you are vexed if you hear such things (as I say). Then you say, "An ill-natured old fellow : when I was going away, he did not weep nor did he say, Into what danger you are going : if you come off safe, my child, I will burn lights."<sup>13</sup> This is what a good-natured man would do." It will be a great thing for you if you do return safe, and it will be worth while to burn lights for such a person : for you ought to be immortal and exempt from disease.

Casting away then, as I say, this conceit of thinking that we know something useful, we must come to philosophy as we apply to geometry, and to music : but if we do not, we shall not even approach to proficiency though we read all the collections<sup>14</sup> and commentaries of Chrysippus and those of Antipater and Archedemus.<sup>15</sup>

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES.

EVERY habit and faculty<sup>1</sup> is maintained and increased by the corresponding actions :

<sup>13</sup> Compare i. c. 19.

<sup>14</sup> Schweighaeuser has no doubt that we ought instead of συλλογικάς, "collections," to read εἰσαγωγικάς, "introductions."

<sup>15</sup> As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, note 2 ; and Antipater, ii. 1 j.

<sup>1</sup> See iv. c. 12.

the habit of walking by walking, the habit of running by running. If you would be a good reader, read ; if a writer, write. But when you shall not have read for thirty days in succession, but have done something else, you will know the consequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten days, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will see how your legs are weakened. Generally then if you would make anything a habit, do it ; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustom yourself to do something else in place of it.

So it is with respect to the affections of the soul : when you have been angry, you must know that not only has this evil befallen you, but that you have also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown fuel upon fire. When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also nurtured, increased your incontinence. For it is impossible for habits and faculties, some of them not to be produced, when they did not exist before, and others not be increased and strengthened by corresponding acts.

In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases of the mind grow up.<sup>2</sup> For when you have once desired money, if reason be applied to lead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and the ruling faculty of our mind is

<sup>2</sup> ἀγρωτήματα. "Aegrotationes quae appellantur a Stoicis ἀγρωτήματα" (Cicero, Tusc. iv. 10).

restored to the original authority. But if you apply no means of cure, it no longer returns to the same state, but being again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is inflamed to desire quicker than before : and when this takes place continually, it is henceforth hardened (made callous), and the disease of the mind confirms the love of money. For he who has had a fever, and has been relieved from it, is not in the same state that he was before, unless he has been completely cured. Something of the kind happens also in diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in it, and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is again lashed on the same places, the lash will produce not blisters (weals) but sores. If then you wish not to be of an angry temper, do not feed the habit : throw nothing on it which will increase it : at first keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry. I used to be in passion every day ; now every second day ; then every third, then every fourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make a sacrifice to God. For the habit at first begins to be weakened, and then is completely destroyed. "I have not been vexed to-day, nor the day after, nor yet on any succeeding day during two or three months ; but I took care when some exciting things happened." Be assured that you are in a good way.<sup>3</sup> To-day when I saw a handsome person, I did not say to

<sup>3</sup> κομψῶς σοί ἔσται. Compare the Gospel of St. John v. 52, ἐπὶ ὅτε οὐκ ἔπαρ' αὐτῶν τὴν ἥραν ἐν ᾗ κομψότερον ἔσχε.

myself, I wish I could lie with her, and Happy is her husband ; for he who says this says, Happy is her adulterer also. Nor do I picture the rest to my mind ; the woman present, and stripping herself and lying down by my side. I stroke my head and say, Well done, Epictetus, you have solved a fine little sophism, much finer than that which is called the master sophism. And if even the woman is willing, and gives signs, and sends messages, and if she also fondle me and come close to me, and I should abstain and be victorious, that would be a sophism beyond that which is named the Liar, and the Quiescent.<sup>4</sup> Over such a victory as this a man may justly be proud ; not for proposing the master sophism.

How then shall this be done ? Be willing at length to be approved by yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity with your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearance visits you, Plato says,<sup>5</sup> Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to

<sup>4</sup> "Placet enim Chrysippo cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere ; id est quod ab iis dicitur ἡσυχάζειν" (Cicero, Acad. ii. Pr. 29). Compare Persius, Sat. vi. 80 :

Depinge ubi sistam,  
Inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi.

<sup>5</sup> The passage is in Plato, Laws, ix. p. 854, ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, etc. The conclusion is, "If you cannot be cured of your (mental) disease, seek death which is better and depart from life." This bears some resemblance to the precept in Matthew vi. 29, "And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee," etc.



the temples of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you resort to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. Go to Socrates, and see him lying down with Alcibiades, and mocking his beauty : consider what a victory he at last found that he had gained over himself ; what an Olympian victory ; in what number he stood from Hercules ;<sup>6</sup> so that, by the gods, one may justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man, you who have conquered not these sorry boxers<sup>7</sup> and pancratiasts, nor yet those who are like them, the gladiators. By placing these objects on the other side you will conquer the appearance : you will not be drawn away by it. But in the first place be not hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance, but say, Appearances, wait for me a little : let me see who you are, and what you are about :<sup>8</sup> let me put you to the test. And then do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow ; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out this base

<sup>6</sup> Hercules is said to have established gymnastic contests and to have been the first victor. Those who gained the victory both in wrestling and in the pancratium were reckoned in the list of victors as coming in the second or third place after him, and so on.

<sup>7</sup> I have followed Wolff's conjecture *πόρτα*; instead of the old reading *παλκτας*.

<sup>8</sup> Compare iii. c. 12.

appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only trifling words, and nothing more.

This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the combat, divine is the work ; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from perturbation. Remember God : call on him as a helper and protector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri<sup>9</sup> in a storm. For what is a greater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violent and drive away the reason ?<sup>10</sup> For the storm itself, what else is it but an appearance ? For take away the fear of death, and suppose as many thunders and lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm<sup>11</sup> and serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the same again, be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a condition and so weak that you will not even know afterwards

<sup>9</sup> Castor and Pollux. Horace, *Carm.* i. 12 :

Quorum simul alba nautis  
Stella refulsit, etc.

<sup>10</sup> Gellius, *xix. c. 1*, "*visa quae vi quadam sua sese inferunt noscitanda hominibus.*"

<sup>11</sup> "Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou chooseth, thy opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay."—Antoninus, *xii.*

that you are doing wrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defences) for your wrong-doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod<sup>12</sup> to be true,

With constant ills the dilatory strives.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### AGAINST THOSE WHO EMBRACE PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS ONLY IN WORDS.<sup>1</sup>

THE argument called the ruling argument (*ἡ κυριεύων λόγος*)<sup>2</sup> appears to have been proposed from such principles as these: there is in fact a common contradiction between one another in these three propositions, each two being in contradiction to the third. The propositions are, that everything past must of necessity be true; that an impossibility does not follow a possibility; and that a thing is possible which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus<sup>3</sup> observing this contradiction employed the probative force of the first two for the demonstration of this proposition: That nothing is possible which is not

<sup>12</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, v. 411.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Gellius, xvii. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> See the long note communicated to Upton by James Harris; and Schweighaeuser's note.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of Ptolemaeus Soter. He was of the school named the Megaric, and distinguished in dialectic.

true and never will be. Now another will hold these two: That something is possible which is neither true nor ever will be: and That an impossibility does not follow a possibility. But he will not allow that everything which is past is necessarily true, as the followers of Cleanthes seem to think, and Antipater copiously defended them. But others maintain the other two propositions: That a thing is possible which is neither true nor will be true: and That everything which is past is necessarily true; but then they will maintain that an impossibility can follow a possibility. But it is impossible to maintain these three propositions, because of their common contradiction.<sup>4</sup>

If then any man should ask me, Which of these propositions do you maintain? I will answer him, that I do not know; but I have received this story, that Diodorus maintained one opinion, the followers of Panthoides, I think, and Cleanthes maintained another opinion, and those of Chrysippus a third. What then is your opinion? I was not made for this purpose, to examine the appearances that occur to me, and to compare what others say, and to form an opinion of my own upon the thing. Therefore I differ not at all from the grammarian. Who was Hector's father? Priam. Who were his brothers? Alexander and Deiphobus. Who was their

<sup>4</sup> If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradiction to the third and destroy it.

mother? Hecuba.—I have heard this story. From whom? From Homer. And Hellanicus also, I think, writes about the same things, and perhaps others like him. And what further have I about the ruling argument? Nothing. But if I am a vain man, especially at a banquet, I surprise the guests by enumerating those who have written on these matters. Both Chrysippus has written wonderfully in his first book about Possibilities, and Cleanthes has written specially on the subject, and Archedemus. Antipater also has written not only in his work about Possibilities, but also separately in his work on the ruling argument. Have you not read the work? I have not read it. Read. And what profit will a man have from it? he will be more trifling and impertinent than he is now; for what else have you gained by reading it? What opinion have you formed on this subject? none; but you will tell us of Helen and Priam, and the island of Calypso which never was and never will be. And in this matter indeed it is of no great importance if you retain the story, but have formed no opinion of your own. But in matters of morality (Ethic) this happens to us much more than in these things of which we are speaking.

Speak to me about good and evil. Listen :

The wind from Ilium to Ciconian shores  
Brought me.<sup>5</sup>                      *Odyssey*, ix. 39.

Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are indifferent. The good then are the

<sup>5</sup> See note 85 at end.

virtues and the things which partake of the virtues; the bad are the vices, and the things which partake of them; and the indifferent are the things which lie between the virtues and the vices, wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. Whence do you know this? Hellanicus says it in his Egyptian history; for what difference does it make to say this, or to say that Diogenes has it in his *Ethic*, or Chrysippus or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of these things and formed an opinion of your own? Show how you are used to behave in a storm on shipboard. Do you remember this division (distinction of things), when the sail rattles and a man, who knows nothing of times and seasons, stands by you when you are screaming and says, Tell me, I ask you by the gods, what you were saying just now, Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck. does it participate in vice? Will you not take up a stick and lay it on his head? What have we to do with you, man? we are perishing and you come to mock us. But if Caesar send for you to answer a charge, do you remember the distinction? If when you are going in pale and trembling, a person should come up to you and say, Why do you tremble, man? what is the matter about which you are engaged? Does Caesar who sits within give virtue and vice to those who go in to him? You reply, Why do you also mock me and add to my present sorrows?—Still tell me, philosopher, tell me why you tremble? Is it not

death of which you run the risk, or a prison, or pain of the body, or banishment, or disgrace? What else is there? Is there any vice or anything which partakes of vice? What then did you use to say of these things?—"What have you to do with me, man? my own evils are enough for me." And you say right. Your own evils are enough for you, your baseness, your cowardice, your boasting which you showed when you sat in the school. Why did you decorate yourself with what belonged to others? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?

Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find to what sect you belong. You will find that most of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics,<sup>6</sup> and those feeble. For wherein will you show that you really consider virtue equal to everything else or even superior? But show me a Stoic, if you can. Where or how? But you can show me an endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also with equal accuracy? who then is a Stoic? As we call a statue Phidias, which is fashioned according to the art of Phidias; so show me a man who is fashioned according to the doctrines which he utters. Show me a man

<sup>6</sup> The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed to a happy life; but still they contended that the smallest mental excellence was superior to all other things (Cicero, *De Fin.* v. 5, 31)

who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, dying and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him : I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic. You cannot show me one fashioned so ; but show me at least one who is forming, who has shown a tendency to be a Stoic. Do me this favour : do not grudge an old man seeing a sight which I have not seen yet. Do you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or the Athena, a work of ivory and gold ?<sup>7</sup> Let any of you show me a human soul ready to think as God does, and not to blame<sup>8</sup> either God or man, ready not to be disappointed about anything, not to consider himself damaged by anything, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous ; and why should I not say it direct ? desirous from a man to become a god, and in this poor mortal body thinking of his fellowship with Zeus.<sup>9</sup> Show me the man. But you cannot. Why then do you delude yourselves and cheat others ? and why do you put on a guise which does not belong to you, and walk about being thieves and pilferers of these names and things which do not belong to you ?

And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in my school. And I have this pur-

<sup>7</sup> See ii. 8, note 7.

<sup>8</sup> "To blame God" means to blame the constitution and order of things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked ; as absurd as for the potter's vessel to blame the potter, if that can be imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break.

<sup>9</sup> See note 86 at end.



pose, to make you free from restraint, compulsion, hindrance, to make you free, prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great. And you are here to learn and practise these things. Why then do you not finish the work, if you also have such a purpose as you ought to have, and if I in addition to the purpose also have such qualification as I ought to have? What is that which is wanting? When I see an artificer and material lying by him, I expect the work. Here then is the artificer, here the material; what is it that we want? Is not the thing one that can be taught? It is. Is it not then in our power? The only thing of all that is in our power. Neither wealth is in our power, nor health, nor reputation, nor in a word anything else except the right use of appearances. This (right use) is by nature free from restraint, this alone is free from impediment. Why then do you not finish the work? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it, or through your own fault, or through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible, and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the fault is either in me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in both. Well then, are you willing that we begin at last to bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of the past? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, and you will see.

## CHAPTER XX.

## AGAINST THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS.

THE propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used even by those who contradict them ; and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again, if a man should come forward and say, Know that there is nothing that can be known,<sup>1</sup> but all things are incapable of sure evidence ; or if another say, Believe me, and you will be the better for it, that a man ought not to believe anything ; or again, if another should say, Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn anything ; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? "Men, agree [with us] that no man agrees [with another]: believe us that no man believes anybody."

<sup>1</sup> See note 87 at end.

Thus Epicurus<sup>2</sup> also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For what does he say? "Be not deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken: there is no natural fellowship among rational animals, believe me. But those who say otherwise deceive you and seduce you by false reasons."—What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived. Will you fare worse if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved? Nay, it will be much better and safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? Why do you keep awake for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so many books that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure? For if this is so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you judged yourself worthy: eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore.<sup>3</sup> And what is it to you how the rest shall think about these things, whether right or wrong? For what have we to do with you? You take care of sheep

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, de Fin. ii. 30. 31, speaking of the letter which Epicurus wrote to Hermarchus when he was dying, says "that the actions of Epicurus were inconsistent with his sayings," and "his writings were confuted by his probity and morality."

<sup>3</sup> See note 83 at end.

because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked? For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans; but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before everything to persuade them that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing, in order that all things may be secured for you?<sup>4</sup> Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom then ought we to maintain it? With such as on their part also maintain it, or with such as violate this fellowship? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines?

What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepiness, and compelled him to write what he did write? What else was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, nature, which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling and complaining? For since, she says, you think that there is no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then say that Orestes was agitated by

<sup>4</sup> It would give security to the Epicureans, that they would enjoy all that they value, if other men should be persuaded that we are all made for fellowship, and that temperance is a good thing.

the Erinyes (Furies) and roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele)? So strong and invincible is man's nature. For how can a vine be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree? or, on the other hand, how can an olive tree be moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine? It is impossible: it cannot be conceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements (affects) of a man; and even those who are deprived of their genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man's desires.<sup>5</sup> Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a friend, but he did not mutilate human desires, for he could not; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their might to do it. What a shame is this? when a man has received from nature measures and rules for the knowing of truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules and to improve<sup>6</sup> them, but just the contrary, endeavours to take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the truth?

<sup>5</sup> See Upton's note.

<sup>6</sup> I have followed Schweighaeuser, who suggests *πρὸς ἐπεργάσασθαι* in place of the MSS. *πρὸς ἐργάσασθαι*.

What say you, philosopher? piety and sanctity, what do you think that they are? If you like, I will demonstrate that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it, that our citizens may be turned and honour the deity, and may no longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have you then the demonstrations?—I have, and I am thankful.—Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary: That there are no gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong-doers.<sup>7</sup>—Well done, philosopher, you have done something for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine.—What then, does not this satisfy you? Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.—Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as these have grown our well-constituted states; by these was Sparta founded: Lycurgus fixed these opinions in

<sup>7</sup> Polybius (vi. 56), when he is speaking of the Roman state, commends the men of old time, who established in the minds of the multitude the opinions about the gods and Hades, wherein, he says, they acted more wisely than those in his time who would destroy such opinions.

the Spartans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile condition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free men more honourable than base, and that those who died at Thermopylae<sup>8</sup> died from these opinions ; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city?<sup>9</sup> Then those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and interpreters. Of whom? of gods who do not exist : and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and imposture.

Man, what are you doing?<sup>10</sup> are you refuting yourself every day ; and will you not give up these frigid attempts? When you eat, where do you carry your hand to? to your mouth or to your eye? when you wash yourself, what do you go into? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit? If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I

<sup>8</sup> Epictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae, B.C. 480, against Xerxes and his army. Herodotus (vii. 228) has recorded the inscription placed over the Spartans :—

Stranger, go tell the Spartans, Here we lie  
Obedient to those who bade us die.

The inscription is translated by Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 42.

<sup>9</sup> When Xerxes was advancing on Athens, the Athenians left the city and embarked on their vessels before the battle of Salamis, B.C. 480. See Cicero, *De Officiis*, iii. 11.

<sup>10</sup> He is now attacking the Academics, who asserted that we can know nothing

would rack him. If he said, "Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath," I would take pickle sauce and pour it down on his head. What is this? he would say.—An appearance was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it.—Here give me the barley drink (tisane), he says. —I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce.—Did I not ask for the barley drink? Yes, master : this is the barley drink. Take it and smell ; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us?—If I had three or four fellow-slaves of the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by using all the things which nature gives, and in words destroying them.

Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do nothing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto ;<sup>11</sup> not to mention that they are enjoying the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the stars, and the sea and the land and the co-operation of mankind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by

<sup>11</sup> Epictetus is speaking according to the popular notions. To deny Demeter and to eat the bread which she gives is the same thing in the common notions of the Greeks, as it would be for Epictetus to deny the existence of God and to eat the bread which he gives.



these things to turn their attention to them ; but they only seek to belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. But what they shall say, and about what things or to what persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, they care not even in the least degree, nor do they care if any generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all the seeds of his generous nature ; nor if we<sup>12</sup> should give an adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts ; nor if a public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse from these doctrines ; nor if another who neglects his parents should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching.—What then in your opinion is good or bad ? This or that ?—Why then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from them, or try to convince them ? By Zeus, one might much sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The MSS. have *παράσχωμεν*. *Παράσχωσι* would be in conformity with the rest of the passage. But this change of persons is common in Epictetus.

<sup>13</sup> See note 89 at end.

## CHAPTER XXI.

OF INCONSISTENCY.<sup>1</sup>

SOME things men readily confess, and other things they do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or without understanding ; but quite the contrary you will hear all men saying, I wish that I had fortune equal to my understanding. But men readily confess that they are timid, and they say : I am rather timid, I confess ; but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish. A man will not readily confess that he is intemperate ; and that he is unjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no means confess that he is envious or a busybody. Most men will confess that they are compassionate. What then is the reason?—The chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency and confusion in the things which relate to good and evil. But different men have different reasons ; and generally what they imagine to be base, they do not confess at all. But they suppose timidity to be a characteristic of a good disposition, and compassion also ; but silliness to be the absolute characteristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit (confess) the things which

<sup>1</sup> Schweighaeuser has some remarks on the title of this chapter. He says "that this discourse does not keep to the same subject, but proceeds from that with which it began to other things."

are offences against society. But in the case of most errors, for this reason chiefly they are induced to confess them, because they imagine that there is something involuntary in them as in timidity and compassion ; and if a man confess that he is in any respect intemperate, he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what is involuntary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all involuntary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something involuntary ; and for this reason they confess to jealousy also.

Living then among such men, who are so confused, so ignorant of what they say, and of the evils which they have or have not, and why they have them, or how they shall be relieved of them, I think it is worth the trouble for a man to watch constantly (and to ask) whether I also am one of them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether I conduct myself as a temperate man, whether I ever say this, that I have been taught to be prepared for everything that may happen. Have I the consciousness, which a man who knows nothing ought to have, that I know nothing? Do I go to my teacher, as men go to oracles, prepared to obey? or do I like a snivelling boy go to my school to learn history and understand the books which I did not understand before, and, if it should happen so, to explain them also to others?—Man, you have had a fight in the house

with a poor slave, you have turned the family upside down, you have frightened the neighbours, and you come to me<sup>2</sup> as if you were a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how I have explained some word, and how I have babbled whatever came into my head. You come full of envy, and humbled, because you bring nothing from home;<sup>3</sup> and you sit during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how your father is disposed towards you and your brother. "What are they saying about me there? Now they think that I am improving, and are saying, He will return with all knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before I return: but much labour is necessary, and no one sends me anything, and the baths at Nicopolis are dirty; everything is bad at home, and bad here."

Then they say, no one gains any profit from the school.—Why, who comes to the school? who comes for the purpose of being improved? who comes to present his opinions to be purified? who comes to learn what he is in want of? Why do you wonder then if you carry back from the school the very things which you bring into it? For you come not to lay aside (your prin-

<sup>2</sup> καταστολὰς ποιήσας. I have omitted these words because I don't understand them; nor do the commentators. The word καταστολή occurs in ii. 10. 15, where it is intelligible.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, "because to you or for you nothing is brought from home." Perhaps the meaning is explained by what follows. The man has no comfort at home; he brings nothing by the thought of which he is comforted.

ciples) or to correct them or to receive other principles in place of them. By no means, nor anything like it. You rather look to this, whether you possess already that for which you come. You wish to prattle about theorems? What then? Do you not become greater triflers? Do not your little theorems give you some opportunity of display? You solve sophistical syllogisms.<sup>4</sup> Do you not examine the assumptions of the syllogism named the Liar?<sup>5</sup> Do you not examine hypothetical syllogisms? Why then are you still vexed if you receive the things for which you come to the school? Yes; but if my child die or my brother, or if I must die or be racked, what good will these things do me?<sup>6</sup>—Well, did you come for this? for this do you sit by my side? did you ever for this light your lamp or keep awake? or, when you went out to the walking place, did you ever propose any appearance that had been presented to you instead of a syllogism, and did you and your friends discuss it together? Where and when? Then you say, Theorems are useless. To whom? To such as make a bad use of them. For eye-salves are not useless to those who use them as they ought and when they ought. Fomentations are not useless. Dumb-

<sup>4</sup> See i. 7.

<sup>5</sup> See ii. 17, note 11.

<sup>6</sup> τί με ταῦτα ὠφελήσει; Schweighaeuser in his note says that he has written the text thus; but he has not. He has written τί μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελήσει; The με appears to be necessary, and he has rendered the passage accordingly; and rightly, I think.

bells<sup>7</sup> are not useless ; but they are useless to some, useful to others. If you ask me now if syllogisms are useful, I will tell you that they are useful, and, if you choose, I will prove it.<sup>8</sup>—How then will they in any way be useful to me? Man, did you ask if they are useful to you, or did you ask generally? Let him who is suffering from dysentery, ask me if vinegar is useful ; I will say that it is useful.—Will it then be useful to me?—I will say, no. Seek first for the discharge to be stopped and the ulcers to be closed. And do you, O men, first cure the ulcers and stop the discharge ; be tranquil in your mind, bring it free from distraction into the school, and you will know what power reason has.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### ON FRIENDSHIP.<sup>1</sup>

**W**HAT a man applies himself to earnestly, that he naturally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to the things which are bad? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to things which in no way concern themselves? Not to these either. It remains then that they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are good ; and if they are

<sup>7</sup> See i. 4, note 5 on Halteres.

<sup>8</sup> See ii. 25.

<sup>1</sup> See note 50 at end.

earnestly employed about things, they love such things also. Whoever then understands what is good, can also know how to love : but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are neither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving? To love then is only in the power of the wise.

How is this? a man may say ; I am foolish, and yet I love my child.—I am surprised indeed that you have begun by making the admission that you are foolish. For what are you deficient in? Can you not make use of your senses? do you not distinguish appearances? do you not use food which is suitable for your body, and clothing and habitation? Why then do you admit that you are foolish? It is in truth because you are often disturbed by appearances and perplexed, and their power of persuasion often conquers you ; and sometimes you think these things to be good, and then the same things to be bad, and lastly neither good nor bad ; and in short you grieve, fear, envy, are disturbed, you are changed. This is the reason why you confess that you are foolish. And are you not changeable in love? But wealth, and pleasure, and, in a word, things themselves, do you sometimes think them to be good, and sometimes bad? and do you not think the same men at one time to be good, at another time bad? and have you not at one time a friendly feeling towards them, and at another time the feeling of an enemy? and do you not at one time

praise them, and at another time blame them? Yes ; I have these feelings also. Well then, do you think that he who has been deceived about a man is his friend? Certainly not. And he who has selected a man as his friend and is of a changeable disposition, has he goodwill towards him? He has not. And he who now abuses a man, and afterwards admires him? This man also has no goodwill to the other. Well then, did you never see little dogs caressing and playing with one another, so that you might say, there is nothing more friendly? but that you may know what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh among them, and you will learn. Throw between yourself and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to die. Then you will change your tone and say, What a son I have brought up ! He has long been wishing to bury me. Throw a smart girl between you ; and do you the old man love her, and the young one will love her too. If a little fame intervene or dangers, it will be just the same. You will utter the words of the father of Admetus :

Life gives you pleasure : and why not your father ?<sup>2</sup>

Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when he was little ? that he was not

<sup>2</sup> The first verse is from the *Alcestis* of Euripides, v. 691. The second in Epictetus is not in Euripides. Schweighaeuser thinks that it has been intruded into the text from a trivial scholium.



in agony when the child had a fever? that he did not often say, I wish I had the fever instead of the child? Then when the test (the thing) came and was near, see what words they utter. Were not Eteocles and Polynices from the same mother and from the same father? Were they not brought up together, had they not lived together, drunk together, slept together, and often kissed one another? So that, if any man, I think, had seen them, he would have ridiculed the philosophers for the paradoxes which they utter about friendship. But when a quarrel rose between them about the royal power, as between dogs about a bit of meat, see what they say :

*Polynices.* Where will you take your station  
before the towers?

*Eteocles.* Why do you ask me this?

*Pol.* I will place myself opposite and try to  
kill you.

*Et.* I also wish to do the same.<sup>3</sup>

Such are the wishes that they utter.

For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest.<sup>4</sup> Whatever then appears to it an impediment to this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or a child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses : for its nature is to love nothing so much as its own interest ; this is father, and brother, and kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods appear to us to

<sup>3</sup> From the *Phœnissæ* of Euripides, v. 723, etc.

<sup>4</sup> See note 91 at end.

be an impediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of Aesculapius to be burned when his dear friend died.<sup>5</sup>

For this reason if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured ; but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way, being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines : if in the flesh, there is the ruling power : if in the will, it is there : and if it is in externals, it is there.<sup>6</sup> If then I am there where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father ; for this will be my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active co-operation, of observing my relations (towards all). But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous).<sup>7</sup>

It was through this ignorance that the Athe-

<sup>5</sup> Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian, *Expedition of Alexander*, vii. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Matthew vi. 21, "For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."

<sup>7</sup> See note 92 at end.

nians and the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with both ; and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both ; and the Romans with the Getae.<sup>8</sup> And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus ; and if any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed anyone who said that they were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now when you see brothers to be friends, appearing to have one mind, do not conclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if they swear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appearances.<sup>9</sup> But examine, not what other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and brought up together, and under the same paedagogue ; but examine this only, wherein they place their

<sup>8</sup> The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, i. 1.) The quarrel of the great king, the king of Persia, is the subject of the history of Herodotus (i. 1). The great quarrel of the Macedonians with the Persians is the subject of Arrian's expedition of Alexander. The Romans were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may assume that Epictetus was still living then.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Eth.* viii. c. 8. Mrs. Carter.

interest, whether in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave or free : do not name them even men, if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains,<sup>10</sup> and in the courts of justice display the acts of robbers ; nor yet that which makes them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them do whatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear that in truth these men think the good to be only there where will is, and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associated a long time and are companions, but when you have ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is a communion<sup>11</sup> of honest things and of nothing else ?

<sup>10</sup> Schweighaeuser thinks that this is the plain meaning : "as wild beasts in the mountains lie in wait for men, so men lie in wait for men, not only in deserted places, but even in the forum,"

<sup>11</sup> See note 93 at end.

But you may say, Such a one treated me with regard so long ; and did he not love me ? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of his beast ? How do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter ? But this woman is my wife, and we have lived together so long. And how long did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children and of many ? But a necklace <sup>12</sup> came between them : and what is a necklace ? It is the opinion about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was the thing which broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife, that which did not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a mother. And let every man among you who has seriously resolved either to be a friend himself or to have another for his friend, cut out these opinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all he will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, he will not change his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next place, to another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and completely a friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike himself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of his ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in

<sup>12</sup> The old story about Eriphyle, who betrayed her husband for a necklace.

things of the greatest importance ; but he will be harsh to no man, being well convinced of Plato's doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge together, and sail together, and you may be born of the same parents ; for snakes also are : but neither will they be friends nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and cursed opinions.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### ON THE POWER OF SPEAKING.

EVERY man will read a book with more pleasure or even with more ease, if it is written in fairer characters. Therefore every man will also listen more readily to what is spoken, if it is signified by appropriate and becoming words. We must not say then that there is no faculty of expression ; for this affirmation is the characteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of an impious man, because he undervalues the gifts which come from God, just as if he would take away the commodity of the power of vision, or of hearing, or of seeing. Has then God given you eyes to no purpose ? and to no purpose has he infused into them a spirit <sup>1</sup> so strong and of such skilful

<sup>1</sup> See note 94 at end.

contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things which are seen? What messenger is so swift and vigilant? And to no purpose has he made the interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and elastic that the vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a manner moved?<sup>2</sup> And to no purpose has he made light, without the presence of which there would be no use in any other thing?

Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the things which are superior to them. But indeed for the power of seeing and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which contribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine and oil, give thanks to God; but remember that he has given you something else better than all these, I mean the power of using them, proving them, and estimating the value of each. For what is that which gives information about each of these powers, what each of them is worth?<sup>3</sup> Is it each faculty itself? Did you ever hear the faculty of vision saying anything about itself? or the faculty of hearing? or wheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog? No; but they are appointed as ministers and slaves to serve the faculty which has the power of making use of the appearances of things. And if you inquire what is the value of each thing, of whom do you inquire? who answers you? How then can any other faculty

<sup>2</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note.

<sup>3</sup> See i. 1.

be more powerful than this, which uses the rest as ministers and itself proves each and pronounces about them? for which of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? which of them knows when it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from objects to which it ought not to apply them and does apply them to other objects? Is it the faculty of vision? No; but it is the faculty of the will. What is that faculty which closes and opens the ears? what is that by which they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved by what is said? Is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than the faculty of the will.<sup>4</sup> Will this faculty then, seeing that it is amidst all the other faculties, which are blind and dumb and unable to see anything else except the very acts for which they are appointed in order to minister to this (faculty) and serve it, but this faculty alone sees sharp and sees what is the value of each of the rest; will this faculty declare to us that anything else is the best, or that itself is? And what else does the eye do when it is opened than see? But whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain person and in what manner, who tells us? The faculty of the will. And whether we ought to believe what is said or not to believe it, and, if we do believe, whether we ought to be moved by it or

<sup>4</sup> See note 95 at end.



not, who tells us? Is it not the faculty of the will? But this faculty of speaking and of ornamenting words, if there is indeed any such peculiar faculty, what else does it do, when there happens to be discourse about a thing, than to ornament the words and arrange them as hair-dressers do the hair? But whether it is better to speak or to be silent, and better to speak in this way or that way, and whether this is becoming or not becoming, and the season for each and the use, what else tells us than the faculty of the will? Would you have it then to come forward and condemn itself?

What then? it (the will) says,<sup>5</sup> if the fact is so, can that which ministers be superior to that to which it ministers, can the horse be superior to the rider, or the dog to the huntsman, or the instrument to the musician, or the servants to the king? What is that which makes use of the rest? The will. What takes care of all? The will. What destroys the whole man, at one time by hunger, at another time by hanging, and at another time by a precipice? The will. Then is anything stronger in men than this? and how is it possible that the things which are subject to restraint are stronger than that which is not? What things are naturally formed to hinder the faculty of vision? Both will and things which do not depend on the faculty of the will.<sup>6</sup> It is the same with the faculty of hearing, with the

<sup>5</sup> See note 96 at end.

<sup>6</sup> See note 97 at end.

faculty of speaking in like manner. But what has a natural power of hindering the will? Nothing which is independent of the will; but only the will itself, when it is perverted. Therefore this (the will) is alone vice or alone virtue.

Then being so great a faculty and set over all the rest, let it (the will) come forward and tell us that the most excellent of all things is the flesh. Not even if the flesh itself declared that it is the most excellent, would any person bear that it should say this. But what is it, Epicurus, which pronounces this, which wrote about the End (purpose) of our Being,<sup>7</sup> which wrote on the Nature of Things, which wrote about the Canon (rule of truth), which led you to wear a beard, which wrote when it was dying that it was spending the last and a happy day?<sup>8</sup> Was this the flesh or the will? Then do you admit that you possess anything superior to this (the will)? and are you not mad? are you in fact so blind and deaf?

What then? does any man despise the other faculties? I hope not. Does any man say that there is no use or excellence in the speaking

<sup>7</sup> This appears to be the book which Cicero (*Tuscul.* iii. 18) entitles on the "supreme good" (*de summo bono*), which, as Cicero says, contains all the doctrine of Epicurus. The book on the Canon or Rule is mentioned by Velleius in Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, i. c. 16, as "that celestial volume of Epicurus on the Rule and Judgment." See also *De Fin.* i. 19.

<sup>8</sup> This is said in a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying in great pain (*Diog. Laert.* x. 22); Cicero (*De Fin.* ii. c. 30) quotes this letter.

faculty?<sup>9</sup> I hope not. That would be foolish, impious, ungrateful towards God. But a man renders to each thing its due value. For there is some use even in an ass, but not so much as in an ox : there is also use in a dog, but not so much as in a slave : there is also some use in a slave, but not so much as in citizens : there is also some use in citizens, but not so much as in magistrates. Not indeed, because some things are superior, must we undervalue the use which other things have. There is a certain value in the power of speaking, but it is not so great as the power of the will. When then I speak thus, let no man think that I ask you to neglect the power of speaking, for neither do I ask you to neglect the eyes, nor the ears, nor the hands, nor the feet, nor clothing, nor shoes. But if you ask me what then is the most excellent of all things, what must I say? I cannot say the power of speaking, but the power of the will, when it is right (ῥηθῆναι). For it is this which uses the other (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both small and great. For when this faculty of the will is set right, a man who is not good becomes good ; but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It is through this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we blame one another, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this which if we neglect it makes

<sup>9</sup> The MSS. have προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως. Lord Shaftesbury suggested φραστικῆς and Salmasius also. Schweighaeuser has put φραστικῆς in the text, and he has done right.

unhappiness, and if we carefully look after it, makes happiness.

But to take away the faculty of speaking and to say that there is no such faculty in reality, is the act not only of an ungrateful man towards those who gave it, but also of a cowardly man ; for such a person seems to me to fear, if there is any faculty of this kind, that we shall not be able to despise it. Such also are those who say that there is no difference between beauty and ugliness. Then it would happen that a man would be affected in the same way if he saw Thersites and if he saw Achilles ; in the same way, if he saw Helen and any other woman. But these are foolish and clownish notions, and the notions of such men as know not the nature of each thing, but are afraid, if a man shall see the difference, that he shall immediately be seized and carried off vanquished. But this is the great matter : to leave to each thing the power (faculty) which it has, and leaving to it this power to see what is the worth of the power, and to learn what is the most excellent of all things, and to pursue this always, to be diligent about this, considering all other things of secondary value compared with this, but yet, as far as we can, not neglecting all those other things. For we must take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the most excellent thing, but we must take care of them on account of the most excellent thing, because it will not be in its true natural condition if it does

not rightly use the other faculties, and prefer some things to others.

What then is usually done? Men generally act as a traveller would do on his way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being pleased with it should remain there. Man, you have forgotten your purpose: you were not travelling to this inn, but you were passing through it.—But this is a pleasant inn.—And how many other inns are pleasant? and how many meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing through. But your purpose is this, to return to your country, to relieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the usual magistracies.<sup>10</sup> For you are not come to select more pleasant places, but to live in these where you were born and of which you were made a citizen. Something of the kind takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since by the aid of speech and such communication as you receive here you must advance to perfection, and purge your will and correct the faculty which makes use of the appearances of things; and since it is necessary also for the teaching (delivery) of theorems to be effected by a certain mode of expression and with a certain variety and sharpness, some persons captivated by these very things abide in them, one captivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another

<sup>10</sup> See note 98 at end.

again by sophisms, and still another by some other inn (*πανδοσιον*) of the kind ; and there they stay and waste away as if they were among Sirens.

Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself capable of using conformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desires not to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into that which you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor ever to have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, conforming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able from your whole soul to utter these verses :

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny.<sup>11</sup>

Then having this purpose before you, if some little form of expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you abide among them and choose to dwell there, forgetting the things at home, and do you say, These things are fine? Who says that they are not fine? but only as being a way home, as inns are. For what hinders you from being an unfortunate man, even if you speak like Demosthenes? and what prevents you, if you can resolve syllogisms like Chrysippus,<sup>12</sup> from being wretched, from sorrowing, from envying, in a word, from being

<sup>11</sup> The rest of the verses are quoted in the *Encheiridion*, s. 52.

<sup>12</sup> Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of syllogisms. Diogenes Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so

disturbed, from being unhappy? Nothing. You see then that these were inns, worth nothing; and that the purpose before you was something else. When I speak thus to some persons, they think that I am rejecting care about speaking or care about theorems. But I am not rejecting this care, but I am rejecting the abiding about these things incessantly<sup>13</sup> and putting our hopes in them. If a man by this teaching does harm to those who listen to him, reckon me too among those who do this harm: for I am not able, when I see one thing which is most excellent and supreme, to say that another is so, in order to please you.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

TO (OR AGAINST) A PERSON WHO WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT VALUED (ESTEEMED) BY HIM.

A CERTAIN person said to him (Epictetus): Frequently I desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any answer; and now, if it is possible, I entreat you to say something to me. Do you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in anything

famous among dialecticians that most persons thought, if there was dialectic among the gods, it would not be any other than that of Chrysippus.

<sup>13</sup> See Schweighaeuser's note on ἀκαταπαύτως.

else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully?—I do think so.—He then who by speaking receives benefit himself, and is able to benefit others, will speak skilfully; but he who is rather damaged by speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art of speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others benefited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they hear? Or will you find that among them also some are benefited and some damaged?—There are both among these also, he said.—In this case also then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in hearing also, as there is in speaking?—It seems so.—If you choose, consider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom does it belong? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it belongs? To a statuary. And the looking at a statue skilfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art?—This also requires the aid of art.—Then if speaking properly is the business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit is the business of the skilful man? Now as to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully,<sup>1</sup> let us for the present, if you please, say

<sup>1</sup> "That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in



no more, for both of us are a long way from everything of the kind. But I think that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear philosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so?

Tell me then about what I should talk to you: about what matter are you able to listen?—About good and evil.—Good and evil in what? In a horse? No. Well, in an ox? No. What then? In a man? Yes. Do we know then what a man is, what the notion is which we have of him, or have we our ears in any degree practised about this matter? But do you understand what nature is? or can you even in any degree understand me when I say, I shall use demonstration to you? How? Do you understand this very thing, what demonstration is, or how anything is demonstrated, or by what means; or what things are like demonstration, but are not demonstration? Do you know what is true or what is false? What is consequent on a thing, what is repugnant to a thing, or not consistent, or inconsistent? But must I excite you to philosophy, and how? Shall I show to you the repugnance in the opinions of most men, through which they differ about things good and evil, and about things which are profit-

the art of speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantage from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a philosophical discussion.”—Schweighaeuser.

able and unprofitable, when you know not this very thing, what repugnance (contradiction) is? Show me then what I shall accomplish by discoursing with you: excite my inclination to do this. As the grass which is suitable, when it is presented to a sheep, moves its inclination to eat, but if you present to it a stone or bread, it will not be moved to eat; so there are in us certain natural inclinations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear to be somebody, when he himself shall excite us; but when he shall sit by us like a stone or like grass, how can he excite a man's desire (to speak)? Does the vine say to the husbandman, Take care of me? No, but the vine by showing in itself that it will be profitable to the husbandman if he does take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When children are attractive and lively, whom do they not invite to play with them, and crawl with them, and lisp with them? But who is eager to play with an ass or to bray with it? for though it is small, it is still a little ass.

Why then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this to you, that he who knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is this world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the good and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire according to nature nor turn away nor move

towards, nor intend (to act), nor assent, nor dissent, nor suspend his judgment ; to say all in a few words, he will go about dumb and blind, thinking that he is somebody, but being nobody. Is this so now for the first time? Is it not the fact that ever since the human race existed, all errors and misfortunes have arisen through this ignorance? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles quarrel with one another? Was it not through not knowing what things are profitable and not profitable? Does not the one say it is profitable to restore Chryseis to her father, and does not the other say that it is not profitable? does not the one say that he ought to take the prize of another, and does not the other say that he ought not? Did they not for these reasons forget both who they were and for what purpose they had come there? Oh, man, for what purpose did you come? to gain mistresses or to fight? To fight. With whom? the Trojans or the Hellenes? With the Trojans. Do you then leave Hector alone and draw your sword against your own king? And do you, most excellent sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are the people's guardian and have such cares ; and are you quarrelling about a little girl with the most warlike of your allies, whom you ought by every means to take care of and protect? and do you become worse than (inferior to) a well-behaved priest who treats you these fine gladiators with all respect? Do you see what kind of things ignorance of what is profitable does?

But I also am rich. Are you then richer than Agamemnon? But I am also handsome. Are you then more handsome than Achilles? But I have also beautiful hair. But had not Achilles more beautiful hair and gold coloured? and he did not comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also strong. Can you then lift so great a stone as Hector or Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. Are you the son of a goddess mother? are you the son of a father sprung from Zeus? What good then do these things do to him, when he sits and weeps for a girl? But I am an orator. And was he not? Do you not see how he handled the most skilful of the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix? how he stopped their mouths?<sup>2</sup>

This is all that I have to say to you ; and I say even this not willingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look to in order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are roused by generous horses? Must I look to your body? You treat it disgracefully. To your dress? That is luxurious. To your behaviour, to your look? That is the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do not say to him, You tell me nothing ; but only show yourself worthy of hearing or fit for hearing ; and you will see how you will move the speaker.

<sup>2</sup> In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messengers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonderful example of eloquence.

## CHAPTER XXV.

THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY.<sup>1</sup>

**W**HEN one of those who were present said, Persuade me that logic is necessary, he replied, Do you wish me to prove this to you? The answer was—Yes.—Then I must use a demonstrative form of speech.—This was granted.—How then will you know if I am cheating you by my argument? The man was silent. Do you see, said Epictetus, that you yourself are admitting that logic is necessary, if without it you cannot know so much as this, whether logic is necessary or not necessary?

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## WHAT IS THE PROPERTY OF ERROR.

**E**VERY error comprehends contradiction; for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it is plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what does the thief wish

<sup>1</sup> See i. 17.

to do? That which is for his own interest.<sup>1</sup> If then the theft is not for his interest, he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational soul is by nature offended at contradiction, and so long as it does not understand this contradiction, it is not hindered from doing contradictory things; but when it does understand the contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the contradiction, and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from the false when he sees that a thing is false; but so long as this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to truth.

He then is strong in argument and has the faculty of exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to each man the contradiction through which he errs, and clearly to prove how he does not do that which he wishes and does that which he does not wish. For if anyone shall show this, a man will himself withdraw from that which he does; but so long as you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man persists in his practice; for having the appearance of doing right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates also trusting to this power used to say, I am used to call no other witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him with whom I am discussing, and I ask him to give his opinion and call him as a witness, and though he is only one, he is sufficient in the place of all. For Socrates knew by what the rational soul is moved

<sup>1</sup> Compare Xenophon, *Memoirs*, iii. 9. 4.

just like a pair of scales, and then it must incline, whether it chooses or not.<sup>2</sup> Show the rational governing faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from it ; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him who is not persuaded.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> There is some deficiency in the text. Cicero (*Acad. Prior.* i. 12), "*ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi ; sic animum perspicuis cedere,*" appears to supply the deficiency.

<sup>3</sup> *M. Antoninus*, v. 28 ; x. 4.





## NOTES.

I (p. 1). A. Gellius (i. 2 and xvii. 19) speaks of the Discourses of Epictetus being arranged by Arrian; and Gellius (xix. 1) speaks of a fifth book of these Discourses, but only four are extant and some fragments. The whole number of books was eight, as Photius (Cod. 58) says. There is also extant an *Encheiridion* or Manual, consisting of short pieces selected from the Discourses of Epictetus; and there is the valuable commentary on the *Encheiridion* written by Simplicius in the sixth century A.D. and in the reign of Justinian.

Arrian explains in a manner what he means by saying that he did not write these Discourses of Epictetus; but he does not explain his meaning when he says that he did not make them public. He tells us that he did attempt to write down in the words of Epictetus what the philosopher said; but how it happened that they were first published, without his knowledge or consent, Arrian does not say. It appears, however, that he did see the Discourses when they were published; and as Schweighaeuser remarks, he would naturally correct any errors that he detected, and so there would be an edition revised by himself.



2 (p. 5). Compare Antoninus, ii. 3. Epictetus does not intend to limit the power of the gods, but he means that the constitution of things being what it is, they cannot do contradictories. They have so constituted things that man is hindered by externals. How then could they give to man a power of not being hindered by externals? Seneca (De Providentia, c. 6) says: "But it may be said, many things happen which cause sadness, fear, and are hard to bear. Because (God says) I could not save you from them, I have armed your minds against all." This is the answer to those who imagine that they have disproved the common assertion of the omnipotence of God, when they ask whether He can combine inherent contradictions, whether He can cause two and two to make five. This is indeed a very absurd way of talking.

3 (p. 5). Schweighaeuser observes that these faculties of pursuit and avoidance, and of desire and aversion, and even the faculty of using appearances, belong to animals as well as to man; but animals in using appearances are moved by passion only, and do not understand what they are doing, while in man these passions are under his control. Salmasius proposed to change *ἡμέτερον* into *ἐμέτερον*, to remove the difficulty about these animal passions being called "a small portion of us (the gods)." Schweighaeuser, however, though he sees the difficulty, does not accept the emendation. Perhaps Arrian has here imperfectly represented what his master said, and perhaps he did not.

4 (p. 10). The preconception (*πρόληψις*) is thus defined by the Stoics: *ἔστι δὲ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθ' ὅλου* (Diogenes Laert. vii.). "We name Anticipation all knowledge by which I can *a priori*

know and determine that which belongs to empirical knowledge, and without doubt this is the sense in which Epicurus used his expression *πρόληψις*” (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 152, 7th ed.). He adds: “But since there is something in appearances which never can be known *a priori*, and which consequently constitutes the difference between empirical knowledge and knowledge *a priori*, that is, sensation (as the material of observation), it follows that this sensation is specially that which cannot be anticipated (it cannot be a *πρόληψις*). On the other hand, we could name the pure determinations in space and time, both in respect to form and magnitude, anticipations of the appearances, because these determinations represent *a priori* whatever may be presented to us *a posteriori* in experience.”

5 (p. 15). The text is : *εἰ ἢ μὴ οὐ χείρων*. The sense seems to be : Epictetus is not superior to Socrates, but if he is not worse, that is enough for me. On the different readings of the passage and on the sense, see the notes in Schweighauser's edition. The difficulty, if there is any, is in the negative *μή*.

6 (p. 15). Epictetus speaks of God (*ὁ θεός*) and the gods. Also conformably to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus. The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one. “Father of men and gods,” says Homer of Zeus ; and Virgil says of Jupiter, “Father of gods and king of men.” Salmasius proposed *ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*.

7 (p. 16). *ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε μή τι τούτων ἀπορῶναι τῶν ἀτυχημάτων*. Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6 : *ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης*, etc. Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike the

style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which Epictetus was teaching.

8 (p. 17). *ὑπερέκειται*. The Latin translation is : "in futurum tempus rejicit." Wolf says : "Significat id, quod in Enchiridio dictum est : philosophiae tiro-nem non ninium tribuere sibi, sed quasi addubitantem expectare dum confirmetur judicium."

9 (p. 19). Halteres are gymnastic instruments (Galen. i., De Sanitate tuenda ; Martial, xiv. 49 ; Juvenal, vi. 420, and the Scholiast. Upton). Halteres is a Greek word, literally "leapers." They are said to have been masses of lead, used for exercise and in making jumps. The effect of such weights in taking a jump is well known to boys who have used them. A couple of bricks will serve the purpose. Martial says (xiv. 49) :

Quid pereunt stulto fortes haltere lacerti ?  
Exercet melius vinca fossa viros.

Juvenal (vi. 421) writes of a woman who uses dumb-bells till she sweats, and is then rubbed dry by a man,

Quum lassata gravi ceciderunt brachia massa.  
(Macleane's Juvenal.)

As to the expression, *Ὅψι σὺ, καὶ οἱ ἀλτῆρες*, see Upton's note. It is also a Latin form : "Epicurus hoc viderit," Cicero, Acad. ii. c. 7 : "haec fortuna viderit," Ad. Attic. vi. 4. It occurs in M. Antoninus, viii. 41, v. 25 ; and in Acta Apostol. xviii. 15.

10 (p. 24). Goethe has a short poem, entitled Gleich und Gleich (Like and Like) :

Ein Blumenglöckchen  
Vom Boden hervor  
War früh gesprosset  
In lieblichem Flor ;

Da kam ein Bienchen  
 Und naschte fein :—  
 Die müssen wohl beyde  
 Für einander seyn.

11 (p. 26). The original is *αὐτοῦ*, which I refer to God ; but it may be ambiguous. Schweighaeuser refers it to man, and explains it to mean that man should be a spectator of himself, according to the maxim, *Γινώθι σεαυτόν*. It is true that man can in a manner contemplate himself and his faculties as well as external objects ; and as every man can be an object to every other man, so a man may be an object to himself when he examines his faculties and reflects on his own acts. Schweighaeuser asks how can a man be a spectator of God, except so far as he is a spectator of God's works ? It is not enough, he says, to reply that God and the universe, whom and which man contemplates, are the same thing to the Stoics ; for Epictetus always distinguishes God the maker and governor of the universe from the universe itself. But here lies the difficulty. The universe is an all-comprehensive term : it is all that we can in any way perceive and conceive as existing ; and it may therefore comprehend God, not as something distinct from the universe, but as being the universe himself. This form of expression is an acknowledgment of the weakness of the human faculties, and contains the implicit assertion of Locke that the notion of God is beyond man's understanding (Essay, etc., ii. c. 17).

12 (p. 29). *ἀφορμὰς*. This word in this passage has a different meaning from that which it has when it is opposed to *ὁρμή*. Epictetus says that the powers which man has were given by God : Antoninus says, from nature. They mean the same thing.

13 (p. 30). The title is *περὶ τῆς χρείας τῶν μεταπίπτόντων καὶ ὑποθετικῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων*. Schweighaeuser has a big note on *μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι*, which he has collected from various critics. Mrs. Carter translated the title, "Of the Use of Convertible and Hypothetical Propositions and the like." But "convertible" might be understood in the common logical sense, which is not the meaning of Epictetus. Schweighaeuser explains *μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι* to be sophistical arguments in which the meaning of propositions or of terms, which ought to remain the same, is dexterously changed and perverted to another meaning.

14 (p. 33). This, then, is a case of *μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι* (chap. vii. 1), where there has been a sophistical or dishonest change in the premises or in some term, by virtue of which change there appears to be a just conclusion, which, however, is false; and it is not a conclusion derived from the premises to which we assented. A ridiculous example is given by Seneca, Ep. 48: "Mus syllaba est: mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit." Seneca laughs at this absurdity, and says perhaps the following syllogism (*collectio*) may be a better example of acuteness: "Mus syllaba est: syllaba autem caseum non rodit: mus ergo caseum non rodit." One is as good as the other. We know that neither conclusion is true, and we see where the error is. Ménage says that though the Stoics particularly cultivated logic, some of them despised it, and he mentions Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus. Upton, however, observes that Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus did not despise logic (he says nothing about Seneca), but employed it for their own purposes.

It has been observed that if a man is asked whether, if every A is B, every B is also A, he might answer that it is. But if you put the conversion in this material form, "Every goose is an animal," he immediately perceives that he cannot say, "Every animal is a goose." What does this show? It shows that the man's comprehension of the proposition, every A is B, was not true, and that he took it to mean something different from what the person intended who put the question. He understood that A and B were co-extensive. Whether we call this reasoning or something else, makes no matter. A man whose understanding is sound cannot in the nature of things reason wrong; but his understanding of the matter on which he reasons may be wrong somewhere, and he may not be able to discover where. A man who has been trained in the logical art may show him that his conclusion is just according to his understanding of the terms and the propositions employed, but yet it is not true.

15 (p. 38). In i. 20, Epictetus defines the being (*οὐσία*) or nature of good to be a proper use of appearances; and he also says, i. 29, 1, that the nature of the good is a kind of will (*προαιρέσις ποία*), and the nature of evil is a kind of will. But Schweighaeuser cannot understand how the "good of man" can be "a certain will with regard to appearances;" and he suggests that Arrian may have written, "a certain will which makes use of appearances."

16 (p. 39). It is the possession of reason, he says, by which man has communion with God; it is not by any external means, or religious ceremonial. A modern expositor of Epictetus says, "Through reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed

up with the deity as though they were part of him" (Epictet. i. 14, 6; ii. 8, 11, 17, 33). In the Epistle named from Peter (ii. 1, 4) it is written: "Whereby are given to us exceeding great and precious promises, that by these (see v. 3) ye might be partakers of the divine nature (γίνεσθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως), having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust." Mrs. Carter, Introduction, § 31, has some remarks on this Stoic doctrine, which are not a true explanation of the principles of Epictetus and Antoninus.

17 (p. 40). In our present society there are thousands who rise in the morning and know not how they shall find something to eat. Some find their food by fraud and theft, some receive it as a gift from others, and some look out for any work that they can find and get their pittance by honest labour. You may see such men everywhere, if you will keep your eyes open. Such men, who live by daily labour, live an heroic life, which puts to shame the well-fed philosopher and the wealthy Christian.

Epictetus has made a great misstatement about irrational animals. Millions die annually for want of sufficient food; and many human beings perish in the same way. We can hardly suppose that he did not know these facts.

Compare the passage in Matthew (vi. 25-34). It is said, v. 26: "Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?" The expositors of this passage may be consulted.

18 (p. 42). Upton has referred to the passages of Epictetus in which this expression is used, i. 24, 20;

i. 25, 18; ii. 1, 19, and others; to Seneca, *De Provid.* c. 6, Ep. 91; to Cicero, *De Fin.* iii. 18, where there is this conclusion: "e quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, quum beatus sit; et stulti manere in vita quum sit miser."

Compare Matthew vi. 31: "Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek :) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things," etc.

19 (p. 44). A "Praefectus Annonae," or superintendent of the supply of corn at Rome, is first mentioned by Livy (iv. 12) as appointed during a scarcity. At a later time this office was conferred on Cn. Pompeius for five years. Maecenas (*Dion.* 52, c. 24) advised Augustus to make a Praefectus Annonae or permanent officer over the corn market and all other markets (*ἐπὶ τοῦ σίτου τῆς τε ἀγορᾶς τῆς λοιπῆς*). He would thus have the office formerly exercised by the aediles.

20 (p. 45). Schweighaeuser proposes a small alteration in the Greek text, but I do not think it necessary. When Epictetus says, "Why are we not active?" he means, Why do some say that we are not active? and he intends to say that We are active, but not in the way in which some people are active. I have therefore added in ( ) what is necessary to make the text intelligible. The next passage is rather obscure. The word *ἐπαραγρῶραι* signifies, it is said, to read over for the purpose of explaining as a teacher may do. The pupil also would read something to the teacher for the purpose of showing if he understood it. So Epictetus also says, "But what is it to me," etc.



21 (p. 51). *κἂν μεταδόξῃ*, "if you should change your mind," as we say. So we may translate, in the previous part of this chapter, *ἰδοξεν ἡμῖν, σοί*, and the like, "we had a mind to such and such a thing." Below it is said that the cause of our actions are "our opinions and our wills," where the Greek for "wills" is *δόγματα*. If we translate *ἰδοξεν ἡμῖν*, "seemed right," as some persons would translate it, that is not the meaning, unless we understand "seemed right" in a sense in which it is often used, that is, a man's resolve to do so and so. See Schweighauser's note on *ἐπιόληψις* and *δόγμα*. As Antoninus says (viii. 1): "How then shall a man do this (what his nature requires)? If he has principles (*δόγματα*) from which come his affects (*ῥογαί*) and his acts (*πράξεις*)?"

22 (p. 53). The line is from the prayer of Ulysses to Athena: "Hear me, child of Zeus, thou who standest by me always in all dangers, nor do I even move without thy knowledge." Socrates said that the gods know everything, what is said and done and thought (Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 1, 19). Compare Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, i. 1, 2; and Dr. Price's *Dissertation on Providence*, sect. i. Epictetus enumerates the various opinions about the gods in ancient times. The reader may consult the notes in Schweighauser's edition. The opinions about God among modern nations, who are called civilized, and are so more or less, do not seem to be so varied as in ancient times; but the contrasts in modern opinions are striking. These modern opinions vary between denial of a God, though the number of those who deny is perhaps not large, and the superstitious notions about God and his administration of the world, which are taught by teachers, learned and ignorant, and exercise a great

power over the minds of those who are unable or do not dare to exercise the faculty of reason.

23 (p. 55). Upton has collected the passages in which this doctrine was mentioned. One passage is in Gellius (vi. 1), from the fourth book of Chrysippus on Providence, who says: "Nothing is more foolish than the opinions of those who think that good could have existed without evil." Schweighacuser wishes that Epictetus had discussed more fully the question of the nature and origin of Evil. He refers to the commentary of Simplicius on the *Encheiridion* of Epictetus, c. 13 (8), and 34 (27), for his treatment of this subject. Epictetus (*Encheiridion*, c. 27) says that "as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe." Simplicius observes (p. 278, ed. Schweighacuser): "The Good is that which is according to each thing's nature, wherein each thing has its perfection; but the Bad is the disposition contrary to its nature of the thing which contains the bad, by which disposition it is deprived of that which is according to nature, namely, the good. For if the Bad as well as the Good were a disposition and perfection of the form (*πίδεσς*) in which it is, the bad itself would also be good and would not then be called Bad."

24 (p. 57). The original is *δῆγμα*, which the Latin translators render "decretis," and Mrs. Carter "principles." I don't understand either. I have rendered the word by "thoughts," which is vague, but I can do no better. It was the Stoic doctrine that the human intelligence is a particle of the divine. Mrs. Carter names this "one of the Stoic extravagancies, arising from the notion that human souls were literally parts

of the Deity." But this is hardly a correct representation of the Stoic doctrine.

25 (p. 60). Things appear to be separate, but there is a bond by which they are united. "All this that you see, wherein things divine and human are contained, is One : we are members of one large body" (Seneca, Ep. 95). "The universe is either a confusion, a mutual involution of things and a dispersion ; or it is unity and order and providence" (Antoninus, vi. 10) : also vii. 9, "all things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy ; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing." See also Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, ii. 7 ; and *De Oratore*, iii. 5.

26 (p. 61). Antoninus, v. 27 : "Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the Daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man's understanding and reason." Antoninus (iii. 5) names this Daemon "the god who is in thee." St. Paul (1 Cor. i. 3, 16) says, "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Even the poets use this form of expression—

*Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo [ipso] :*

*Impetus hic sacrae semina mentis habet.*

Ovid. *Fasti*. vi. 5.

27 (p. 63). "The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom" (Mrs. Carter). The flowers of a fig are inside the fleshy receptacle which becomes the fruit.

Schweighaeuser prints  $\mu\eta\delta' \alpha\nu, \iota\gamma\omega \sigma\omicron\iota \lambda\acute{\iota}\gamma\omega,$

προσδύκα : and in his Latin version he prints : "Id vero, ego tibi dico, ne expectes." I neither understand his pointing, nor his version. Wolf translates it, "Etsi ego tibi dixero (virtutem brevi parari posse), noli credere"; which is right. Wolf makes *ἄν* go with *λέγω*.

28 (p. 67). This is obscure. The conclusion, "Reason therefore is analyzed by itself" is not in Epictetus ; but it is implied, as Schweighaeuser says (p. 197, notes). So Antoninus, xi. 1, writes : "These are the properties of the rational soul ; it sees itself, analyzes itself." If reason, our reason, requires another reason to analyze it, that other reason will require another reason to analyze that other reason ; and so on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analyzed, it must be analyzed by itself. The notes on the first part of this chapter in the edition of Schweighaeuser may be read by those who are inclined.

29 (p. 67). "Our opinions." There is some defect in the text, as Wolf remarks. "The opponent," he says, "disparages Logic (Dialectic) as a thing which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching to Logic ; but Epictetus informs him that a man who is not a Dialectician will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching."

30 (p. 71). This is true. If you place before a man the fear of death, you threaten him with the fear of death. The man may yield to the threat, and do what it is the object of the threat to make him do ; or he may make resistance to him who attempts to enforce the threat ; or he may refuse to yield, and so take the consequence of his refusal. If a man yields to the threat, he does so for the reason which Epictetus gives, and freedom of choice, and consequently free-

dom of will really exists in this case. The Roman law did not allow contracts or agreements made under the influence of threats to be valid ; and the reason for declaring them invalid was not the want of free will in him who yielded to the threat, but the fact that threats are directly contrary to the purpose of all law, which purpose is to secure the independent action of every person in all things allowed by law. This matter is discussed by Savigny, *Das heut. Römische Recht*, iii. § 114. See the title, "*Quod metus causa*," in the Digest, 4, 2. Compare also Epictetus, iv. 1, 68, etc.

31 (p. 71). *τὸ παθεῖν ὄντι*, etc. Sch•eighaeuser has a note on the distinction between *τὸ ὀρίεσθαι* and *τὸ ὀρμᾶν*. Compare Epictetus, iii. 2, 1 ; iii. 3, 2 ; iii. 22, 43 ; and i. 4, 11. Schweighaeuser says that *ὀρίεσθαι* refers to the *ἀγαθόν* and *συμφέρον*, and *ὀρμᾶν* to the *καθῆκον*, and he concludes that there is a defect in the text, which he endeavours to supply.

32 (p. 72). Mrs. Carter says: "The most ignorant persons often practise what they know to be evil ; and they who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their inclinations to blind their judgment, are not justified by following it." (Perhaps she means "them," "their inclinations.") "The doctrine of Epictetus therefore, here and elsewhere, on this head, contradicts the voice of reason and conscience ; nor is it less pernicious than ill-grounded. It destroys all guilt and merit, all punishment and reward, all blame of ourselves or others, all sense of misbehaviour towards our fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers did not teach repentance towards God."

Mrs. Carter has not understood Epictetus ; and her censure is misplaced. It is true that "the most

ignorant persons often practise what they know to be evil," as she truly says. But she might have said more. It is also true that persons, who are not ignorant, often do what they know to be evil, and even what they would condemn in another, at least before they had fallen into the same evil themselves; for when they have done what they know to be wrong, they have a fellow-feeling with others who are as bad as themselves. Nor does he say, as Mrs. Carter seems to imply that he does, for her words are ambiguous, that they who voluntarily suffer their inclinations to blind their judgment are justified by following them. He says that men will do as they do, so long as they think as they think. He only traces to their origin the bad acts which bad men do; and he says that we should pity them and try to mend them. Now the best man in the world, if he sees the origin and direct cause of bad acts in men, may pity them for their wickedness, and he will do right. He will pity, and still he will punish severely, if the interests of society require the guilty to be punished; but he will not punish in anger. Epictetus says nothing about legal penalties; and I assume that he would not say that the penalties are always unjust, if I understand his principles. His discourse is to this effect, as the title tells us, that we ought not to be angry with the errors of others: the matter of the discourse is the feeling and disposition which we ought to have towards those who do wrong, "because they are mistaken about good and evil."

He does not discuss the question of the origin of these men's mistake further than this: men think that a thing or act is advantageous; and it is impossible for them to think that one thing is advantageous and

to desire another thing. Their error is in their opinion. Then he tells us to show them their error, and they will desist from their errors. He is not here examining the way of showing them their error; by which I suppose that he means convincing them of their error. He seems to admit that it may not be possible to convince them of their errors; for he says, "if they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion."

This is the plain and certain meaning of Epictetus which Mrs. Carter in her zeal has not seen.

33 (p. 76). The MSS. have *ὑομένος* or *οιόμενος*. Schweighaeuser has accepted Upton's emendation of *οἰνωμένος*, but I do not. The "sleep" refers to dreams. Aristotle, *Ethic.* i. 13, says: "better are the visions (dreams) of the good (*ἐπικεικῶν*) than those of the common sort;" and Zeno taught that "a man might from his dreams judge of the progress that he was making, if he observed that in his sleep he was not pleased with anything bad, nor desired or did anything unreasonable or unjust" (Plutarch, *On Progress in Virtue*, § 12).

34 (p. 78). The word is *φιλαυτον*, self-love, but here it means self-regard, which implies no censure. See Aristotle, *Ethic. Nicom.* ix. c. 8: *ὥς ἐν αἰσχροῖσι φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι*. His conclusion is: *οἷτω μὲν οὖν δεῖ φιλαυτον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὥς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή*. See the note of Schweighaeuser. Epictetus, as usual, is right in his opinion of man's nature.

35 (p. 78). This has been misunderstood by Wolf. Schweighaeuser, who always writes like a man of sense, says: "Epictetus means by 'our proper interests,' the interests proper to man, as a man, as a rational

being; and this interest or good consists in the proper use of our powers, and so far from being repugnant to common interest or utility, it contains within itself the notion of general utility and cannot be separated from it."

36 (p. 80). Schweighaeuser says that he has introduced into the text Lord Shaftesbury's emendation, ὅπου. The emendation ὅπου is good, but Schweighaeuser has not put it in his text; he has οἱ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τιθέμεθα. Matthew vi. 21, "for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also." So these people show, by thanking God, what it is for which they are thankful.

37 (p. 80). Casaubon, in a learned note on Suetonius, Augustus, c. 18, informs us that divine honours were paid to Augustus at Nicopolis, which town he founded after the victory at Actium. The priesthood of Augustus at Nicopolis was a high office, and the priest gave his name to the year; that is, when it was intended in any writing to fix the year, either in any writing which related to public matters, or in instruments used in private affairs, the name of the priest of Augustus was used, and this was also the practice in most Greek cities. In order to establish the sense of this passage, Casaubon changed the text from τὰς φωνάς into τὰ σύμφωνα, which emendation Schweighaeuser has admitted into his text.

38 (p. 84). Epicurus is said to have written more than any other person, as many as three hundred volumes (κύλινδροι, rolls). Chrysippus was his rival in this respect. For if Epicurus wrote anything, Chrysippus vied with him in writing as much; and for this reason he often repeated himself, because he did not read over what he had written, and he left his writings



uncorrected in consequence of his hurry (Diogenes Laertius, x.).—Upton. See i. 4, note 3.

39 (p. 85). Praecognitions (*προλήψεις*) is translated Praecognita by John Smith, Select Discourses, p. 4. Cicero says (Topica, 7): "Notionem appello quod Graeci tum *ἐννοίαν*, tum *πρόληψιν* dicunt. Ea est insita et ante percepta cujusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens." In the De Natura Deorum (i. 16) he says: "Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat *πρόληψιν* Epicurus? id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest." Epicurus, as Cicero says in the following chapter (17), was the first who used *πρόληψις* in this sense, which Cicero applies to what he calls the ingrafted or rather innate cognitions of the existence of gods, and these cognitions he supposes to be universal; but whether this is so or not, I do not know. See i. c. 2; Tuscul. i. 24; De Fin. iii. 6, and *πρόληψις* in iv. 8, 6.

40 (p. 85). The word is *ὅσιον*, which is very difficult to translate. We may take an instance from ourselves. There is a general agreement about integrity, and about the worship of the supreme being, but a wondrous difference about certain acts or doings in trading, whether they are consistent with integrity or not; and a still more wondrous difference in forms of worship, whether they are conformable to religion or not.

41 (p. 88). Upton refers to a passage in the Theaetetus (p. 150, Steph.), where Socrates professes that it is his art to discover whether a young man's mind is giving birth to an idol (an unreality) and a falsity, or to something productive and true; and he says

(p. 151) that those who associate with him are like women in child-birth, for they are in labour and full of trouble nights and days much more than women, and his art has the power of stirring up and putting to rest this labour of child-birth.

The conclusion in the chapter is not clear. The student is supposed to be addressed by some rich old man, who really does not know what to say ; and the best way of getting rid of him and his idle talk is by dismissing him with a joke. See Schweighaeuser's note.

42 (p. 89). The word *ὑπονοητικοί* is not intelligible. Schweighaeuser suggests that it ought to be *προνοητικοί*, "how have we any care for others?" Epicurus taught that we should not marry nor beget children nor engage in public affairs, because these things disturb our tranquillity.

43 (p. 95). The conclusion, "and you will then see," is not in the text, but it is what Epictetus means. The argument is complete. If we admit the existence of God, and that he is our father, as Epictetus teaches, we have from him the intellectual powers which we possess ; and those men in whom these powers have been roused to activity, and are exercised, require no other instructor. It is true that in a large part of mankind these powers are inactive and are not exercised, or if they are exercised, it is in a very imperfect way. But those who contemplate the improvement of the human race, hope that all men, or, if not all men, a great number will be roused to the exercise of the powers which they have, and that human life will be made more conformable to Nature, that is, that man will use the powers which he has, and will not need advice and direction from other men, who,

professing that they are wise and that they can teach, prove by their teaching and often by their example that they are not wise, and are incapable of teaching.

This is equally true for those who may deny or doubt about the existence of God. They cannot deny that man has the intellectual powers which he does possess; and they are certainly not the persons who will proclaim their own want of these powers. If man has them and can exercise them, the fact is sufficient; and we need not dispute about the source of these powers which are in man Naturally, that is, according to the constitution of his Nature.

44 (p. 98). Paradoxes (*παράδοξα*), "things contrary to opinion," are contrasted with paralogies (*παράλογα*), "things contrary to reason" (iv. 1. 173). Cicero says (Prooemium to his Paradoxes), that paradoxes are "something which cause surprise and contradict common opinion;" and in another place he says that the Romans gave the name of "admirabilia" to the Stoic paradoxes.—The puncture of the eye is the operation for cataract.

45 (p. 99). *ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας*. "Intelligere quid verum rectumque sit, prius est et facilius. Id vero exsequi et observare, posterius et difficilius."—Wolf.

This is a profound and useful remark of Epictetus. General principles are most easily understood and accepted. The difficulty is in the application of them. What is more easy, for example, than to understand general principles of law which are true and good? But in practice cases are presented to us which, as Bacon says, are "immersed in matter"; and it is this matter which makes the difficulty of applying the principles, and requires the ability and study of an

experienced man. It is easy, and it is right, to teach the young the general principles of the rules of life ; but the difficulty of applying them is that in which the young and the old too often fail. So if you ask whether virtue can be taught, the answer is that the rules for a virtuous life can be delivered ; but the application of the rules is the difficulty, as teachers of religion and morality know well, if they are fit to teach. If they do not know this truth, they are neither fit to teach the rules, nor to lead the way to the practice of them by the only method which is possible ; and this method is by their own example, assisted by the example of those who direct the education of youth, and of those with whom young persons live.

46 (p. 105). "The chief question which was debated between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics on one side, and the Stoics on the other, was this, whether there is a criterion of truth ; and in the first place, the question is about the evidence of the senses, or the certainty of truth in those things which are perceived by the senses."—Schweighaeuser.

The strength of the Stoic system was that "it furnishes a ground-work of common sense, and the universal belief of mankind, on which to found sufficient certitude for the requirements of life : on the other hand, the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense of the word, was abandoned."—Levin's *Six Lectures*, p. 70.

47 (p. 108). This is the literal version. It does not mean "that it appeared right," as Mrs. Carter translates it. Alexander never thought whether it was right or wrong. All that appeared to him was the possessing of Helene, and he used the means for getting posses-

sion of her, as a dog who spies and pursues some wild animal.

48 (p. 111). The expression τὸ φαινόμενον often occurs in this chapter, and it is sometimes translated by the Latin "sententia" or "opinio"; and so it may be, and I have translated it by "opinion." But Epictetus says (s. 30) ἀλλὰ τί ἐφάμην, καὶ εἰθὺς ποιῶ τὸ φάνέν: which means that there was an appearance, which was followed by the act. The word generally used by Epictetus is φαντασία, which occurs very often. In the Encheiridion (i. 5) there is some difference between φαντασία and τὸ φαινόμενον, for they are contrasted: τὸ φαινόμενον is the phenomenon, the bare appearance: φαντασία in this passage may be the mental state consequent on the φαινόμενον: or, as Diogenes Laertius says, Φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ.

49 (p. 112). This is the maxim of Horace, Epp. i. 6; and Macleane's note,—

Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,  
Solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum.

on which Upton remarks that this maxim is explained very philosophically and learnedly by Lord Shaftesbury (the author of the Characteristics), vol. iii. p. 202. Compare M. Antoninus, xii. 1. Seneca, De Vita Beata, c. 3, writes, "Aliarum rerum quae vitem instruunt diligens, sine admiratione cujusquam." Antoninus (i. 15) expresses the "sine admiratione" by τὸ ἀθαύμαστον.

50 (p. 118). The Roman emperors kept gladiators for their own amusement and that of the people (Lipsius, Saturnalia, ii. 16). Seneca says (De Provid. c. 4), "I have heard a mirmillo (a kind of gladiator) in the

time of C. Caesar (Caligula) complaining of the rarity of gladiatorial exhibitions: What a glorious period of life is wasting." "Virtue," says Seneca, "is eager after dangers; and it considers only what it seeks, not what it may suffer."—Upton.

51 (p. 118). The word is Hypothesis (*ὑπόθεσις*), which in this passage means "matter to work on," "material," "subject," as in ii. 5, 11, where it means the "business of the pilot." In i. 7, hypothesis has the sense of a proposition supposed for the present to be true, and used as the foundation of an argument.

52 (p. 118). Tropic (*τροπικόν*), a logical term used by Stoics, which Schweighaeuser translates "propositio connexa in syllogismo hypothetico."

The meaning of the whole is this: You do not like the work which is set before you; as we say, you are not content "to do your duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call you." Now this is as foolish, says Wolf, as for a man in any discussion to require that his adversary should raise no objection except such as may serve the man's own case.

53 (p. 120). The word is *Κύριος*, the name by which a slave in Epictetus addresses his master (*dominus*), a physician is addressed by his patient, and in other cases also it is used. It is also used by the Evangelists. They speak of the angel of the Lord (Matt. i. 24); and Jesus is addressed by the same term (Matt. viii. 2), Lord or master.

Mrs. Carter has the following note: "It hath been observed that this manner of expression is not to be met with in the Heathen authors before Christianity, and therefore it is one instance of Scripture language coming early into common use."

But the word (*κύριος*) is used by early Greek writers to indicate one who has power or authority, and in a sense like the Roman "dominus," as by Sophocles for instance. The use of the word then by Epictetus was not new, and it may have been used by the Stoic writers long before his time. The language of the Stoics was formed at least two centuries before the Christian era, and the New Testament writers would use the Greek which was current in their age. The notion of "Scripture language coming early into common use" is entirely unfounded, and is even absurd. Mrs. Carter's remark implies that Epictetus used the Scripture language, whereas he used the particular language of the Stoics, and the general language of his age, and the New Testament writers would do the same. There are resemblances between the language of Epictetus and the New Testament writers, such as the expression *μὴ γίνωτο* of Paul, which Epictetus often uses; but this is a slight matter. The words of Peter (Ep. ii. 1, 4), "that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature," are a Stoic expression, and the writer of this Epistle, I think, took them from the language of the Stoics.

54 (p. 120). The words in the text are: *περὶ τῆς ὑψίστης (κατῆτης) εἶναι ὑπάτην*. "When *ὑπάτη* is translated 'the lowest chord or note,' it must be remembered that the names employed in the Greek musical terminology are precisely the opposite to ours. Compare *κατῆτη* 'the highest note,' though the word in itself means lowest."—Key's Philological Essays, p. 42, note 1.

55 (p. 123). He calls the uninstructed and ignorant by the Greek word, "Idiotæ," "idiots," which we now use in a peculiar sense. An Idiotæ was a private

individual as opposed to one who filled some public office ; and thence it had generally the sense of one who was ignorant of any particular art, as, for instance, one who had not studied philosophy.

56 (p. 129). This was a doctrine of Heraclitus and of Zeno. Zeno (Diog. Laert. vii. 137) speaks of God as "in certain periods or revolutions of time exhausting into himself the universal substance (*οὐσία*), and again generating it out of himself." Antoninus (xi. 1) speaks of the periodical renovation of all things. For man, whose existence is so short, the doctrine of all existing things perishing in the course of time and then being renewed, is of no practical value. The present is enough for most men. But for the few who are able to embrace in thought the past, the present, and the future, the contemplation of the perishable nature of all existing things may have a certain value by elevating their minds above the paltry things which others prize above their worth.

57 (p. 129). Schweighauser says that he does not quite see what is the meaning of "ought to be open," and he suggests that Epictetus intended to say, "we ought to consider that the door is open for all occasions"; but the occasions, he says, ought to be when things are such that a man can in no way bear them or cannot honourably endure them, and such occasions the wise man considers to be the voice of God giving to him the signal to retire.

58 (p. 130). This is an allusion to one of the Roman modes of manumitting a slave before the praetor. Compare Persius, Sat. v. 75—

Heu steriles veri, quibus una Quiritem  
Vertigo facit ;

and again—



Verterit hunc dominus, momento turbinis exit  
 Marcus Dama.

The sum paid on manumission was a tax of five per cent., established in B.C. 356 (Livy, vii. 16), and paid by the slave. Epictetus here speaks of the tax being paid by the master; but in iii. 26, he speaks of it as paid by the enfranchised slave. See Dureau de la Malle, *Économie Politique des Romains*, i. 290, ii. 469.

59 (p. 132). The word is *ὑπὸ ἀταξίας*. Mrs. Carter thinks that the true reading is *ὑπὸ ἀπραξίας*, "through idleness" or "having nothing to do"; and she remarks that "freedom from perturbations" is the very thing that Epictetus had been recommending through the whole chapter and is the subject of the next chapter, and therefore cannot be well supposed to be the true reading in a place where it is mentioned with contempt. It is probable that Mrs. Carter is right. Upton thinks that Epictetus is alluding to the Sophists, and that we should understand him as speaking ironically; and this may also be right. Schweighaeuser attempts to explain the passage by taking "free from perturbations" in the ordinary simple sense; but I doubt if he has succeeded.

60 (p. 132). *ἑμπεπερεύσθ*. Epictetus (iii. 2, 14) uses the adjective *πίρπερος* to signify a vain man. Antoninus (v. 5) uses the verb *περπίρνεσθαι*: and Paul (Corinthians i. c. 13, 4), where our version is, "charity (love) vaunteth not itself." Cicero (ad. Attic. i. 14, 4) uses *ἐνπεπερευσάμην* to express a rhetorical display.

61 (p. 133). "Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, torture, exile, and sudden executions, can be ranked among the common accidents of life, may be surprised to find Epictetus so frequently

endeavouring to prepare his hearers for them. But it must be recollected that he addressed himself to persons who lived under the Roman emperors, from whose tyranny the very best of men were perpetually liable to such kind of dangers."—Mrs. Carter. All men even now are exposed to accidents and misfortunes against which there is no security, and even the most fortunate of men must die at last. The lessons of Epictetus may be as useful now as they were in his time. See i. 30.

62 (p. 137). "The reader must know that these dissertations were spoken extempore, and that one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker. So the reader will not be surprised that when the discourse is on the maintenance of firmness or freedom from perturbations, Epictetus should now speak of philosophical preparation, which is most efficient for the maintenance of firmness."—Wolf.

63 (p. 138). Mrs. Carter says, "This is one of the many extravagant refinements of the philosophers; and might lead persons into very dangerous mistakes, if it was laid down as a maxim in ordinary life." I think that Mrs. Carter has not seen the meaning of Epictetus. The philosopher will discover the man's character by trying him, as the assayer tries the silver by a test.

Cicero (*De legibus*, i. 9) says that the face expresses the hidden character. Euripides (*Medea*, 518) says better, that no mark is impressed on the body by which we can distinguish the good man from the bad. Shakespeare says—

There's no art  
To find the mind's construction in the face.  
Macbeth, act i. sc. 4.

64 (p. 140). It is not clear what is meant by women being common by nature in any rational sense. Zeno and his school said (Diogenes Laertius, vii. ; Zeno, p. 195. London, 1664): "It is their opinion also that the women should be common among the wise, so that any man should use any woman, as Zeno says in his Polity, and Chrysippus in the book on Polity, and Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato ; and we shall love all the children equally like fathers, and the jealousy about adultery will be removed." These wise men knew little about human nature, if they taught such doctrines.

65 (p. 143). The word is *ἀπασσόν*, which was also used by the Romans. One threw the ball and the other caught it. Chrysippus used this simile of a ball in speaking of giving and receiving (Seneca, De Beneficiis, ii. 17). Martial has the word (Epig. iv. 19), "Five harpasta manu pulverulenta rapis"; and elsewhere.

66 (p. 143). In Plato's Apology, c. 15, Socrates addresses Meletus ; and he says, it would be equally absurd if a man should believe that there are foals of horses and asses, and should not believe that there are horses and asses. But Socrates says nothing of mules, for the word mules in some texts of the Apology is manifestly wrong.

67 (p. 148). Epictetus alludes to the verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Compare Antoninus (vii. 40) : "Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn : one man is born ; another dies." Cicero (Tuscul. Disp. iii. 25) has translated six verses from Euripides, and among them are these two :

tum vita omnibus  
Metenda ut fruges : sic jubet necessitas.

68 (p. 149). So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (*ad inferos*) is the same from all places (*Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 43*). What follows is one of the examples of extravagant assertion in Epictetus. A tyrant may kill by a slow death as a fever does. I suppose that Epictetus would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic the ways to death are not indifferent : some ways of dying are painful, and even he who can endure with fortitude would prefer an easy death.

69 (p. 151). Divination was a great part of ancient religion, and, as Epictetus says, it led men "to omit many duties." In a certain sense, there was some meaning in it. If it is true that those who believe in God can see certain signs in the administration of the world by which they can judge what their behaviour ought to be, they can learn what their duties are. If these signs are misunderstood, or if they are not seen right, men may be governed by an abject superstition. So the external forms of any religion may become the means of corruption and of human debasement, and the true indications of God's will may be neglected. Upton compares *Lucan (ix. 572)*, who sometimes said a few good things.

70 (p. 156). Mrs. Carter has a note here. "See *1 Cor. vi. 19, 2 Cor. vi. 16, 2 Tim. i. 14, 1 John iii. 24, iv. 12, 13*. But though the simple expression of carrying God about with us may seem to have some nearly parallel to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more venerable manner, as taking the hearts of good men for a temple to dwell in. But the other expressions here of feeding and exercising God, and the whole of the paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic system, show the real sense of

even its more decent phrases to be vastly different from that of Scripture."

The passage in 1 Cor. vi. 19 is, "What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God and ye are not your own?" This follows v. 18, which is an exhortation to "flee fornication." The passage in 2 Cor. vi. 16 is, "And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them," etc. Mrs. Carter has not correctly stated the sense of these two passages.

It is certain that Epictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles in the New Testament; but whence did these writers learn such forms of expression as we find in the passages cited by Mrs. Carter? I believe that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Epictetus, and that they applied them to the new religion which they were teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Epictetus does not differ: the spirit of God is in man.

Swedenborg says, "In these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the Lord resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being the Lord's mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees by these faculties; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior degrees of love and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and the Lord in him."—Swedenborg, *Angelic Wisdom*, 240. Again, "the faculty of thinking rationally, viewed in himself, is not man's, but God's in man."

I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist ought to be understood in the Church of England service. Some English divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of his body which was broken ; as we see in T. Burnet's posthumous work (*de Fide et Officiis Christianorum*, p. 80). It was a commemoration of the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. But this does not appear to be the sense in which the ceremony is now understood by some priests and by some members of the Church of England, whose notions approach near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the communicants, for the prayer is, "Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the flesh of thy dear son Jesus Christ, and to drink his blood, that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body, and our souls washed through his most precious blood, and that we may evermore dwell in him, and he in us." This is a different thing from Epictetus' notion of God being in man, and also different, as I understand it, from the notion contained in the two passages of Paul ; for it is there said generally that the Holy Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end of the Communion Service an admonition that the sacramental bread and wine remain what they were, "and that the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here ; it being against the truth of Christ's natural body to be at one time in more places than one." It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of

the English Church that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual presence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines; and yet in the Prayer Book we have the language that I have quoted; and even Calvin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, "that the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament we have 'true communion in Christ's body and blood'" (Contemporary Review, p. 464, August, 1874). What would Epictetus have thought of the subtleties of our days?

71 (p. 160). "The abuse of the faculties which are proper to man, called rationality and liberty, is the origin of evil. By rationality is meant the faculty of understanding truths and thence falses, and goods and thence evils; and by liberty is meant the faculty of thinking, willing, and acting freely—and these faculties distinguish man from beasts."—Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 264, and also 240. See Epictetus, ii. c. 8.

72 (p. 161). A conjunctive or complex (*συμπεπλεγμένοι*) axiom or lemma. Gellius (xvi. 8) gives an example: "P. Scipio, the son of Paulus, was both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was the colleague of L. Mummius in his censorship." Gellius adds, "In every conjunctive, if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true, the whole is said to be false." For the whole is proposed as true; therefore, if one part is false, the whole is not true. The disjunctive (*διεζευγμένοι*) is of this kind: "Pleasure is either bad or good, or neither good nor bad."

73 (p. 162). We often say a man learns a particular thing; and there are men who profess to teach certain things, such as a language, or an art; and they mean by teaching that the taught shall learn; and learning means

that they shall be able to do what they learn. He who teaches an art professes that the scholar shall be able to practise the art, the art of making shoes for example, or other useful things. There are men who profess to teach religion, and morality, and virtue generally. These men may tell us what they conceive to be religion, and morality, and virtue; and those who are said to be taught may know what their teachers have told them. But the learning of religion, and of morality, and of virtue, mean that the learner will do the acts of religion, and of morality, and of virtue; which is a very different thing from knowing what the acts of religion, of morality, and of virtue are. The teacher's teaching is in fact only made efficient by his example, by his doing that which he teaches.

74 (p. 163). "He is not a Stoic philosopher, who can only explain in a subtle and proper manner the Stoic principles; for the same person can explain the principles of Epicurus, of course for the purpose of refuting them, and perhaps he can explain them better than Epicurus himself. Consequently he might be at the same time a Stoic and an Epicurean; which is absurd."—Schweighaeuser. He means that the mere knowledge of Stoic opinions does not make a man a Stoic, or any other philosopher. A man must according to Stoic principles practise them in order to be a Stoic philosopher. So if we say that a man is a religious man, he must do the acts which his religion teaches; for it is by his acts only that we can know him to be a religious man. What he says and professes may be false; and no man knows except himself whether his words and professions are true. The uniformity, regularity, and consistency of his acts are evidence which cannot be mistaken.



75 (p. 163). It is possible that by Jews Epictetus means Christians, for Christians and Jews are evidently confounded by some writers, as the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book iv. c. 7, Epictetus gives the name of Galilaeans to the Jews. The term Galilaeans points to the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans, ii. 28), "For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly—but he is a Jew which is one inwardly," etc. His remarks (ii. 17-29) on the man "who is called a Jew, and rests in the law and makes his boast of God" may be compared with what Epictetus says of a man who is called a philosopher, and does not practise that which he professes.

76 (p. 165). This may appear extravagant; but it is possible to explain it, and even to assent to it. If a man believes that all is wisely arranged in the course of human events, he would not even try to resist that which he knows it is appointed for him to suffer; he would submit and he would endure. If Epictetus means that the man would actively promote the end or purpose which he foreknew, in order that his acts may be consistent with what he foreknows and with his duty, perhaps the philosopher's saying is too hard to deal with; and as it rests on an impossible assumption of foreknowledge, we may be here wiser than the philosophers, if we say no more about it. Compare Seneca, *de Provid.* c. 5.

77 (p. 168). Socrates. We must by no means then do an act of injustice. Crito. Certainly not. Socrates. Nor yet when you are wronged must you do wrong in return, as most people think, since you must in no way do an unjust act.—Plato, *Crito*, c. 10.

78 (p. 174). Socrates' notion of envy is stated by Xenophon (*Mem.* iii. 9, 8), to be this: "It is the pain

or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and such are the only envious persons." Bishop Butler gives a better definition ; at least, a more complete description of the thing. "Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any *other grief* in the natural passion, but only *that want* which is implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great *grief*. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the *particular means* of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is the same ; namely, that equality or superiority : and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end."--Sermons upon Human Nature, I.

In the next sentence I have omitted the words ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησιον. I see no sense in them ; and the text is plain without them.

79 (p. 184). Compare iii. 2. 4, iv. 8. 20. Antoninus (viii. 27) writes : "There are three relations [between thee and other things] : the one to the body which surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all ; and the third to those who live with thee." This is precise, true, and practical. Those who object to "the divine cause," may write in place of it "the nature and constitution of things" ; for there is a constitution of things, which the philosopher attempts to discover ; and for most practical purposes, it is immaterial whether we say

that it is of divine origin or has some other origin, or no origin can be discovered. The fact remains that a constitution of things exists; or, if that expression be not accepted, we may say that we conceive that it exists and we cannot help thinking so.

80 (p. 185). See i. 14. 13, ii. 8. 14. Socrates (Xen. Mem. i. 1. 19) said the same. That man should make himself like the gods is said also by Antoninus, x. 8. See Plato, De Legg. i. 4.—Upton.

When God is said to provide for all things, this is what the Greeks called *πρόνοια*, providence. (Epictetus, i. 16, iii. 17.) In the second of these passages there is a short answer to some objections made to Providence.

Epictetus could only know or believe what God is by the observation of phaenomena; and he could only know what he supposed to be God's providence by observing his administration of the world and all that happens in it. Among other works of God is man, who possesses certain intellectual powers which enable him to form a judgment of God's works, and a judgment of man himself. Man has or is supposed to have certain moral sentiments, or a capacity of acquiring them in some way. On the supposition that all man's powers are the gift of God, man's power of judging what happens in the world under God's providence is the gift of God; and if he should not be satisfied with God's administration, we have the conclusion that man, whose powers are from God, condemns that administration which is also from God. Thus God and man, who is God's work, are in opposition to one another.

If a man rejects the belief in a deity and in a providence, because of the contradictions and difficulties

involved in this belief or supposed to be involved in it, and if he finds the contradictions and difficulties such as he cannot reconcile with his moral sentiments and judgments, he will be consistent in rejecting the notion of a deity and of providence. But he must also consistently admit that his moral sentiments and judgments are his own, and that he cannot say how he acquired them, or how he has any of the corporeal or intellectual powers which he is daily using. By the hypothesis they are not from God. All then that a man can say is that he has such powers.

81 (p. 189). The word is ἀποκαρτερεῖν, which Cicero (Tusc. i. 34) renders "per inedia[m] vita[m] discedere." The words "I have resolved" are in Epictetus κέκρικα. Pliny (Epp. i. 12) says that Corellius Rufus, when he determined to end his great sufferings by starvation, made the same answer, κέκρικα, to the physician who offered him food.

82 (p. 195). "It is observable that this most practical of all the philosophers owns his endeavours met with little or no success among his scholars. The Apostles speak a very different language in their epistles to the first converts of Christianity; and the Acts of the Apostles, and all the monuments of the primitive ages, bear testimony to the reformation of manners produced by the Gospel. This difference of success might indeed justly be expected from the difference of the two systems."—Mrs. Carter. I have not quoted this note of Mrs. Carter because I think that it is true. We do not know what was the effect of the teaching of Epictetus, unless this passage informs us, if Mrs. Carter has drawn a right inference from it. The language of Paul to the Corinthians is not very different from that of Epictetus, and he speaks very un-

favourably of some of his Corinthian converts. We may allow that "a reformation of manners was produced by the Gospel" in many of the converts to Christianity, but there is no evidence that this reformation was produced in all; and there is evidence that it was not. The corruptions in the early Christian Church and in subsequent ages are a proof that the reforms made by the Gospel were neither universal nor permanent; and this is the result which our knowledge of human nature would lead us to expect.

83 (p. 199). "There are innumerable passages in St. Paul which, in reality, bear that noble testimony which Epictetus here requires in his imaginary character. Such are those in which he glories in tribulation; speaks with an heroic contempt of life, when set in competition with the performance of his duty; rejoices in bonds and imprisonments, and the view of his approaching martyrdom; and represents afflictions as a proof of God's love. See Acts xx. 23, 24; Rom. v. 3, viii. 38-39; 2 Tim. iv. 6."—Mrs. Carter.

84 (p. 202). "That Epictetus does not quite correctly compare the notion of what is wholesome to the human body with the preconceived notion (*anticipata notione*) of moral good and bad, will be apparent to those who have carefully inquired into the various origin and principles of our notions."—Schweighaeuser. Also see his note on *ἀνάρτων*.

85 (p. 216). "Speak to me," etc., may be supposed to be said to Epictetus, who has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians' learning. When he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the Odyssey, the first which occurs to him, and says, Listen. There is nothing to listen to, but it is as

good for the hearer as anything else. Then he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a philosopher. He is bantering the hearer: it makes no matter from what author I learned them; it is all the same. The real question is, have you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an opinion yourself?

86 (p. 219). "Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ," 1 John i. 3. The attentive reader will observe several passages besides those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity between Epictetus and the Scriptures; and will perceive from them, either that the Stoics had learnt a good deal of the Christian language, or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such strong expressions as we often find in Scripture and sometimes in the philosophers, especially Epictetus."—Mrs. Carter.

The word "fellowship" in the passage of John and of Epictetus is *κοινωνία*. See note 53, p. 281.

87 (p. 221). "Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. Sic omnia latere censebat in occulto, neque esse quidquam quod cerni aut intelligi possit. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adensatione adprobare."—Cicero, *Academ. Post.* 1. 12, *Diog. Laert.* ix. 90 of the Pyrrhonists.

88 (p. 222). Paul says, *Cor.* i. 15, 32: "If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." The words, "let us eat and drink," etc., are said to be a quotation from

the Thais of Menander. The meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection of the dead, why should I not enjoy the sensual pleasures of life only? This is not the doctrine of Epictetus, as we see in the text.

89 (p. 228). "This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you." Matthew xxi. 31.—Mrs. Carter.

To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston replied, "Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you?" When the Academic denied it, Ariston said, "Who made you blind? who stole your power of sight?" (Diog. Laert. vii. 163).—Upton.

90 (p. 233). "In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic principle that friendship is only possible between the good."—Schweighaeuser. He also says that there was another discourse by Epictetus on this subject, in which he expressed some of the opinions of Musonius Rufus (i. 1, note 12). Schweighaeuser draws this conclusion from certain words of Stobaeus; and he supposes that this dissertation of Epictetus was in one of the last four books of Epictetus' discourses by Arrian, which have been lost.

Cicero (de Amicit. c. 5) says "nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse," and c. 18.

91 (p. 236). Compare Euripides, Hecuba, v. 846, etc. :—

δεινόν γε θνητοῖς ὥς ἅπαντα συμπίπτει  
καὶ τὰς ἀνάγκας οἱ νόμοι διώρισαν,  
φίλους τιθείτε τοὺς γε πολεμιοτάτους  
ἐχθροὺς τε τοὺς πρὶν εὐμενεῖς ποιοῦμενοι.

92 (p. 237). "By 'self' is here meant the proper Good, or, as Solomon expresses it, Eccl. xii. 13, 'the whole of man.' The Stoic proves excellently the inconvenience of placing this in anything but a right choice (a right disposition and behaviour); but how it is the interest of each individual in every case to make that choice in preference to present pleasure and in defiance of present sufferings, appears only from the doctrine of a future recompense."—Mrs. Carter. Compare Cicero, De Fin. ii. 15, where he is speaking of Epicurus, and translates the words ἀποφαίνειν ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἄρα τὸ ἰνδοξον, "ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur Honestum quod est populari fama gloriosum (ἰνδοξον)." See Schweighaeuser's note.

93 (p. 239). ὅπου δόσις τοῦ καλοῦ. Lord Shaftesbury suggested δόσις καὶ λήψις τοῦ καλοῦ: which Upton approved, and he refers to ii. 9. 12, αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις. Schweighaeuser suggests διαδόσεις, which I have followed in the version. Schweighaeuser refers to i. 12. 6, i. 14. 9. The MSS. give no help.

94 (p. 241). The word for "spirit" is πνεῦμα, a vital spirit, an animal spirit, a nervous fluid, as Schweighaeuser explains it, or as Plutarch says (De Placit. Philosoph. iv. 15), "the spirit which has the power of vision, which permeates from the chief faculty of the mind to the pupil of the eye;" and in another passage of the same treatise (iv. 8), "the instruments of perception are said to be intelligent spirits (πνεύματα νοερά) which have a motion from the chief faculty of the mind to the organs."

95 (p. 243). Schweighaeuser has this note: "That which Epictetus names the προαιρετικὴ δύναμις and



afterwards frequently *προαίρεσις*, is generally translated by 'voluntas' (will); but it has a wider meaning than is generally given to the Latin word, and it comprehends the intellect with the will, and all the active power of the mind which we sometimes designate by the general name Reason."

96 (p. 244). On the Greek text of this paragraph Upton remarks that, "there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes."

97 (p. 244). The general reading is *καὶ προαίρετά*. Salmasius proposes *καὶ ἀπροαίρετα*, which Schweighaeuser says in a note that he accepts, and so he translates it in the Latin; but in his text he has *καὶ προαίρετά*.

98 (p. 248). The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace (Ep. i. 1. 16) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic principles,—

Nunc agilis fio et mensor civilibus undis,—

but this was only talk. The Stoic should discharge all the duties of a citizen, says Epictetus; he should even marry and beget children. But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty; and the continuance of the human race is secured by the natural love of the male and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, which the Roman censor Metellus gave to his fellow-citizens, that, as they could not live without women, they should make the best of this business of marriage (Gellius, i. 6).



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